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Abstract 
How does nuclear weapons acquisition affect a state’s foreign policies? Despite the importance 
of this question it remains decidedly under-studied. Most of the work to date is limited to stand-
alone inferences as to how nuclear weapons have, do and should affect foreign policies, with 
little in the way of organised and systematic investigation. Within this body of work two 
primary threads have emerged. The first draws on Kenneth Waltz’s theory defensive realism; 
a pillar in the neorealist tradition. By deploying Waltz’s vision of security-seeking states, 
observers argue that the security gains of nuclear weapons will relieve states of the need to 
compete for their survival in anarchy, allowing these nuclear-armed states to withdraw into a 
peaceful existence in the international status quo, pacifying their foreign policies. In more 
recent years a competing school of thought has emerged that aligns with defensive realism’s 
neorealist antipode: offensive realism. Arguing that states inherently seek hegemony, this 
scholarship asserts that, far from being content with security under a nuclear blanket, nuclear 
weapons acquisition will embolden states to engage in ‘expansive’ and ‘assertive’ foreign 
policies in further growing their power and international position. 
Neither of these optimistic or pessimistic views of the foreign policy implications of 
nuclear weapons acquisition represents a coherent research program, but rather a series of 
stand-alone inferences implicitly organised around competing neorealist premises. There has 
been no systematic attempt to formalise the underlying theories or test their respective 
explanatory powers. It is to this task that this study commits itself. 
By drawing on the competing neorealist theories of defensive and offensive realism to 
develop and test competing theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, this study aims to 
impose an epistemological framework on this emerging debate, determining which provides 
the best explanation of foreign policy behaviour following nuclear weapons acquisition. The 
core empirical work of this study comes in the form of three in-depth case studies of past and 
present nuclear-armed states (Pakistan, South Africa and Israel), with these findings 
supplemented by a statistical evaluation of foreign policy change subsequent to nuclear 
weapons acquisition across all nuclear-armed states. 
Overall, this study seeks to refine a systemic theory of nuclear weapons and foreign 
policy; that is, one that explains how the acquisition of nuclear weapons causes foreign policy 
outcomes by constraining state responses to the structural determinants of international 
behaviour – anarchy and self-help. Such a theory can provide both a basis for predicting the 
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foreign policy behaviour of future proliferators, as well as a theoretical foundation for further 
studies of nuclear weapons and foreign policy. An understanding as to how nuclear weapons 
acquisition affects states’ foreign policies is also an important input in developing policy 
responses to, and normative positions on nuclear proliferation, an issue likely to increase in 
relevance to contemporary policy makers as the technological barriers to nuclear weapons 
development break down, and as the decline of US unipolarity creates new opportunities and 
incentives for nuclear acquisition. If nuclear weapons acquisition pushes states toward 
‘aggressive’ and ‘expansive’ foreign policies (as per offensive realism), we would expect 
proliferation to attend with increasing regional instability, putting the neighbours of 
proliferators on notice and placing a higher premium on non-proliferation efforts. If nuclear 
weapons reduce aggressive behaviour (as per defensive realism), on the other hand, the 
opposite would be true. Neighbours of proliferative states should welcome nuclear weapons 
acquisition as a way of reducing the security-seeking expansion of the acquiring state, and the 
international community should exercise tolerance for a state’s decision to proliferate. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The research question and why it matters 
How do nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of states that acquire them? Will a state 
that acquires nuclear weapons withdraw into political quiescence, finding security under 
nuclear deterrence and avoiding continued costs of balance of power politics? Or will it take 
advantage of the strategic dividends of its nuclear capabilities to increasingly pursue power and 
unilateral advantage in a competitive international system? These are the central questions of 
this dissertation, questions that are of significant import for both policy practitioner and 
academic audiences. For practitioners, an understanding of the foreign policy implications of 
nuclear weapons acquisition is an essential input in developing policy responses to, and 
normative positions on nuclear proliferation. If nuclear weapons acquisition pushes states 
toward aggressive and expansive foreign policy, we would expect proliferation to attend with 
increasing regional instability, putting the neighbours of proliferators on notice and placing a 
higher premium on non-proliferation efforts. If nuclear weapons, on the other hand, reduce 
aggressive behaviour, the opposite would be true. Neighbours of proliferative states should 
welcome nuclear weapons acquisition as a way of reducing the security-seeking expansion of 
the acquiring state. The current non-proliferation regime enforced by the United Nations (UN) 
and United States (US) should be dismantled; classified information on nuclear technology 
should be made public; and, the risks of nuclear inadvertence notwithstanding,1 states should 
be empowered to make their own choices as to whether or not they acquire nuclear weapons.2 
Successfully adjudicating between these policy alternatives is only going to become 
more important as the extant barriers to nuclear proliferation break down and we are forced to 
confront contingencies of diffuse and diverse networks of regional nuclear powers outside of 
the familiar paradigm of Cold War bipolarity.3 The transfer of nuclear weapons know-how, 
whether through espionage or state-sanctioned transfers of civilian nuclear technologies with 
                                                 
1 On the risks of nuclear inadvertence, see Bradley A. Thayer, “The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A 
Review Essay,” Security Studies 3, no. 3 (1994); Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003). 
2 For examples of this debate playing out in the literature, see Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, 
India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2010); Mark S. Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy” (Ph.D Diss., 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016), 20 (note 2). 
3 Joshua Rovner, “After Proliferation: Deterrence Theory and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” in Strategy 
in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and 
James R. Homes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012); Paul Bracken, The Second 
Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times Books, 2012). 
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dual-use applications; the decline in the relative power of the US and thus its ability to enforce 
its non-proliferation preferences; and the progressive erosion of the normative strength of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) through regional nuclear breakouts 
such as North Korea portends a net increase in the number of nuclear-armed states in the 
foreseeable future. 
The effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on foreign policy is also an important point 
of inquiry for academic audiences. As put by Mark Bell, “How states use nuclear weapons… 
to achieve their goals in international politics is a fundamental question at the heart of scholarly 
debates about the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics and the broader 
meaning of the ‘nuclear revolution.’”4 Understanding how states’ foreign policy preferences 
change in the presence of nuclear weapons will enrich existing debates on the implications of 
nuclear proliferation for international outcomes, as well as providing a basis for producing 
theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy with greater theoretical specificity that build on 
the more/less aggressive framework. 
1.2 Structure of this study 
This study establishes rival hypotheses regarding the foreign policy effects of nuclear weapons 
acquisition and subjects them to empirical evaluation. These hypotheses are derived from the 
competing neorealist frameworks of offensive and defensive realism, with each theorising that 
nuclear weapons make states more or less aggressive, respectively. In an offensive realist 
framework, states inherently seek hegemony, and the new strategic options for competing for 
power afforded by nuclear weapons acquisition will embolden these underlying tendencies, 
leading to a net increase in foreign policy aggression. In a defensive realist framework, on the 
other hand, states seek only a peaceful existence in the status quo, and nuclear weapons 
acquisition will enable states to eschew further competition for power safe in the knowledge 
that any future external aggression will be stayed by nuclear deterrence, leading to a net 
decrease in foreign policy aggression. 
These rival hypotheses are tested through both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
First, I perform in-depth analysis of three past and present nuclear-armed states – Pakistan, 
South Africa and Israel – to determine which neorealist model best fits each case. For each 
case, four discrete foreign policy indicators are coded as demonstrating more aggression in the 
                                                 
4 Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 21. 
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nuclear era (consistent with the expectations of offensive realism), less aggression in the 
nuclear era (consistent with the expectations of defensive realism), or no change in foreign 
policy aggression in the nuclear era (the null hypothesis). The agreement scores for each 
hypothesis across these 12 data points are then calculated and compared to determine which 
does the best job of explaining the foreign policy implications of nuclear weapons acquisition 
across the three cases. This in-depth approach to adjudicating between the hypotheses is 
supplemented by a statistical exercise that measures change in foreign policy aggression across 
two foreign policy indicators for every state to have acquired nuclear weapons (n = 9). 
Agreement scores for offensive realism, defensive realism and the null hypothesis are 
calculated again based on these 18 quantitative data points to triangulate the in-depth case study 
results and determine which hypothesis, overall, does the best job of explaining the foreign 
policy implications of nuclear weapons acquisition. 
In terms of sequencing: chapter 2 establishes the theoretical and methodological 
framework of this study, deriving the two rival hypotheses and advancing a mixed 
methodology for their evaluation. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 evaluate the hypotheses through in-depth 
case analysis. Chapter 6 engages in large(r)-N quantitative analysis. And chapter 7 synthesises 
the outcomes, assesses which theory performs best in explaining the foreign policy implications 
of nuclear weapons acquisition, identifies the implications of this study for academic and 
practitioner audiences, and suggests some areas for further research. 
Overall, this study will argue that offensive realism slightly outperforms defensive realism 
as an explanation of the foreign policy behaviour of nuclear-armed states, suggesting that, as 
new states enter the nuclear club, regional instability and zero-sum political disputes will 
become increasingly common. 
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2 Nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
The study of foreign policy is concerned with understanding how and why states behave as 
they do. Theories of foreign policy propose determinants of state behaviour, and, in doing so, 
provide a basis for predicting how states will respond at the international level to changes in 
their internal and external environments. In this chapter, I formalise competing theories of 
foreign policy with respect to nuclear weapons acquisition from the neorealist literature, and 
establish a methodological framework for their empirical evaluation. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the existing literature on the relationship between 
nuclear weapons and state behaviour, and identifies a gap with respect to how the constraints 
of the international system determine foreign policy behaviour in the context of nuclear 
weapons acquisition. Drawing from the competing neorealist theories of offensive and 
defensive realism, this chapter then derives competing theories of nuclear weapons and foreign 
policy that variously predict more or less foreign policy aggression consequent to nuclear 
weapons acquisition, respectively. A case study methodology for the empirical evaluation of 
these theories is then established. 
2.1 Literature review 
The international implications of nuclear proliferation is a well-serviced field in the academic 
literature. Though whilst many studies have focussed on the effects of nuclear weapons on the 
calculations of other states,5 or on international outcomes other than foreign policy – such as 
                                                 
5 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security 15, no. 1 (1990); Matthew Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential 
Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Managing the Atom Working Paper Series (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Kennedy School, 2009); Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May 
Better,” in Adelphi Papers (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Richard K. 
Betts, “Nuclear Peace and Conventional War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (1988); Keir A. 
Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International 
Security,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000); Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal, “Nuclear 
Weapons as Shields,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 3 (2009); Keith B. Payne, “On 
Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, no. 1 (2009); Stephen Van Evera, 
“Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 3 (1990): 12-14. See 
also Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 35-36. 
Christopher J. Watterson 
16 
 
crisis outcomes,6 the occurrence or non-occurrence of militarised conflict,7 or further nuclear 
proliferation8 – relatively few have examined the effects of nuclear weapons on the foreign 
policies of the states that acquire them. Instead, the academic commentary on this issue is 
limited to casual observations as to how nuclear weapons have, do and should affect foreign 
policies, with little in the way of organised and systematic examinations. 
Within this body of casual observations two primary threads have emerged. The first 
draws on Kenneth Waltz’s theory of defensive realism; a pillar in the neorealist tradition. By 
deploying Waltz’s vision of security-seeking states, observers argue that the security gains of 
nuclear weapons will have a pacifying effect on the foreign policies of those that acquire them. 
Van Evera summarised the position neatly: 
The nuclear revolution has dampened security motives for expansion… Before 1945, states 
sought to redress insecurity by territorial expansion and preventive war. The nuclear 
revolution has given states the option of achieving security without resort to war, by 
peacefully acquiring superior defensive weapons. As a result of this increased security, 
competition for security will be muted in the new Europe; arguments for preemptive and 
                                                 
6 Susan G. Sample, “Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (1998); Susan G. Sample, “The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor 
States Vs. Major Powers,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6 (2002); Victor Asal and Kyle 
Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 
(2016); Jacek Kugler, “Terror without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 3 (1984); Ward Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 66-86. 
7 Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998); John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability 
in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10, no. 4 (1986); Marc Trachtenberg, 
“The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 
(1985); David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster, and Samuel B. Robison, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect 
of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 
(2012); Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller, “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on 
Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 1 (2013); Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”; Betts, 
“Nuclear Peace and Conventional War”; Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A 
Comment,” International Security 13, no. 2 (1988); Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. 
Hutchison, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of 
Rivalry,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 2 (2016); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. 
Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982); Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A 
Quantitative Approach,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009); Christopher J. Watterson, 
“Competing Interpretations of the Stability–Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War,” The 
Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 1-2 (2017); Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, 87-103. 
See also Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 34 (note 6). 
8 C. Hobbs and M. Moran, Exploring Regional Responses to a Nuclear Iran: Nuclear Dominoes? 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); Nicholas L. Miller, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating 
Prophecy?,” Security Studies 23, no. 1 (2014); Philipp C. Bleek, “Does Proliferation Beget 
Proliferation? Why Nuclear Dominoes Rarely Fall” (Ph.D Diss., Georgetown University, 2010); 
Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” Asia Policy 3, no. 1 (2007). 
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preventive war will be less common; diplomacy will be conducted with less reckless search 
for unilateral advantage; and foreign and security policies will be relatively open.9 
In short, if states only seek the bare necessities of survival, and if nuclear weapons 
acquisition meets those needs, the state is “secure and, therefore, concerned only with 
maintaining its relative position, not with an expansion that would add costs with no concurrent 
increase in security.”10 A number of observers have pointed, in particular, to the redundancy 
of territorial conquest for nuclear-armed states, arguing that the traditional security-based 
rationales for territorial aggrandisement such as enhanced defence in depth and productive 
capacity are absent when a state is protected by a nuclear deterrent: 
the deterrent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country’s security than 
does conquest of territory. A country with a deterrent strategy does not need the extent of 
territory required by a country relying on a conventional defence in depth. A deterrent 
strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and 
this removes a major cause of war.11 
Nuclear weapons devalue traditional concerns over geographic depth; in other words, buffer 
zones and distant bases are less important in a nuclear world because nuclear retaliation can 
be assured in their absence.12 
[Nuclear weapons] do not facilitate conquest in the least and, therefore, do not encourage 
taking to the offense especially since the security of a state that has a secure second-strike 
force is not enhanced by holding greater territory.13 
Similar arguments have been made regarding preventative and pre-emptive wars. If a 
state is protected from military aggression due to its possession of a nuclear deterrent, there is 
no longer any reason to pre-empt external aggression with the initiation of such conflicts: 
if national security is provided by one’s capability to destroy the opponent, not by the 
possession of a more effective military machine than the other side, then the force that drives 
the security dilemma is sapped.14 
                                                 
9 Van Evera, “Primed for Peace,” 9, 13. See also Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Realist Case against 
Nuclear Disarmament,” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 2 (2010): 173; Scott Sagan, Kenneth Waltz, and 
Richard K. Betts, “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?,” Journal of 
International Affairs 60, no. 2 (2007): 137. 
10 Krieger Zanvyl and Ariel Ilan Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” International 
Studies Review 9, no. 3 (2007): 371. 
11 Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 5-6. 
12 Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace,” 100-01. 
13 Waltz and Sagan summarised in Zanvyl and Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” 374. 
See also Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” 
Security Studies 4, no. 4 (1995): 738; Benjamin Frankel, “An Anxious Decade: Nuclear Proliferation 
in the 1990s,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (1990): 8-9; Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons.” 
14 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 
(1979): 618. 
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the robust security provided by nuclear weapons virtually eliminates fears that might lead status 
quo states to launch preventive or preemptive wars.15 
Such suppositions have been marshalled in advancing arguments for selective proliferation to 
other states such as Ukraine,16 Japan,17 Iran,18 North Korea,19 Germany, Pakistan and India.20 
Germany in particular, as the historically ‘dissatisfied state’, has been the subject of sustained 
nuclear advocacy on the expectation of a peaceful shift in its foreign policy: 
If Germany again faces a serious threat from without, it will not need to reach for more 
defensible borders or for wider territories to provide economic autarky, as it once did; now it 
can secure itself by building a nuclear deterrent … a secure Germany is a more benign 
Germany.21 
Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Germany’s great conventional 
strength gives it significant capacity to disturb Europe if it feels insecure.22 
Taken together, these arguments predict that nuclear weapons acquisition will result in reduced 
insecurity leading to a peaceful shift in the acquiring state’s foreign policy, characterised by 
the eschewal of militarised conflict and the non-pursuit of unilateral advantage. 
In more recent years a competing school of thought has emerged that aligns with 
defensive realism’s neorealist antipode: offensive realism. Arguing that states inherently seek 
hegemony, this scholarship asserts that, far from being content with security under a nuclear 
blanket, nuclear weapons acquisition will encourage states to engage in ‘expansive’ and 
‘assertive’ foreign policies. Gartzke and Jo, for example, in a study into the effects of nuclear 
proliferation on the incidence of interstate disputes, attribute the empirical absence of nuclear 
deterrence between nuclear-armed states to those states expanding their interests in the 
international system: 
Nuclear nations may be converting some or all of the conflict-diminishing effects of 
deterrence into bigger demands on other nations or may be “trading” security for influence. 
                                                 
15 Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace,” 97. 
16 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 
(1993). 
17 Wentz 1968 cited in Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, “Nuclear Proliferation and the 
Probability of Nuclear War,” Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 257 (note 4). 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” 
Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012). 
19 Zanvyl and Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” 382-83. 
20 Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South 
Asia,” (Washington D.C.: The Stimson Center, 2004); Wentz 1968 in Hagerty, The Consequences of 
Nuclear Proliferation, 14-15. 
21 Van Evera, “Primed for Peace,” 42-43. 
22 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 38. 
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Nations protected by a nuclear umbrella may be more assertive, in turn diminishing the 
observable deterrent effect of nuclear capabilities.23 
Similarly, Bell and Miller speculate that an observed increase in low-level militarised conflicts 
in asymmetric nuclear dyads is due to “nuclear-armed states expand[ing] their interests”.24 
Neither these optimistic or pessimistic views of the foreign policy implications of 
nuclear weapons acquisition is a coherent research program, but rather a series of casual 
observations wittingly or unwittingly organised around competing neorealist premises. There 
has been no systematic attempt to formalise the underlying theories or test their respective 
explanatory powers. This presents an opportunity for study. By drawing on the competing 
neorealist theories of defensive and offensive realism to develop and test competing theories 
of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, one can impose an epistemological framework on this 
emerging debate to determine which of these theories provides the most accurate explanation 
of foreign policy behaviour following nuclear weapons acquisition. 
2.1.1 Levels of analysis 
Beyond the abovementioned neorealist deductions there have, to the author’s knowledge, been 
three organised and systematic efforts to establish and test theories of nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy. The first is S. Paul Kapur’s book Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, published in 2007, which draws on the case of the 
Indo-Pakistani Kashmir conflict to argue that “the acquisition of nuclear weapons can 
encourage a conventionally weak, revisionist state to challenge the territorial status quo through 
aggressive conventional behavior.”25 The second came in September 2016 with the publication 
of a Ph.D dissertation titled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy by Mark S. Bell. This 
dissertation argues that nuclear weapons acquisition can lead to six conceptually distinct and 
observable foreign policy behaviours, with observance or non-observance of these behaviours 
contingent upon three variables: “the existence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, 
the presence of senior allies, and the state’s power trajectory”.26 The third is Michael Cohen’s 
                                                 
23 Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 221. See also Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, 
“Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984). 
24 Bell and Miller, “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” 1. See also Robert 
Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” 
International Security 27, no. 4 (2003). 
25 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 32. 
26 Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 3. 
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2017 book titled When Proliferation Causes Peace, which argues that nuclear-armed states will 
either “authorize assertive foreign policies that cause conflict and nuclear crises” or “restrained 
foreign policies toward their primary adversaries and often to other states” based on the extent 
to which they have experienced “fear of imminent nuclear war” through involvement in nuclear 
crises.27 
These three works differ from the earlier mentioned neorealist deductions in that they 
rely on the individual properties of states such as conventional military strength, the presence 
of territorial threats, and involvement in nuclear crises to predict foreign policy outcomes 
consequent to nuclear weapons acquisition, rather than the underlying structural determinants 
of foreign policy behaviour. This is an important distinction that bears elaboration. 
Scholars of international relations theorise causal relationships between independent 
and dependent variables within various political contexts, ranging from the international 
system, down to the levels of states, bureaucratic decision-making organisations, and 
individual policy-makers. One can attribute international outcomes such as war, peace, 
alliances and foreign policies to causal relationships that manifest at one or many of these 
‘levels of analysis’. Theorising at the ‘systemic’, or ‘structural’ level of analysis asks how the 
inherent qualities of the international system – anarchy and self-help – determine international 
outcomes. One step below the systemic level is the ‘national’, or ‘unit’ level, in which one 
theorises how the unique qualities of states determine international outcomes. For example, 
one could explain the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea (an international outcome) through 
systemic factors, such as the uncertainty of anarchy motivating one polity (Russia) to seek 
unilateral advantage over another (the NATO block), specifically by gaining a geostrategic 
edge in the Black Sea. Alternatively, one could attribute this outcome to unit-level factors, such 
as the Russian nation’s irredentist ambitions emergent from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Neither of these explanations is necessarily superior to the other; for each the causal work 
simply occurs at different levels of abstraction vis-à-vis the dependent variable.28 
The theories of foreign policy advanced by Bell, Kapur and Cohen operate at the unit-
level of analysis. That is, the theorised determinants of foreign policies, such as conventional 
                                                 
27 Michael Cohen, When Proliferation Causes Peace (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2017), 206. 
28 J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14, no. 
01 (2011); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 15-7. 
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military strength and experience in nuclear crises, are the properties of individual states, and 
not the international system. Such unit-level theories operate with certain assumptions as to the 
other levels of analysis. They assume, for example, that individual policy makers will always 
respond to these unit-level factors in the same, predictable fashion. They also assume that the 
international system constrains state behaviour in a manner consistent with their theory. 
Kapur’s theory that weak, revisionist nuclear-armed states engage in military expansion, for 
example, presumes that the inherent qualities of the international system in which those states 
operate (anarchy and self-help) will be permissive to military expansion in the first place. 
Neorealism, and specifically offensive and defensive realism, on the other hand, 
theorise causality at the systemic level of analysis. That is, they make diverging assessments 
as to how the self-help and anarchic nature of the international system determine international 
outcomes. Given my stated ambition to formalise and test the inchoate neorealist theories of 
nuclear weapons and foreign policy present in the literature, I locate my theorising within this 
level of analysis. Whilst a systemic theory of foreign policy cannot claim the theoretical 
precision of lower level theories (such as those of Bell, Kapur and Cohen), given that such 
theories are built on assumptions as to the structural incentives that shape international 
outcomes, a systemic approach provides the necessary foundation upon which such lower-level 
explanations – i.e. at national, organisational and individual levels of analysis – can be built: 
what Zakaria refers to as a ‘first-cut theory’.29 Therefore, my proposed systemic study should 
be considered a basis, rather than an alternative to those theories of nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy advanced by Bell, Kapur and Cohen, and no doubt many more in the future. To 
demonstrate this stratified theoretical relationship, I take a moment to synthesise the outcomes 
of Bell’s 2016 study with the objectives of my proposed study. 
Bell advances a universal theory of nuclear weapons and foreign policy – that is, one 
that is applicable to all past, present and future nuclear-armed states.30 The theory, labelled 
‘nuclear opportunism’, argues that nuclear weapons cause combinations of six conceptually 
                                                 
29 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 13-43; David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in 
International Relations”; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, 
“Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in 
Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore 
K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 41-43. See also Jakob Gustavsson, “How 
Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?,” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 1 (1999). 
30 Cohen’s is also universal. Kapur’s related only to weak, revisionist states. 
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distinct foreign policy behaviours (‘aggression’, ‘expansion’, ‘independence’, ‘bolstering’, 
‘steadfastness’ and ‘compromise’) by lowering the associated costs of these behaviours.31 
Though the costs to engage in all six behaviours are lesser than they would have been absent 
nuclear weapons, a nuclear-armed state will find particular combinations of behaviours 
‘attractive’ based on its prevailing security environment as determined by three unit-level 
variables: “the existence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of senior 
allies, and the state’s power trajectory”.32 
By emphasising the role of the proliferating state’s strategic environment in 
determining foreign policy outcomes, Bell makes certain assumptions regarding the underlying 
preferences of states, specifically that states are driven to “improve their position in 
international politics” and “gain the maximum benefit from their nuclear weapons.”33 It is this 
assumption that animates Bell’s causal logic. Bell assumes that a state’s willingness to engage 
in any one of the six politically ‘opportunistic’ foreign policy behaviours is limited only by 
costs. Therefore, by nuclear weapons reducing the costs of these behaviours, one would 
logically expect these behaviours to be more frequent.34 If, however, we propose that a state’s 
underlying preferences (as dictated by the international system) might be to avoid ‘improving 
their position’ in favour of, say, conforming to the status quo (as per defensive realism), then 
the causal logic of nuclear opportunism is sapped: states will not want to engage in such 
opportunistic foreign policy behaviours, regardless of how cost-effective they are. Essentially, 
though not explicitly, Bell has adopted an assumption of state preferences consistent with 
offensive realism: states always seek expansion.35 
My study stands to validate or invalidate that assumption by testing the explanatory 
powers of offensive and defensive realism within the context of nuclear weapons acquisition. 
The observation that states continue to seek expansion after having acquired nuclear weapons 
                                                 
31 Though he does not present this as a determinant claim: “I do not assume that the expected costs of 
engaging in each of these behaviors will always be reduced by nuclear acquisition. Nonetheless, … 
nuclear weapons can reduce the cost of each of these behaviors.” Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy,” 38 (emphasis original). 
32 Ibid., 3. Bell’s overall theoretical framework is laid out in ibid., 31-92. 
33 Ibid., 32, 42, 65-70. 
34 Ibid., 38-9, 56-7. 
35 Ibid., 41-42. He even contrasts his view of state preferences with that of defensive realism: “For 
defensive realists, states are inherently security-seeking and most aggressive state behaviors emerges 
from perceived or actual insecurity. … By contrast, the theory of nuclear opportunism views states as 
more ambitious actors that seek to gain strategic benefits that they can [sic] from possessing nuclear 
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would support Bell’s theoretical premise, whereas the observation of non-expansion after 
nuclear weapons acquisition would critically challenge it. It is on this basis that my study 
provides a ‘first-cut theory’ of nuclear weapons and foreign policy: it infers state preferences 
consistent with nuclear weapons acquisition, a premise upon which theories of foreign policy 
behaviours at lower levels of analysis can be developed. 
2.2 Theory building 
2.2.1 Foreign policy as a dependent variable 
The study of foreign policy is principally concerned with understanding the causes of state 
behaviour. In simple terms, “a theory of foreign policy explains why different states, or the 
same state at different historical moments, have different intentions, goals, and preferences 
toward the outside world.”36 In conceptualising ‘foreign policy’ as an object of analysis, Cohen 
and Harris described as a minimum consensus definition “a set of goals, directives or 
intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor 
or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting 
the target in the manner desired by the policy-makers”.37 This definition introduces two core 
stipulations which this study adopts as the conceptual foundation of foreign policy: (1) it must 
be the deliberative and determined product of the national officialdom; and (2) it must be 
designed to influence international outcomes.  
Cohen and Harris’s description of foreign policy as inclusive of state preferences 
(“goals” and “intentions”), however, introduces some ambiguity with respect to the two core 
stipulations. Specifically, to what extent can one view a state’s preferences as of the purpose 
of influencing international outcomes given that preferences lack agency and must therefore 
be operationalised in order to exert such influence? To be sure, a state’s preferences are the 
primary determinant of that state’s behaviour, however there is a layer of operational 
abstraction that separates the two. Hermann seemingly resolved this conundrum by narrowing 
the definitional scope of foreign policy to “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program”,38 
thereby emphasising foreign policy’s operational dimension. By this definition a state’s 
preferences only become policy once they’re implemented. For example, State A’s preference 
                                                 
36 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 14. 
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for conquering State B is an abstraction of State A’s foreign policy of war against State B. The 
preference for conquest had to filter through a layer of bureaucratic decision-making before it 
was operationalised as policy. This definition removes the issue of needing to distinguish 
conceptually between foreign policy preferences and actions, and provides a realistic 
framework for measurement and analysis, which this study adopts. 
As I discuss in section 2.1.1, I locate my theorising within the systemic level of analysis. 
That is, this study theorises how the structural determinants of foreign policy (self-help and 
anarchy) cause foreign policy outcomes in the presence of nuclear weapons. Before 
proceeding, I note that there is some opposition in the literature to developing theories of 
foreign policy within the systemic level of analysis. Waltz himself has argued that neorealism 
is not a suitable basis for theorising with respect to foreign policy because, as paraphrased by 
Elman, “unit-level influences will interfere to make systemically derived behavioral 
predictions inaccurate”.39 Elman also, however, raises several points as to why, despite an 
inescapable confounding effect of ‘unit-level influences’, neorealism can produce theories of 
foreign policy that are generally useful.40 Firstly, there will be cases in which structural 
determinants exert primary influence on foreign policy behaviour, thereby diminishing the 
relative explanatory value of unit-level variables and justifying a systemic approach to 
theorising. Waltz himself acknowledges this: 
to the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the 
outcomes of their behavior becomes predictable. … some successful predictions can be made 
without paying attention to states. … Predictions can be made when we can answer this 
question with some confidence: How would we expect any state so placed to act?41 
Secondly, if one accepts a degree of theoretical imprecision (not at all uncommon in the social 
and political sciences), one can still generate probabilistic theories of value. Even if a systemic 
theory of foreign policy does not perform perfectly, knowing that it predominates in, say, 80% 
of cases is still a useful insight from a policy and academic perspective. 
Accepting the general utility of international systemic theories of foreign policy, I now 
derive competing systemic theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy within the neorealist 
                                                 
39 Colin Elman, “Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz,” Security Studies 6, 
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traditions of offensive and defensive realism.42 As models that exist within the broader realist 
tradition, both offensive and defensive realism are concerned primarily with the relationships 
between power, security and international outcomes. Thus, to formulate theories of nuclear 
weapons and foreign policy within these frameworks, we must first have a firm understanding 
of these relationships. 
2.2.2 Power, security and foreign policy 
In a realist framework power is the base currency of international relations. In defining power 
this study draws from the concept of ‘relational power’, which David Baldwin describes as a 
“dominant tradition” in power analysis in international relations.43 ‘Relational power’ is 
conceived as “a relationship in which the behavior of actor A at least partially causes a change 
in the behavior of actor B.”44 Units of power can be seen as degrees of influence that State A 
is able to exercise over State B; the more able State A is to alter the behaviour of State B, the 
more powerful its relational power with respect to State B. In this framework a state’s power 
varies across a number of dimensions: the scope of State B’s behaviour influenced by State A 
(scope); the number and relative power of State Bs that State A can influence (domain); the 
probability that State B will change its behaviour as intended by State A (weight); the relative 
cost that State A incurs to influence State B (costs); and the means through which State A’s 
influence is exercised – diplomatically, militarily, economically and so on (means).45 Within 
this conceptual framework power assumes two properties: it is both dyadic and zero-sum. It is 
dyadic in that State A’s power is conceived with respect to a State B or a cluster of State Bs. 
And it is zero-sum in that, as State A’s power grows, State B’s power declines, and vice versa. 
That is, as State A increases its influence over State B’s behaviour, State B loses its own 
influence (or agency) over that behaviour, and therefore has a diminished influence over 
international outcomes emergent from that behaviour. 
As a zero-sum resource, power can only be acquired competitively. I label such 
competition for power as ‘aggression’. States harness their national capabilities – military, 
                                                 
42 Portions of this general approach to theorising were adapted from Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 
On this point I also acknowledge Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” Though the majority 
of my theoretical and conceptual work was completed prior to my reading of this dissertation, it did 
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economic, diplomatic and so on – to shape new political realities in which they possess a greater 
share of power (or influence) than they had previously, i.e. redistribute power in their favour. 
The manner in which states so mobilise and deploy their capabilities is formalised in foreign 
policy. In short, aggressive foreign policy leads to power gains. Take, for example, the US’s 
Cold War strategy of Soviet containment. Through a panoply of foreign policies, including 
increasing trade and military deployments in Europe and East Asia, political and military 
alliances in Europe and the Middle East, proxy wars in Africa, and aid to third world states, the 
US sought to limit the expansion of Soviet influence globally, thereby increasing its own ability 
to influence international outcomes and ultimately facilitate the implosion of the Soviet 
political system.46 Each was an example of US foreign policy aggression toward the Soviet 
Union, designed to increase its own share of power to the detriment of the Soviets. 
The accumulation of power is not, in and of itself, an end of states. Instead, states seek 
power as a means to the ultimate end of ‘security’. In defining security, I rely on Wolfers’ 
characterisation first advanced in 1952, which Baldwin describes as seeming “to capture the 
basic intuitive notion underlying most uses of the term security”;47 that being “the absence of 
threats to acquired values”.48 For all states ‘survival’ (a state’s existence in the international 
system) is the foremost ‘acquired value’ that they seek to secure. Below the level of survival 
individual states will differ in the values that they possess, as well as the relative import that 
they assign to securing these values. Other common values include territorial integrity, political 
autonomy, economic wellbeing etc.49 It is through the competition for power (seeking to 
increase one’s own share of power at the expense of another) that states seek security. Power 
grants a state the ability to influence the behaviour of other states away from posing a threat to 
the former’s acquired values. 
Within the neorealist literature key theoretical differences emerge regarding the manner 
in which states pursue security in a competitive international system. Two chief schools of 
thought vying for theoretical supremacy in this sense are those of defensive and offensive 
realism, championed by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, respectively. Defensive 
realism posits that a state will seek only a certain amount of power in pursuit of security; this 
                                                 
46 On US containment policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal 
of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxon: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
47 David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 (2001): 13. 
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amount located somewhere between total vulnerability (no power) and hegemony (complete 
power). Possessing too little power makes a state insecure by “[inviting] an attack that greater 
strength would have dissuaded an adversary from launching”, whereas possessing too much 
power makes a state insecure by “[prompting] other states to increase their arms and pool their 
efforts against the dominant state.”50 Thus there is a theoretical power-level ‘sweet spot’ at 
which security is maximised. In establishing exactly how much power is required to achieve 
peak security, Schweller states that “Waltz’s use of the term security implies… the minimum 
power needed to assure the state’s survival.”51 A state will rationally seek only enough power 
to remove threats to its uppermost ‘acquired value’ – survival – whilst rationally avoiding the 
balancing risks associated with further power gains.52 
Offensive realism, on the other hand, rejects the defensive realist premise that balancing 
constrains power gains. Mearsheimer argues that balancing tends to be slow and inefficient,53 
and is often rejected as a strategy in favour of ‘buck-passing’: eschewing balancing 
commitments in the hope that other states will bear the cost of containing the rising power.54 
Absent the risk that balancing coalitions will emerge in response to rising powers, offensive 
realist states are free to pursue maximum power unencumbered. Tough questions such as ‘what 
are the threats to my survival worth fighting for?’ and ‘how much security is enough?’ become 
redundant. It is safer to hedge all bets by acquiring as much power as possible: “When all states 
have capabilities for doing each other harm, each is driven to amass as much power as it can to 
be as secure as possible against attack.”55 An offensive realist state will therefore pursue power 
to the maximum extent that its capabilities allow: “A great power that has a marked power 
advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has the capability as 
well as the incentive to do so.”56 The prospect of a state being ‘perfectly secure’ and thus 
eschewing further power gains is only realised when the state reaches a position of unassailable 
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power (hegemony) which is exceedingly rare in a competitive international system. That’s not 
to say that all states are expanding all the time. Mearsheimer emphasises that individual acts 
of competing for power remain subject to rational assessments of costs and benefits. States, he 
says, “are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into 
losing wars… If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more 
propitious moment.”57 Thus states may wax and wane between the pursuit and non-pursuit of 
power empirically, however the underlying impetus to maximise power is a constant in the 
minds of policy-makers. 
Thus, the ultimate end of offensive realist states, as with defensive realist states, is 
security. The difference is that, absent any balancing constraints on acquiring power, offensive 
realist states are less inclined to discriminate as to how units of power fulfil their specific 
security needs. They simply acquire as much power as they can on the assumption that it all 
gets them closer to a position of hegemony in which their security is invulnerable: “great 
powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus 
eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power.”58 In short, offensive realist 
states seek security through maximum power; defensive realist states through optimum power. 
2.2.3 Nuclear weapons as an independent variable 
How, then, within these theoretical frameworks, do nuclear weapons affect foreign policy 
outcomes? 
Nuclear weapons are military ordnances that utilise the unique qualities of nuclear 
fission chain reactions (atomic weapons) or nuclear fusion (thermonuclear weapons) to 
generate explosive power. The most rudimentary designs of nuclear weapons generally range 
in the explosive yield of 10-20 kilotons (kT; thousands of tons of TNT equivalent), though they 
can be refined to achieve reduced or greatly enhanced yields (sub-kiloton to megaton). The 
detonation of a nuclear weapon causes damage through four principal mechanisms: an initial 
blast of gamma radiation (initial nuclear radiation) that damages electronic materiel and causes 
radiation sickness in exposed humans; a wave of thermal radiation that is capable of starting 
fires and burning skin; a blast wave orders of magnitude more energetic than the most powerful 
conventional explosives; and radioactive fallout that irradiates the surrounding environment.59 
                                                 
57 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 37. 
58 Ibid., 35. 
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It is the immense destructive potential of such weapons that gives them their unique, almost 
mystical military, political and symbolic power. Even a single, rudimentary device can 
decimate a city. 
Nuclear weapons were initially developed as tools for strategic bombing campaigns, 
such as their use by the US against Imperial Japan at the close of World War 2. Upon the Soviet 
acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities in the early 1950s and subsequent nuclear 
symmetry between the US and USSR, the primary function of nuclear weapons shifted to one 
of deterrence. Nuclear-armed states would utilise nuclear weapons to ward off military attacks 
on their homelands through the threat of inflicting ‘unacceptable’ damage upon the aggressor 
in retaliation. As the Cold War progressed, however, it became clear that nuclear deterrence 
could not preclude any and all political conflict. Nuclear-armed states continued to face 
disputes on the margins of their political interests, where the costs of using nuclear weapons 
outweighed the benefits.60 For example, Argentina invaded the Falklands, Russia and China 
clashed over the Ussuri River, and China backed the Viet Cong against the US. Instead, nuclear 
deterrence has proven most effective at the level of a state’s vital interests – i.e. in matters of 
state survival. Logically states are unlikely to challenge a nuclear-armed state’s vital interests 
for fear that the nuclear-armed state, under siege and with nothing to lose, will launch a nuclear 
attack on the aggressor and inflict unacceptable damage. Such a logical deduction is backed up 
empirically, as put by Waltz: “If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily 
in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, 
over a period of more than fifty years.”61 
Let us utilise this as our theoretical point of departure: nuclear weapons prevent external 
attacks on a state’s vital interests, including survival (the most vital interest). In defensive 
realism, states seek only enough power to ensure their survival in anarchy. Once that ideal is 
reached, they cease competing for further power through foreign policy aggression so as to 
avoid the costs of balancing. Given that nuclear weapons guarantee a state’s survival in 
anarchy, we would therefore expect a defensive realist state armed with nuclear weapons to 
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eschew further aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, according to defensive realist theory, 
nuclear weapons acquisition reduces foreign policy aggression (HDR). 
For an offensive realist state, survival is not enough; it demands hegemony. Therefore, 
an offensive realist state will continue to compete for power through aggressive foreign policy 
even after acquiring the security dividends of nuclear weapons. Indeed, they are likely to scale 
up such aggressive foreign policy relative to their newly acquired nuclear weapons capabilities. 
That is, nuclear weapons increase a state’s ability to compete for power through new forms of 
foreign policy aggression (for example nuclear threats and coercion), and given that a state is 
driven to maximally utilise its capabilities in the pursuit of hegemony, we will see an increase 
in foreign policy aggression commensurate with those new nuclear capabilities. Therefore, in 
an offensive realist framework, nuclear weapons acquisition increases foreign policy 
aggression (HOR). The null hypothesis (H0) is therefore that nuclear weapons acquisition 
causes no change in foreign policy aggression. 
Summing up, this study asks whether nuclear weapons acquisition makes states more or 
less aggressive in their foreign policies. Before proceeding, it is perhaps useful to also 
emphasise what this study does not do. Firstly. this study does not ask why states acquire 
nuclear weapons. Rather, it examines the implications of acquisition, and remains agnostic 
about the underlying reasons for acquisition. In a neorealist framework, state behaviour is 
exclusively a function of power and security. The act of acquisition (and attendant gains in 
power and security) will theoretically cause an observable discontinuity in foreign policy 
behaviour (toward more or less foreign policy aggression) independently of the causes of 
nuclear weapons acquisition. Secondly, this study does not focus on the particular types of 
foreign policy aggression caused by nuclear weapons, but simply whether such aggression goes 
up or down. Individual examples and types of nuclear weapons-driven foreign policy 
aggression (or ‘nuclear aggression’ for short) are addressed throughout in service of the broader 
argument, but no effort is made to synthesise a comprehensive theory of nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy at any level of specificity greater than more/less aggressive. This, too, is a 
property of the neorealist theoretical framework chosen for this study. A systemic theory of 
nuclear weapons and foreign policy can predict whether the overall disposition of a state will 
become more or less aggressive following nuclear weapons acquisition, but not when a state 
will find a particular manifestation of nuclear aggression more or less attractive than another. 
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2.3 Methodology 
I now set out a method for the evaluation of HOR and HDR. In short, I seek to assess whether 
states become more or less aggressive in their foreign policy behaviour after acquiring nuclear 
weapons. The general approach to this task will involve in-depth case studies of three nuclear-
armed states. This section advances a methodology for case analysis and a framework for case 
selection.62 The penultimate chapter of this study also includes a quantitative evaluation of HOR 
and HDR to triangulate the case study results. This quantitative methodology is established and 
executed in that chapter. 
2.3.1 Case studies 
The case studies will engage in longitudinal analysis of individual nuclear-armed states both 
before and after nuclear weapons acquisition. Conclusions regarding the treatment effect (i.e. 
nuclear weapons acquisition) on foreign policy will be drawn by comparing the pre-nuclear 
(counterfactual) and nuclear (treatment) eras. The temporal scope of analysis will be limited to 
10 years either side of nuclear acquisition. Limiting the temporal scope to 20 years allows for 
a greater depth of process tracing than would be possible over a longer period, whilst 
controlling for those confounding unit-level variables that change over the long-term.63 
Restricting in all cases the treatment period to the first 10 years of the treatment effect also 
enhances internal validity by holding relatively constant those meta-qualities of nuclear 
weapons that both vary over time and have been shown to exhibit effects on international 
outcomes, such as force structure,64 arsenal size,65 and policy experience.66 The obverse to this 
control, of course, is that it forces us to question how generalisable these results will be beyond 
the 10-year scope of analysis. To the extent that those meta-qualities of nuclear weapons do 
                                                 
62 Portions of this methodology were adapted from Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: The 
Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy,” (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Political Science Department, 2014). 
63 Ibid., 15. 
64 Erik Gartzke, Jeffrey M. Kaplow, and Rupal N. Mehta, “The Determinants of Nuclear Force 
Structure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 3 (2013); Simon A. Mettler and Dan Reiter, 
“Ballistic Missiles and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (2012). 
65 Carolyn C. James, “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing 
Rivalries,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 33, no. 4 
(2000); Carolyn C. James, “Iran and Iraq as Rational Crisis Actors: Dangers and Dynamics of 
Survivable Nuclear War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 23, no. 1 (2000); Stephen J. Cimbala, 
“Deterrence Stability with Smaller Forces: Prospects and Problems,” Journal of Peace Research 32, 
no. 1 (1995). 
66 Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience 
Matter?,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009). See also the literature on ‘nuclear 
learning’: Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Concept of Nuclear Learning,” The Nonproliferation Review 19, 
no. 1 (2012). 
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influence outcomes over time, they reduce the generalisability of time-specific measurements 
to the sample universe.67 
This is certainly a limitation of the method, though, as stated by Bell, “examining the 
effect of nuclear weapons at the point of acquisition most accurately reflects the concerns of 
policymakers.”68 There are a number of reasons why the international community would be 
more interested in planning for the contingencies of a nuclear-armed state’s foreign policy 
during its first 10 years of nuclear weapons statehood than its second. Firstly, it is in the earliest 
years of nuclear weapons acquisition that states are likely to be at their most dangerous and 
unpredictable given their policy inexperience, the rapidly changing security environment, and 
the potential for an overconfidence in their new capabilities leading to miscalculation.69 
Secondly, within a framework of path dependence, one must understand the origins of a state’s 
behaviour with nuclear weapons to understand its future.70 Thus, understanding a nuclear-
armed states foreign policy behaviour in its first ten years of nuclear weapons statehood will 
provide crucial insights for understanding subsequent years.71 Thirdly, it is within the first 10 
years of nuclear weapons statehood that there exists the greatest opportunity for nuclear 
reversal, creating an imperative for states opposed to nuclear proliferation to develop 
approaches for predicting and influencing the foreign policies of the proliferating state during 
this time. Specifically, it can be argued that a state will be more amenable to nuclear reversal 
earlier in its tenure as a nuclear-armed state given that: the sunk costs of development will be 
limited; the state’s nuclear capabilities will be immature and poorly integrated into strategy, 
and therefore easier to part with; and international pressure will likely be at its zenith, i.e. in 
response to a nuclear breakout. And finally, and related to the preceding point, the possibility 
of nuclear reversal means logically that there will be more cases of states entering nuclear 
infancy than making it through to nuclear maturity, placing a premium on an understanding of 
the foreign policy implications of the former. 
With the basics of the case study methodology established, I now provide an outline of 
my approach to analysis. Each case study will be organised around two inferential tasks. In the 
                                                 
67 Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 76-77. 
68 Ibid., 77. 
69 Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict”; Forrest E. Morgan et al., 
Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2008), 85-88; Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 76. 
70 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000). 
71 Bell, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” 77. 
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sections that follow, I describe each of those tasks and explain how they work together to 
advance an overall response to the hypotheses. 
2.3.1.1 Nuclear weapons acquisition 
The first section of each case study will determine the year of nuclear weapons acquisition for 
the case study state – the critical juncture. For the purposes of this study, acquisition is the 
point in time at which we would expect a state’s nuclear weapons capabilities to affect its 
foreign policies. In a defensive realist framework, nuclear weapons affect foreign policy 
outcomes by guaranteeing state survival in anarchy, principally though nuclear deterrence.72 In 
an offensive realist framework, nuclear weapons affect foreign policy outcomes by providing 
the state with new capabilities with which to increasingly compete for power in the perpetual 
pursuit of hegemony (some such capabilities are outlined in Table 1). Thus, the benchmark for 
‘acquisition’ is different across theories. A state’s development of the ability to deter an 
adversary might not align chronologically with an ability to aggressively use nuclear weapons 
to pursue hegemony given that these varying ends of nuclear weapons have differing 
technological requirements that develop over time.73 
That being said, I adopt a single standard for acquisition consistent with the 
requirements of defensive realism. That is, I define acquisition as the point in time at which 
that state began perceiving that its survival in anarchy was guaranteed because of nuclear 
deterrence. I adopt this unifying standard for acquisition principally for simplicity: it is 
methodologically ‘neater’ to have a common critical juncture in adjudicating between the two 
hypotheses. We might also assume that the technological threshold of effecting nuclear 
deterrence is more-or-less consistent with the ability to use nuclear weapons aggressively in 
foreign policy. Though the mechanisms and technological requirements of the aggressive 
applications of nuclear weapons are varied (see Table 1), many such applications rely on, or 
are made credible by the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon an opponent (a shared 
requirement of nuclear deterrence).74 Therefore, we should expect to see general covariance 
                                                 
72 States will adopt varying strategies, or ‘postures’, in effecting nuclear deterrence based on their 
prevailing strategic environment. See Narang’s ‘optimization theory of nuclear posture’: Vipin 
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
73 See Tristan A. Volpe, “Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency,” Security Studies 26, 
no. 3 (2017). 
74 Though Narang and others describe one type of deterrence in which the ability to inflict 
unacceptable damage upon an adversary is not necessary. As put by Narang, ‘Catalytic deterrence’ 
“threatens the explicit breakout of nuclear weapons in the event the state’s survival is threatened in 
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with a state’s ability to both deter and initiate aggression using nuclear weapons. 
 
Table 1. Mechanisms through which nuclear weapons can be used to compete for power through foreign 
policy aggression 
Mechanism Description Example 
Nuclear 
conquest 
Destroying another state with one’s nuclear 
weapons, and subsequently seeking political 
gains by acquiring the conquered territory or by 
removing the state as a claimant from extant 
political contests. 
The US nuclear bombing of Japan 
during WW2. 
Bargaining chip Offering to freeze, rollback, eliminate, or 
otherwise modify one’s nuclear weapons program 
in exchange for political concessions. 
North Korea’s 2008 destruction of the 
cooling tower at its Yongbyon reactor 
in exchange for being removed from 
the US State Sponsors of Terror list. 
Nuclear 
blackmail 
Threatening, implicitly or explicitly, some form of 
nuclear harm – a nuclear strike, export of 
sensitive nuclear weapons technologies etc. – 
unless political concessions are made. 
North Korea’s annual threats to launch 
a nuclear attack against the US unless 
the US-ROK Foal Eagle joint military 
exercises are cancelled. 
Limited nuclear 
war 
Utilising tactical nuclear weapons in fighting 
limited militarised conflicts for political gain. 
The US’s Cold War strategy of 
offsetting conventional Soviet 
superiority by fighting a limited war in 
Western Europe with tactical nuclear 
weapons.75 
Nuclear shield Utilising the deterrent value of nuclear weapons 
as a shield under which one can launch low-level 
militarised conflicts for political gain without fear of 
massive retaliation. 
Pakistan backing the insurgency in 
Indian-controlled Kashmir, insulated 
from massive Indian reprisal attacks 
due to nuclear deterrence (see chapter 
3). 
External 
balancing 
Attracting new non-nuclear allies under extended 
deterrent arrangements, thereby increasing one’s 
influence over the protégé states. 
The US increasing its networks of loyal 
allies in the Asia-Pacific by formalising 
extended nuclear deterrence 
arrangements. 
Disrupting 
alliances 
Reducing a state’s willingness to intercede on 
behalf of its protégé with threats of nuclear harm. 
This reduces the relative power of the protégé 
state by depriving it of allied resources. 
North Korean attempts to weaken the 
US-ROK security alliance by 
threatening the former with a nuclear 
strike should it intervene in a conflict 
on the peninsula. 
Removing 
oneself from 
alliances 
Extricating oneself from alliance commitments by 
ensuring one’s own security with nuclear weapons 
rather than relying on collective security. The 
greater independence can be used to more 
aggressively pursue political gains. 
Nuclear France withdrawing from the 
NATO integrated military command 
and pursuing politique de grandeur. 
Transferring 
nuclear 
capabilities 
Trading nuclear weapons and associated 
technologies for political concessions. 
Pakistani plans to transfer sensitive 
nuclear technologies to Iran in 
exchange for Iranian ‘political support’ 
in Kashmir.76 
                                                 
order to compel – or catalyze – third-party intervention on the state’s behalf.” Narang, Nuclear 
Strategy in the Modern Era, 8. 
75 David McKinley Walker, “Eisenhower’s New Look, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, and Limited War 
with a Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958” (Ph.D Diss., The George Washington 
University, 2004). 
76 Discussed in section 3.2.3. 
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The inferential challenge, then, is determining when the state began to perceive that its 
survival in anarchy was assured, specifically due to its possession of nuclear weapons. Here 
too there is ambiguity in measurement. Even with a highly sophisticated nuclear arsenal, a state 
can never be certain of its existence in the present and future. Firstly, there are existential 
threats to states that are not the products of other utility-maximising states and therefore not 
susceptible to nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons cannot, for example, deter natural disasters 
or state failure. Secondly, existential threats launched by other states might be ambiguous and 
indirect, and therefore exist below the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Would a coalition of 
states be deterred from enacting crippling economic sanctions on another state if the latter had 
nuclear weapons? Against whom would the nuclear-armed state launch the retaliatory strike?77 
Thirdly, there exists an irreducible uncertainty that a nuclear-armed state might, in a moment 
of irrationality or abandon, launch a ruinous nuclear strike on another state, even if the latter 
itself has nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, for instance, with a nuclear arsenal running into the 
tens of thousands, US school children were still practicing duck-and-cover drills. One state can 
manage this latter threat by acquiring anti-nuclear defences (such as anti-ballistic missile and 
air defence capabilities), or depriving other states of the ability to acquire nuclear weapons, or 
not making enemies of states that already possess such weapons.78 Except in exceptional 
circumstances, however, we might assume that this possibility remains for even advanced 
nuclear-armed states. 
Thus, at best, nuclear weapons can increase the probability of a state’s survival in 
anarchy. The extent to which nuclear weapons strengthen survivability will change as the meta-
qualities of those weapons – doctrine, force size, delivery mechanisms etc. – develop over time. 
There will, however, be a point in time at which a state will begin to reap security dividends of 
their inchoate nuclear capabilities. That is, when the probability of that state’s survival in 
                                                 
77 This is an active debate in the literature. Some claim that the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons 
begins and ends with direct military challenges to territorial integrity, and yet nuclear-armed states 
have included, for example, economic ‘red lines’ in their nuclear deterrence doctrine. See, for 
example, Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 25. If a state 
was on the cusp of collapse, and the use of nuclear weapons was the only possibility for survival, I 
imagine that a utility-maximising state would have no better option than to launch a nuclear strike, 
regardless of the issue under dispute. On arguments regarding the limited utility of nuclear deterrence 
to non-territorial issues, see Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox,” 11; Sobek, Foster, and 
Robison, “Conventional Wisdom?,” 149-50; Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: 
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 30. 
See also Joynt and Corbett’s ‘curve of credibility’: D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, 
“Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 2 (1991): 
312. 
78 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 129-30. 
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anarchy will increase by some positive increment due specifically to its nuclear weapons 
capabilities. I define the moment at which the state begins to perceive such security dividends 
as the moment of nuclear weapons acquisition.79 
In identifying this moment, this section of each case study will proceed in two stages. 
The first characterises the nuclear deterrent strategy that the state established whilst developing 
its nuclear weapons capabilities.80 The second identifies the point in time at which the state 
began to perceive that its nuclear weapons capabilities were increasing its survivability as per 
its established deterrent strategy. For example, in the earliest stages of State A’s nuclear 
weapons development it may have envisaged that nuclear weapons would deter an existential 
conventional attack by State B. The year that State A demonstrates a perception that State B 
would be deterred from so attacking it, for example through declarations or tendentious 
changes in its behaviour, would therefore be considered the year of nuclear weapons 
acquisition. 
This approach to measuring acquisition is unique in that it focuses on the subjective 
perceptions of the proliferating state rather than the more common approach of measuring 
against technical benchmarks such as the state’s first nuclear test or acquisition of sufficient 
fissile material for a nuclear bomb.81 Though this ‘cognitive’ approach loses the definitiveness 
of measuring technical milestones – modern sensory equipment can measure down to the 
millisecond when a nuclear test has occurred – and consequently requires significantly more 
research and inference, it is arguably a more valid measure of nuclear weapons acquisition, at 
least in terms of anticipating when nuclear weapons are liable to bear on foreign policy 
outcomes (i.e. by increasing survivability). This is for two reasons. Firstly, technical milestones 
                                                 
79 One might question whether this nuanced definition of acquisition still fits with the theoretical 
precepts of HDR? That is, within a defensive realist framework, would we expect a state that is more 
confident of its survival in anarchy to reduce its aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a state that is 
certain of its survival? I argue in the affirmative; that as the probability of state destruction 
approaches zero so too does aggressive foreign policy in a defensive realist framework. This is 
because the state will be relatively more secure, and thus perceive a lesser need for further power 
gains under a framework of diminishing returns: Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World,” 153-54. Thus, 
while we mightn’t see a complete eschewal of aggressive foreign policy, it should still be lesser than 
prior to nuclear weapons acquisition (consistent with the phrasing of HDR). 
80 This, of course, assumes that there was a deterrent rationale underlying the state’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. This seems a reasonable assumption, though there are other reasons for which states pursue 
nuclear weapons capabilities. See Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three 
Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996); Hughes, “North Korea’s 
Nuclear Weapons.” 
81 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapon State’?: An Exercise in 
Measurement Validation,” The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (2010). 
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can have vastly different strategic implications in the context of a state’s overall nuclear 
weapons program. The ability to conduct a nuclear test, for example, does not necessarily mean 
that a state has the ability to reliably deliver the bomb to enemy territory or guarantee a 
sufficient yield to cause unacceptable damage. North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 was 
likely a ‘fizzle’ at less than 1 kT yield and came well before North Korea had developed 
missile-ready miniaturised warheads that could overcome South Korea’s anti-air defences, let 
alone strike US territory. Thus, it’s far from certain that, following the 2006 test, North Korea 
would’ve felt any more emboldened to pursue a new course in foreign policy due to these 
inchoate nuclear capabilities. 
And secondly, even once a state has a sufficient technical capacity to effect deterrence 
(whatever that may be in a particular case), there might be a delay in the state’s foreign policy 
response to that new capability given the need of the state bureaucracy to first come to terms 
with the strategic implications of such a capability, and then deliberate upon and implement a 
policy in response to the new strategic context. In other words, there may be a lag between a 
state technically acquiring a nuclear deterrent and the state internalising such a capability in its 
foreign policy. Presumably such an organisational pathology would only be exacerbated in 
conditions of nuclear opacity (i.e. non-public nuclear weapons development), where secrecy 
and the compartmentalisation of knowledge would lead to knowledge gaps amongst the 
decision-making elite. By the same token, an overconfident decision-making elite might 
actually pre-empt technical achievements with misplaced confidence in their own under-
developed nuclear weapons program. For example, in 2005, one year prior to its ‘fizzle’ test, 
North Korea was proudly declaring its manufacture of nuclear weapons in self-defence against 
the US,82 though it had, at this stage, no meaningful capability to launch a nuclear strike against 
US interests.83 
To my knowledge there has been no other attempt to formalise a method for measuring 
nuclear weapons acquisition through the perceptions of the proliferating state, rather than 
technical milestones. This methodological innovation is trialled in this study, and its potential 
application in future studies of nuclear proliferation is discussed in the concluding chapter. 
                                                 
82 Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Declares Itself a Nuclear Power,” Washington Post, 10 February 2005. 
83 Of course, such a statement was probably an empty public relations exercise from North Korea, 
though it demonstrates that official expectations can precede, as well as come after, technical 
developments. 
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2.3.1.2 Foreign policy indicators 
Once the date of nuclear weapons acquisition is determined, the empirical challenge is then to 
observe foreign policy change consistent with this critical juncture. To this end, I nominate 
four foreign policy indicators for which offensive and defensive realism predict diverging 
empirical outcomes consequent to nuclear weapons acquisition. By observing change in these 
indicators one way or the other, one can assess whether the case conforms more to the 
expectations of offensive or defensive realism. These measures will also be supplemented by 
thick, descriptive analysis to observe specific instances of the state’s nuclear weapons 
capabilities determining the foreign policy behaviour of interest (‘causal process observations’) 
and control for variant explanations at the ‘unit level’. These four indicators and the procedures 
for their measurement are detailed below.  
Indicator 1: Conventional military assets. The first foreign policy indicator that I observe in 
adjudicating between offensive and defensive realism is conventional military assets. 
The principal function of nuclear weapons is strategic deterrence. As a state’s strategic 
deterrence is bolstered by nuclear weapons the need for conventional forces is diminished. 
Firstly, the nuclear-armed state will not need as many conventional assets to protect their vital 
interests as it can shift the burden of strategic deterrence to nuclear weapons. The massive 
outlay on the Maginot Line, for example, would have been redundant if France had had nuclear 
weapons to protect its territory. Secondly, where general deterrence fails and conflict is 
initiated, the nuclear-armed state can utilise its nuclear arsenal to deescalate tensions and stop 
short the conflict through ‘immediate deterrence’. Thus, the nuclear-armed state will require 
fewer conventional assets to fight militarised conflicts when general deterrence fails. And 
thirdly, military build-ups in neighbouring states should not concern the nuclear-armed state 
given the latter’s ability to defend itself through nuclear deterrence, reducing the need of the 
nuclear-armed state to engage in conventional arms races. Whether a hostile neighbour has one 
corps or ten, their ability to attack and destroy the nuclear-armed state should be deterred by 
nuclear weapons. 
This effect of nuclear weapons has divergent implications in offensive and defensive 
realist frameworks. For defensive realism, given that states seek only the basic needs of security 
which are met by strategic nuclear deterrence, the pecuniary and balancing costs of 
conventional force build-ups should see that state’s conventional military assets decline after 
nuclear weapons acquisition. After all, why continue to expend resources on conventional 
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capabilities that offer no net security gain? In an offensive realist framework, on the other hand, 
where states seek security through hegemony, a nuclear-armed state will perceive an ongoing 
need for conventional military forces. Conventional forces offer states the ability to project 
power and fight limited wars, essential for subjugating rival states (short of outright nuclear 
conquest). Indeed, nuclear weapons enhance a state’s ability to compete for power through 
conventional militarism (i.e. military action limited to conventional weapons), i.e. by shielding 
the nuclear-armed state from retaliation, creating new opportunities for conventional military 
aggression that might necessitate increases in conventional forces. Therefore, an overall decline 
in conventional military assets after nuclear weapons acquisition would be consistent with the 
expectations of defensive realism, whereas an increase in such assets would be consistent with 
the expectations of offensive realism. (No change would be consistent with the null 
hypothesis.) 
The empirical challenge, therefore, is to measure change in a state’s conventional 
military assets over time. I nominate three quantitative measures for this purpose. The first two 
are measures of critical conventional military assets: battle tanks and combat aircraft. Both are 
central to modern conceptions of conventional war, and both are easily measured. 
Measurements will be taken from The Military Balance, an annual indexation of international 
military assets from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.84 The third measure of 
conventional force capabilities is the number of active military personnel, taken from the 
Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (v. 4.0) dataset.85 Soldiers, too, are essential 
for conventional warfare, both as infantry and in operating and maintaining mechanised assets.  
It is noted that use of these three quantitative measures controls for changes in 
conventional military strength due to domestic instability, which is beyond the theoretical 
scope of neorealism. For example, a government might conscript additional paramilitary forces 
to subdue unrest at home, though have no intention of using these to more aggressively pursue 
gains against another state. Such changes in military capability due to conditions at home do 
not reflect more or less aggressive foreign policies, i.e. the dependent variable being measured 
                                                 
84 Regarding the counts of tanks and combat aircraft, where only qualitative descriptors (e.g. ‘some’, 
‘a few’) of numbers were provided, no value was recorded. Where estimates were offered, the 
estimate was recorded. Where an estimate was provided as a range, the median value was recorded. 
Where different counts for ‘total’ and ‘operational’ tanks/aircraft were offered, the ‘operational’ value 
was recorded. 
85 David, J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and 
Major Power War, 1820-1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1972). 
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by this indicator. There are two mechanisms through which this domestic factor is controlled. 
Firstly, tanks and combat aircraft, for the most part, have little tactical utility in supporting 
policing functions, and thus we shouldn’t expect their numbers to rise because of domestic 
considerations alone. Secondly, the Correlates of War (the source of numbers of active military 
personnel) specifically excludes “Irregular forces such as civil defense units” from coding, 
noting that “these figures reflect the project’s best judgment on which forces were intended for 
combat with foreign parties.”86 
Change in conventional military assets between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras will 
be assessed statistically through a student’s t-test. A student’s t-test assesses whether any 
observed variation between two samples of quantitative data (in this case the pre-nuclear and 
nuclear era measures of conventional military assets) is statistically the product of random 
chance (the null hypothesis). If the observed variation is not the product of random chance, it 
can be inferred that such variation is instead the product of an independent variable (i.e. nuclear 
weapons acquisition). Deciding on both the levels of change in conventional military assets 
and statistical significance (i.e. the probability of observed variation being the product of 
random chance; p) required to yield a positive result for either hypothesis is to an extent an 
arbitrary exercise. For this exercise I adopt a minimum threshold of ±10% at p < 0.05, though 
there would certainly be scope to modify these thresholds in similar statistical exercises in the 
future. 
There are four limitations to this approach that should be acknowledged. The first is the 
risk of endogeneity. Though battle tanks are largely exogenous to nuclear strategy, combat 
aircraft may be required to deliver nuclear weapons, and personnel are required to operate and 
maintain those weapons. The overall demand for such dual-use assets in nuclear strategy was 
considered marginal compared with that of conventional warfare, however, and thus only likely 
to have a residual effect on outcomes. Where one aircraft carrying one nuclear bomb can level 
a city, for example, in a conventional setting the military power of a single aircraft is far more 
limited. 
The second is that these measures do not control for the quality of individual units. An 
F-22 Raptor will have the same statistical value as a 1939 Brewster Buffalo. Given, however, 
                                                 
86 “Correlates of War Project: National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0,” 
Correlates of War (2010), viewed 27 January 2017, http://www.correlatesofwar.org, p. 11 (emphasis 
added). 
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that measurements are limited to individual states and a 20-year timeframe, we mightn’t expect 
any revolutionary advances in the quality of arms that exert a significant confounding effect on 
measures of relative change of conventional strength. 
The third is that this measure is likely to under-estimate the idealised number of 
conventional assets to the policy elite given that it does not factor in those assets that are lost 
to battle or attrition. Whilst this effect is unavoidable, assuming a consistent under-estimation 
effect between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras, this does not diminish the ability to measure 
relative change in elite priorities. 
And the fourth weakness relates to the threshold of a positive result for defensive 
realism. I regard a decline in conventional assets by 10 or more percent (at statistically 
significant levels) as a positive result for defensive realism. And yet, it is possible to envisage 
instances in which a defensive realist state does not see such reductions. For example, if a state 
acquired 100 tanks and then acquired nuclear weapons, it mightn’t have an opportunity to rid 
itself of 10 or more of those tanks, even if it sought military retrenchment – for example if there 
were no market willing to buy them and no military conflict to which they could be lost in 
combat (i.e. and their stocks not replenished). It is for this reason that the number of military 
personnel was included in this measure. Unlike combat tanks and aircrafts, which can sit 
disused in military hangars for decades, military personnel bear an ongoing cost to the state in 
terms of salaries, training, supply, and the diversion of citizens from positions of economic 
productivity. If a state has a preference for military retrenchment, therefore, we would expect 
to see an appreciable drop in the number of active military personnel. 
Indicator 2: Militarised conflict initiation. The second foreign policy indicator that I observe 
in adjudicating between offensive and defensive realism is militarised conflict initiation. 
Logically, pre-emptive and preventative wars in defence of the homeland are redundant 
for nuclear-armed states as nuclear deterrence will forestall any hostile designs that an 
adversary might have. Absent any defensive rationale for militarised conflict initiation, and 
without any ambitions for expansion through militarised conflict, a nuclear-armed defensive 
realist state should therefore eschew conflict initiation. In an offensive realist framework, on 
the other hand, while the nuclear-armed state might not perceive the need to initiate 
preventative and pre-emptive wars in the defence of its homeland, it will still be inclined to 
initiate militarised conflicts for the purposes of expanding its power and establishing 
hegemony. Indeed, to the extent that nuclear weapons enable greater military expansion as 
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discussed above, we might expect acquisition to attend with an increase in conflict initiation. 
Therefore, whilst a reduction in militarised conflict initiation would be consistent with the 
expectations of defensive realism, growth would be consistent with the expectations of 
offensive realism. (No change would be consistent with the null hypothesis.) 
The empirical challenge, therefore, is to measure change in a state’s initiation of 
militarised conflicts over time. To this end, I draw from the Correlates of War Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (v. 4.01) dataset.87 Specifically, I measure how many days per year each 
state spent engaged in militarised conflicts that it itself initiated. Individual militarised 
interstate disputes that were active in the 20-year period of interest, and for which the focal 
state was coded as the ‘Originator’ of the conflict, will be included in the measurement. The 
total number of conflict days for each dispute will be calculated from the number of days 
between the conflict start and end dates (inclusive) and aggregated per year.88 For those days 
in which the state was engaged in more than one dispute, the day will be counted again for each 
conflict engaged after the first. As with indicator 1, I adopt a minimum threshold of ±10% at p 
< 0.05 (using a student’s t-test) to yield a positive result for the hypotheses. 
It should be noted that, in statistical terms, the use of days spent in conflict as a unit of 
measurement risks breaking the ‘independence of observations’ assumption, which stands to 
weaken inference. Independence of observations requires that, as stated by Collier, Seawright 
and Munck,  
the value of a particular variable is not influenced by its value in other observations and 
therefore provides new information about the phenomenon in question. If independence of 
observations is not met, this does not necessarily bias the causal inference. However, it does 
reduce the amount of new evidence gained from each additional observation, thereby 
increasing the variance associated with an inference.89 
Where individual militarised disputes span more than one calendar year, and therefore 
contribute to more than one observation, one might argue that this system of measurement 
betrays independence of observations to the extent that the engagement in those days of conflict 
                                                 
87 Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 2 (2015). 
88 Where the exact conflict start or end date is unknown, a default value of ‘1’ will be used. If this 
returns a value less than ‘1’ a default value of one day will be used. For example, an unknown end 
date (updated to ‘1’) and a start date of ‘4’ in the same month and year would equal ‘-2’ days in 
conflict, which would then be updated to ‘1’. 
89 David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck, “The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane, 
and Verba’s Designing Social Enquiry,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), 43. 
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in the first calendar year caused those conflict days in subsequent calendar years, for example 
when conflicts are prolonged due to retaliating against prior acts of hostility or engaging in 
long-term military strategies such as attritional war. Though this criticism cannot be rejected 
entirely, it should be noted that conflicts that span more than one calendar year are in the 
minority, and are therefore unlikely to exert a strong confounding effect.90 One could extend 
the argument to claim that militarised disputes in one calendar year predisposes states to initiate 
discrete militarised disputes in subsequent calendar years, for example in retaking lost 
conquests, avenging military losses etc.91 Though this is likely to exert some confounding 
effect, I assume that those militarised disputes motivated primarily by past conflicts rather than 
by independent policy preferences are infrequent. 
Indicator 3: Policies toward occupied/disputed territories. The third foreign policy 
indicator that I observe in adjudicating between offensive and defensive realism is the state’s 
policies toward its occupied or disputed territories. 
Many states occupy or dispute territories for geostrategic purposes, such as enhancing 
defence in depth or projecting power. In a defensive realist framework, as a state finds security 
under a nuclear deterrent, and given that it does not desire territorial expansion beyond the 
secure confines of its universally recognised borders, we would expect that state to withdraw 
its claims from occupied/disputed territories so as to ease the pecuniary and balancing costs of 
territorial expansion. An offensive realist state, on the other hand, given its insatiable appetite 
for power and expansion, will be reluctant to withdraw any claims from occupied or disputed 
territories, regardless of the security dividends of nuclear weapons. Indeed, to the extent that 
its nuclear capabilities enhance its ability to occupy or dispute territory – for example through 
extending deterrence to those territories, blackmailing other states to withdraw their claims etc. 
– it is likely to more aggressively pursue its claims to occupied and disputed territories. 
                                                 
90 Of the 6,132 militarised disputes (per participant) within the Correlates of War dataset, only 1,520 
(25%) spanned more than one calendar year. Only 7% lasted more than two calendar years, and only 
4% went past three. 
91 One can draw other causal lines between the outbreak of militarised conflicts. Militarised conflict 
can weaken diplomatic relations between states, leaving fewer options outside of military action to 
resolve future political disputes. Past militarised conflicts can rationalise military procurements 
specifically directed toward that opponent, which then creates new opportunities and incentives to 
attack, i.e. through a shifted balance of power and/or offence-defence balance. A history of militarised 
conflict with a state can create a fear of future conflict with that state, thereby rationalising 
preventative or pre-emptive wars. And a history of militarised conflict can encourage a state to launch 
a military attack punitively, either to deter further military adventurism by the other state, or to sate 
domestic populism incited by previous conflicts. 
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Therefore, a nuclear-armed state withdrawing its claims to a disputed/occupied territory or 
reducing the extent to which it pursues extant claims would be consistent with the expectations 
of defensive realism, whereas a nuclear-armed state increasing its claims to a disputed/occupied 
territory or pursuing extant claims more aggressively would be consistent with the expectations 
of offensive realism. (No change in policy would be consistent with the null hypothesis.) 
Change in foreign policy aggression toward occupied/disputed territories will be 
measured through thick, descriptive analysis. Possible indicators to this end might include the 
commitment of additional military forces or resources to the occupied/disputed territories, 
attempts to annex the occupied/disputed territories, rejecting/pursuing options for compromise 
with other claimants to the occupied/disputed territories etc. 
Indicator 4: Other acts of nuclear aggression. Whilst the preceding three indicators offer a 
reliable basis for measuring foreign policy aggression consequent to nuclear weapons 
acquisition, they do not reflect the full theoretical implication of nuclear weapons acquisition 
on a state’s foreign policy behaviours, but rather a ‘snapshot’ with an empirical focus on 
conventional militarism and territorial disputes. These indicators do not describe or measure 
how nuclear weapons might have led to more or less foreign policy aggression in other issue 
areas, such as alliances, foreign aid, international trade, and so on. The observance or non-
observance of such variegated instances of nuclear weapons-driven foreign policy aggression 
(or ‘nuclear aggression’ for short) stands to add value to this study. Firstly, by extending the 
empirical scope one can provide a more detailed descriptive response to the overarching 
question of this study regarding the effects of nuclear weapons on the foreign policies of states 
that acquire them. And secondly, the observance or non-observance of such acts provides 
additional data points that can strengthen inference by providing additional challenges to the 
established hypotheses.92 
There is, therefore, a research imperative to expand the empirical scope of this study 
from conventional militarism and territorial disputes to the full theoretical implications of HDR 
and HOR. Given that it is impractical to fashion individual metrics for measuring foreign policy 
aggression across each conceivable issue area for which nuclear weapons might exert an effect 
such as with indicators 1-3, I propose a more informal approach. I establish this fourth and final 
                                                 
92 On the inferential value of increasing the number of observations, see Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. 213-17. 
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foreign policy indicator as a general ‘catch-all’ for any instance of nuclear aggression not 
captured in the first three indicators. Instead of specific parameters for the measurement of 
clearly defined foreign policy behaviours as with indicators 1-3, ‘measurements’ for this 
indicator will simply involve scouring the literature and reporting on acts of nuclear weapons 
causing foreign policy aggression as I discover them. 
Take, for example, North Korea’s 2017 threat to ‘sink’ Japan with a nuclear strike in 
response to the latter’s advocacy of economic sanctions on the former.93 This threat constitutes 
an act of ‘nuclear aggression’, specifically ‘nuclear blackmail’ as outlined in Table 1: 
threatening some form of nuclear harm (a nuclear strike) unless political concessions 
(withdrawal of support for sanctions) are made. This example would not have been captured 
by the previous three indicators as it ostensibly does not bear on North Korea’s conventional 
military posture nor any outstanding territorial disputes between Japan and North Korea. This 
threat would therefore be included as a measurement for indicator 4. 
In isolating instances of nuclear aggression from the ether of foreign policy decision-
making, I rely on the descriptive frameworks set out in my typology of nuclear aggression 
mechanisms (see Table 1, p. 34) to guide observation. Given that, in general terms, offensive 
realism predicts more aggression and defensive realism less aggression, we can say that the 
observance of such acts would be consistent with the expectations of HOR, whereas the non-
observance of such acts would be consistent with the expectations of HDR.  
Such a heuristic approach is susceptible to the criticism that, by relying on serendipitous 
observations, there is an inherent risk that examples will be missed, biasing inference in favour 
of HDR. This is a particular problem for this study given that states have incentives to 
underrepresent the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy decision-making. States may seek 
to avoid the moral opprobrium that comes with manipulating nuclear capabilities (the political 
power of which is derived from their ability to indiscriminately kill large numbers of people) 
for political ends.94 States that do not publicly acknowledge their possession of nuclear 
weapons (i.e. ‘opaque’ proliferators) also have this as an additional incentive to hide the role 
                                                 
93 “North Korea Threatens US, Japan over UN Sanctions,” Al Jazeera (2017), viewed 4 December 
2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/north-korea-threatens-japan-sanctions-
170914075433009.html. 
94 See Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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of these weapons in decision-making.95 This is an inherent limitation to this approach, though 
not one that invalidates the exercise. If/as future scholarship unearths additional examples of 
nuclear aggression, such observations can be incorporated into this methodological framework 
to strengthen inference. 
2.3.2 Case selection 
In selecting cases to take forward to case analysis, this study identifies ‘pariah’ nuclear-armed 
states as the most fruitful option for in-depth investigation. Though both HOR and HDR are 
universal theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, as discussed previously we might 
expect unit-level variables to exercise a confounding effect on the results. Narrowing the 
empirical focus to a particular ‘type’ of nuclear-armed state will allow for the induction of 
greater theoretical specificity with regard to unit-level variables (i.e. those that afflict that 
particular type of state) that should strengthen inferences with respect to future proliferators of 
that type. (This does, however, come at the cost of generalisability for other, ‘non-pariah’ 
proliferators – a matter discussed in the concluding chapter.) 
Of all the ‘types’ of past, present and future proliferators, pariah states are likely to be 
of the greatest interest to policy makers, specifically because they are the most likely 
proliferators in the short- to medium-term. Robert Harkavy defines a pariah state as “a small 
power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate”, exhibiting the following 
characteristics: (1) militarily weak, in a hostile environment and lacking major power support; 
(2) widely questioned legitimacy; (3) little diplomatic power and little to offer potential alliance 
partners; (4) vulnerable to the interdiction of conventional arms; and (5) facing adversaries 
backed by a major power.96 It is easy to see why nuclear weapons would present an attractive 
option to states facing such conditions. The presence of immediate threats from surrounding 
hostile states coupled with limited conventional military resources and external support would 
encourage the pariah state to seek a decisive tool in guaranteeing its survival (i.e. nuclear 
weapons). The existence of legitimacy crises might make states more willing to take drastic 
measures, such as acquiring nuclear weapons, in shoring up their longevity. And the diplomatic 
                                                 
95 On nuclear opacity see Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (1990); Devin T. Hagerty, “The Power of Suggestion: Opaque 
Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition,” Security 
Studies 2, no. 3-4 (1993). 
96 Robert E. Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation,” International Organization 35, no. 01 
(2009): 136. Other appellations (outlaw, outlier, rogue etc.) are found in the literature that more-or-
less conform to this descriptive framework. See Robert S. Litwak, Outlier States: American Strategies 
to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2012). 
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and economic isolation of ‘pariahtude’ will lessen the coercive effects of international 
instruments such as international law and sanctions designed to prevent proliferation.97 Indeed, 
correlation between these typical attributes of pariah states – such as the presence of external 
threats, the absence of great-power security guarantees, and a low level of integration in the 
world economy – and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation has been demonstrated in the 
literature.98 Current nuclear break-outs such as Iran and North Korea fit this model, as do the 
recently thwarted nuclear weapons programs of Iraq, Libya and Syria.99 
Of the ten-or-so states to have acquired nuclear weapons historically,100 arguably five 
meet the requirements for being labelled a ‘pariah’ during their proximate period of nuclear 
weapons acquisition as per Harkavy’s abovementioned five-dimensional framework and are, 
therefore, prima facie eligible to be taken through to case analysis in this study: 
• China acquired nuclear weapons c. 1964,101 at which time the Sino-Soviet split had 
isolated it from its superpower ally, led to clashes along its northern frontier, and cut-
off its largest supplier of conventional arms (conditions 1, 4 and 5).102 At the same 
time the Chinese Communist Party’s right to rule a unified China was under attack, 
both externally in terms of the West’s continued support of the Kuomintang-led 
Republic of China based in Taiwan, and internally in terms of the popular unrest 
sowed by Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution mass 
movements (condition 2). 
                                                 
97 Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation”; Richard Falk, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
as a World Order Problem,” International Security 1, no. 3 (1977); Steve Chan, “Incentives for 
Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of International Pariahs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 1 (2008). 
98 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2016); Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2016). 
99 On the Iraqi program see Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear 
Alarmism Justified?,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011). On the Libyan program see M. Braut-
Hegghammer, “Libya’s Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 
1 (2008); Wyn Q. Bowen, “Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink,” The 
Adelphi Papers 46, no. 380 (2006). On the Syrian program see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “Israel’s 
Airstrike on Syria’s Al-Kibar Facility: A Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence?,” 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011). 
100 North Korea is variously considered a nuclear-armed state or non-nuclear-armed state by different 
observers. 
101 This and subsequent proximate dates of proliferation taken from Singh and Way in Alexander H. 
Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 308. 
102 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad A Quest for ‘Superb and 
Secret Weapons’, SIPRI Research Report No. 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): 18-34. 
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• Israel acquired nuclear weapons c. 1972, at which time it was facing a multi-front war 
for survival with its larger, Soviet-backed Arab neighbours who had rejected the 
creation of Israel and were committed to the latter’s destruction (conditions 1, 2 and 
5). Israel relied on a steady stream of conventional weapons imports and diplomatic 
patronage from a handful of western states – principally the US – to ward off the 
Arab-Soviet threat, though this supply was constantly under threat from shifting 
global opinion on the Palestinian issue and general Western retreat from 
entanglements in regional conflicts such as in southeast Asia and southern Africa 
(conditions 3 and 4).103 
• South Africa acquired nuclear weapons c. 1979, at which time it had become 
internationally isolated due to its universally maligned policy of racial segregation 
known as Apartheid (conditions 2 and 3). At the same time, South Africa was fighting 
for its survival against Soviet-backed anti-Apartheid guerrillas who were waging a 
proxy war from surrounding sympathetic black African states (conditions 1, 2 and 5), 
all the while facing a mandatory arms embargo imposed by the UN in 1977 (condition 
4). 
• Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons c. 1990, at which time it was locked in a 40-year 
battle for its right to exist alongside its larger, Soviet-backed neighbour and erstwhile 
metropole India, leading to numerous wars, cross-border skirmishes and proxy 
conflicts (conditions 1 and 5). While fighting off what it perceived as Indian attempts 
to undo the partition of the British Raj and annex Pakistan (condition 2), Islamabad 
struggled to find consistent superpower support and a steady stream of arms with 
which to defend itself, particularly following the end of the proxy war in Afghanistan 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, at which point Pakistan’s geostrategic value 
plummeted and Western states turned toward greater cooperation and economic 
engagement with the more powerful India (conditions 3 and 4). 
• North Korea’s current nuclear weapons status remains a point of contention, though 
certainly it has made a number of strides in recent years that have pushed it closer to 
universal recognition as a nuclear-armed state.104 North Korea faces an ongoing 
security competition with the US and the latter’s northeast Asian allies of Japan and 
                                                 
103 Abraham R. Wagner, “Israeli Perceptions of American Security Policy: Current Trends and Future 
Alternatives,” (Washington D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1976), 64-105. 
104 Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen eds., North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the 
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South Korea which has led to an ongoing state of interstate threats, sanctions and 
regional skirmishes (conditions 1 and 5). Exacerbating this state of insecurity is the 
comprehensive sanctions regime in place against Pyongyang (condition 4) in response 
to its regional military provocations and dismal human rights record which has, in 
combination with its backward economy, seen its overall diplomatic power and 
international legitimacy tarnished (conditions 2 and 3). 
Due to space limitations this study can only take three of these five eligible states 
through to case analysis. The challenge, then, is to identify which three are most appropriate 
for the purposes of this study. First, I exclude North Korea from case analysis for the simple 
reason that it hasn’t possessed nuclear weapons long enough. As detailed in section 2.3.1, 
empirical analysis will focus on each case study state’s first ten years of nuclear weapons 
statehood. North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities have only become operational in recent 
years, meaning that there is a risk that North Korea’s date of nuclear weapons acquisition (as 
determined using the method outlined in section 2.3.1.1) will precede the current date by less 
than ten years, depriving the case study of data (i.e. data that hasn’t occurred yet). 
Second, I exclude China from case analysis on the basis that, of the remaining four 
states, it arguably cleaves least closely to Harkavy’s framework of pariahtude. The above points 
re China’s legitimacy crises and conflicts with the Soviet Union c. 1964 notwithstanding, 
during this period China still had many of the trappings of a ‘great power’. For example: China 
had the world’s second and third largest military by active service personnel and expenditure, 
respectively;105 China had the world’s largest population and fourth largest country by 
landmass;106 China had the ability to project military power, such as fighting in the Indochina 
wars and deploying military advisors and materiel globally to Cold War hotspots, such as Sub-
Saharan Africa;107 China remained a net arms exporter, with exports nearly doubling 
imports;108 and China had a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Such qualities are not 
consistent with Harkavy’s concept of “a small power with only marginal and tenuous control 
                                                 
105 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-
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106 Ibid. 
107 “Soviet Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa,” DIA Intelligence Appraisal (9 Jan 1976). 
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over its own fate”. Instead, the remaining three states identified here – Pakistan, South Africa 
and Israel – will be taken forward to case analysis. 
2.4 Expected contribution 
Overall, this study aims to assess whether offensive or defensive realism proves the most 
accurate model of foreign policy behaviour consequent to nuclear weapons acquisition. As 
discussed in section 2.1.1, adjudicating between these systemic theories of nuclear weapons 
and foreign policy will provide a theoretical base upon which theories at lower levels of 
analysis can be built. Understanding, for example, that nuclear weapons acquisition emboldens 
a state’s innate desire for hegemony (as predicted by offensive realism) is a useful basis for 
theorising, for instance, the precise expressions and conditionalities of hegemony-seeking 
behaviour of nuclear-armed states through causal relationships at the unit level. 
Better understanding how nuclear weapons affect foreign policy in general is also an 
important factor in developing policy responses to, and normative positions on nuclear 
proliferation, an issue likely to increase in relevance to contemporary policy makers as the 
technological barriers to nuclear weapons development break down, and as the decline of US 
unipolarity creates new opportunities and incentives for nuclear acquisition.109 
In advancing its argument, this study also offers a more fundamental evaluation of 
competing neorealist theories of international politics – offensive and defensive realism – 
adding to ongoing debates about the merits of neorealism in explaining the international 
system.110 This is not merely an academic intrigue. Neorealist paradigms have been implicitly 
an explicitly marshalled in advancing policy responses to a variety of contemporary political 
issues, including conflict in East Asia,111 a rising China,112 and US retrenchment.113 Assessing 
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the explanatory powers of these models of international behaviour in focused empirical cases 
will validate or invalidate their use elsewhere. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The effects of nuclear weapons on the foreign policies of states that acquire them has been a 
decidedly underexplored topic in the literature to date. Those limited works that have 
systematically examined this question, whilst important, have not evaluated such effects in 
terms of how nuclear weapons modulate the structural determinants of state behaviour. It is to 
this end that this study commits itself. 
This chapter deduced from offensive and defensive realism two general and competing 
theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, and derived from them testable hypotheses that 
broadly predict more or less foreign policy aggression as a result of nuclear weapons 
acquisition. The chapter then advanced a methodology for the empirical evaluation of these 
hypotheses. The methodology was organised around the analysis of individual cases of nuclear 
weapons acquisition. Across the chosen cases, changes in four foreign policy indicators – 
conventional military assets, militarised conflict initiation, policies toward occupied/disputed 
territories, and other acts of nuclear aggression – will be measured to assess whether the 
nuclear-armed state’s foreign policies became more or less aggressive after nuclear weapons 
acquisition. 
Three cases were chosen to take through to this in-depth analysis: Pakistan, South 
Africa and Israel. Each was chosen on the basis that it reflected the ‘pariah’ archetype, 
described by Harkavy as “a small power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own 
fate”.114 It was argued that pariah states are the most likely type of state to acquire nuclear 
weapons in the future. Thus, whilst this study is concerned with testing systemic and universal 
theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy, to the extent that thick, descriptive analysis 
allows the induction of greater theoretical specificity at the unit level, there is an imperative to 
increase our specific knowledge regarding pariah proliferators so as to provide a more informed 
basis in dealing with probable nuclear futures. 
Overall it is anticipated that this study will provide a general basis for predicting foreign 
policy behaviour subsequent to nuclear weapons acquisition, as well as offer a systemic 
theoretical basis for theorising the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy at lower levels 
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of analysis, work that has already begun and will undoubtedly become more valued as the 
barriers to nuclear weapons acquisition break down and as the world faces a new array of 
nuclear breakouts. 
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3 Pakistani nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a medium-sized, highly populous South Asian state with a 
national identity organised around Islamic nationalism and military bravado. Apart from 
playing host to a number of deleterious internal issues such as endemic corruption, poverty, 
sub-state militancy and weak governance, Pakistan also sits in an historically dangerous 
neighbourhood, bordering Iran, Afghanistan, and nuclear-capable China and India. Pakistan 
itself also possesses nuclear weapons, transitioning to nuclear weapons statehood covertly and 
as a non-signatory to the NPT from the 1970s to the early 90s, though it wouldn’t be until 1998 
when it conducted a series of six fission tests that Pakistan would openly declare its nuclear 
capabilities to the world. 
What has been the effect of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons on its foreign 
policies? According to the logic of defensive realism, we should see a Pakistani state that 
minimises its security-seeking behaviour, seeking only the bare necessities of survival in South 
Asian anarchy. Once it acquired nuclear weapons and thereby assured its survival, we would 
therefore expect to see Pakistan withdraw from competitive international behaviour, instead 
seeking peaceful coexistence with its neighbours. In an offensive realist framework, the 
opposite is true. Pakistan should seek hegemony in South Asia through persistent power-
maximisation, seeking every opportunity for gain and the subordination of its regional rivals. 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons will only embolden such aggressive tendencies, and 
encourage Pakistan to subjugate other states through nuclear threats and coercion. This chapter 
assesses which of these two models most accurately fits the case of Pakistan. In making this 
determination this chapter proceeds in two stages. First, I determine the critical juncture of 
nuclear weapons acquisition. That is, when Pakistan began to perceive security gains due to its 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Second, change in Pakistani foreign policy is measured across 
four indicators: conventional arms build-ups, militarised conflict initiation, policies toward 
occupied/disputed territories, and other acts of nuclear aggression. 
3.1 Nuclear weapons acquisition 
Shortly after Pakistan’s partition from British India in 1947 it developed an interest in nuclear 
technology as a tool for power generation and scientific enterprise. Pakistan developed its 
initial nuclear capabilities during the 1950s under the auspices of the US Atoms for Peace 
program and various other technological and professional exchanges with the West. At this 
stage there was little appetite for indigenous nuclear weapons development, with Pakistan 
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instead viewing conventional weapons and its alliance with the US as its primary deterrent to 
its regional rivals, in particular India. 115 Pakistan’s indifference to nuclear weapons began to 
change in the mid-1960s following a failed attempt to seize control of the disputed territory of 
Kashmir which resulted in open war between India and Pakistan. The US responded punitively 
to this conflict by cutting military and economic aid to both belligerents, a move that 
disproportionately weakened Pakistan as India was still buoyed by its military alliance with the 
Soviet Union. This increased vulnerability to India manifest in the failed campaign in Kashmir 
and reduced patronage from the US, coupled with India’s growing nuclear capabilities, created 
an interest in Islamabad for a native nuclear deterrent, with foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
famously declaring in 1965 that, should India acquire a nuclear weapon, “even if Pakistanis 
have to eat grass, we will make the bomb.”116 The determination to build the bomb was reified 
in 1971 following another conflict with India that resulted in a humiliating defeat for Pakistan 
and the loss of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh. In early 1972 President Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto called a meeting with two leading Pakistani nuclear scientists and conveyed his 
intention to pursue a nuclear weapons program.117 
The development of Pakistani nuclear weapons under the shadow of the NPT – which 
neither India nor Pakistan had signed – was driven by a number of covert international 
procurement networks and indigenous scientific enterprises. Local efforts were divided 
between two scientific agencies – the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Khan Research 
Laboratories (KRL) – with each coordinating a broad spectrum of activities relating to nuclear 
weapons development, ranging from the development of the trigger mechanism and bomb core 
to the selection of nuclear test sites.118 By the mid-1980s Pakistan had taken tangible steps 
toward nuclear weaponisation, including the production of weapons-grade highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and the successful activation of chain reactions in cold-tests of nuclear 
devices.119 In the late 1980s and 1990s a series of politico-military crises between India and 
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Pakistan became increasingly animated by each side’s inchoate nuclear capabilities,120 though 
both sides would not acknowledge such capabilities publicly. India broke the deadlock in May 
1998 when it conducted a series of five nuclear tests. Pakistan followed suit two weeks later, 
conducting six tests of its own and declaring proudly to the world its new status as a “nuclear 
power”.121 
This section evaluates when, within this timeline of technical milestones, Pakistan had 
effectively ‘acquired’ nuclear weapons. As outlined in chapter 2, this study defines nuclear 
weapons acquisition as the point in time at which Pakistan began perceiving that its survival in 
anarchy was assured because of nuclear deterrence. To make this determination, this section 
proceeds in two stages. Section 3.1.1 characterises Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent strategy, and 
section 3.1.2 identifies the point in time at which Pakistan began to perceive that its survival 
was assured as per this deterrent strategy (nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’, so defined). 
3.1.1 Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent strategy 
It’s difficult to overstate the extent to which the Indian threat pervades Pakistani strategic 
culture. It is taken as an article of faith that India seeks regional hegemony and has never 
accepted the legitimacy of Pakistan’s independence through the partition of the British Raj. 
Then President of Pakistan Field-marshal Ayub Khan wrote in 1967 that “We had done all we 
could to convince India that we wanted to live in peace with her, but India could not accept the 
existence of a strong and independent Muslim state next door.”122 Khan’s statement is not an 
exaggerated or antiquated view of a callow state. It is, as described by Makeig, a “primordial 
fear” which has “dominated Pakistani attitudes toward India since 1947.”123 Indeed, as recently 
as 2009, the Pakistani political elite have decried “India’s unwillingness to accept the two-
nation theory that led to the emergence of Pakistan”.124  
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It is within this context of perceived Indian enmity that Pakistan fears military 
expansion by its eastern neighbour. Not only has India held the balance of conventional military 
power since independence, but Pakistan is also geographically vulnerable to Indian militarism 
in that its narrow territory lacks defence in depth, and its strategic lines of communication run 
parallel and nearby the level Indo-Pak border, making it vulnerable to a debilitating forward 
thrust by India that could effectively split Pakistan in two.125 
It was under these conditions that Islamabad began to harbour a ‘belief’ that nuclear 
weapons were “the only guarantee of Pakistan’s national survival in the face of both an 
inveterately hostile India that cannot be deterred conventionally and unreliable external allies 
that fail to deliver in extremis.”126 According to a 1984 US intelligence estimate, the Pakistani 
leadership believed that “a small nuclear programme would enable the Pakistanis to do in 
nuclear terms what their ground and air forces could not do in conventional terms: threaten to 
punish any Indian attack so severely that consideration of such an attack would be deterred 
from the outset.”127 The general nature of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a deterrent to 
conventional Indian militarism has been confirmed by the Pakistani elite. In a 1990 meeting 
between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, General Mirsav Aslam Beg and US envoy Robert 
Gates, for example, Khan communicated that “a full-scale ground assault by India could 
dismember the nation within two weeks, as had happened in 1971, leaving the leadership 
with… ‘no option but to go nuclear.’”128 Former Pakistani military officer Feroz Khan 
expressed similar views: 
nuclear weapons were seen as a force multiplier to deter aggression by conventional force. As 
nuclear capability developed, it compensated for Pakistan’s limited resources and its strategic 
asymmetry with India. Nuclear weapons are critical to Pakistan and an assurance for national 
survival. There is no constituency in Pakistan that believes otherwise.129 
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3.1.2 Nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’ 
When, then, did Pakistan begin to perceive that its growing nuclear capabilities were deterring 
the superior conventional forces of India? 
It was 1988 that Pakistan reportedly reached threshold status in terms of the technical 
ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. Early that year US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Robert A. Peck asserted that “Pakistan has acquired 
the technical capabilities needed to possess a nuclear explosive device, but so far has not made 
the political decision to do so”, with estimates on assemblage time should the decision be made 
ranging from months to hours.130 
Pakistani perceptions about the strategic value of its threshold status were tested in 1989 
when resistance to Indian rule materialised in Jammu and Kashmir (the Indian-controlled 
portion of the disputed Kashmir territory), leading to sporadic outbreaks of popular violence 
that escalated into a full-fledged insurgency.131 Pakistan, seeing an opportunity to press its own 
claims in the region, began providing political and material support to insurgent elements, 
causing friction between New Delhi and Islamabad with each side blaming the other for the 
deteriorating situation in the disputed region. Perceiving that India would seek military 
recriminations against Pakistan, on 20 January 1990 a meeting between the top Pakistani power 
brokers resolved to “deter this impending threat”.132 
In a widely publicised New Yorker article published in 1993, journalist Seymour Hersh 
reported that in the early spring of 1990 US intelligence assessed with “100 per cent reliability” 
that the command to assemble functional nuclear weapons had been given,133 and by May 
Pakistan had assembled between six and ten such devices.134 Citing an anonymous US analyst, 
Hersh also reported that in late May US satellites detected truck convoys travelling from 
suspected nuclear storage sites to nearby air bases, and Pakistani F-16s, which had previously 
been modified to deliver nuclear weapons and had been used in aerial drop cold tests, “pre-
positioned and armed for delivery—on full alert, with pilots in the aircraft”, effectively putting 
                                                 
130 Smith, “A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan.” 
131 B. Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), 54-69. 
132 Khan, Eating Grass, 230. 
133 See also George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1999), 308-09 (note 88). 
134 Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge.” 
Christopher J. Watterson 
58 
 
Pakistan in the position to deliver a nuclear strike against India at a moment’s notice.135 These 
accounts were corroborated by subsequent interviews with General Mirsav Aslam Beg, then 
Army Chief and one third of the ‘troika’ of Pakistani nuclear decision-making,136 with Beg 
stating in an interview in September 2005 that: 
A squadron of F-16s was moved to Mauripur and we pulled out our devices and all to arm the 
aircraft … which were picked up by American satellites… [A]ll movement was made in a 
way that is visible, because the purpose was not to precipitate a crisis but to deter… It was 
therefore necessary to convey deterrence signaling by letting the Americans pick up Pakistani 
preparations and convey it to both India (and Israel) about the consequences.137 
In a subsequent interview Beg recounted in more detail and in more certain terms that: 
I ordered the F-16s we had adapted to be armed. We had also recalibrated our French Mirage 
jets so that they, too, could be used to carry a nuclear device. Our few rockets similarly had 
warheads attached to them and were placed on alert. Our panoply, although at this stage fairly 
crude, of nuclear weapons was activated. This was what I meant by a nuclear umbrella. Now 
India would have to be convinced of our intent and in the face of our new-found strength 
would surely not risk an attack—even though we were stirring the pot in Kashmir.138 
Though Beg’s and others’ account of Pakistani nuclear signalling through the arming 
of its F-16s remains somewhat controversial,139 other evidence supports the general proposition 
of a coordinated campaign of Pakistani nuclear signalling during the crisis. For example, in 
late January 1990 Pakistan sent Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan to meet his 
counterpart in Delhi, purportedly to caution India against a planned Indo-Israeli strike against 
Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility that had been detected by Pakistani intelligence. Beg recalled 
the substance of the message to India as: “whether it comes from Israel or elsewhere, we will 
hold India responsible and strike back at India.” Though Khan rejected any nuclear undertones 
to this message, both Beg and the Indian Minister of External Affairs Inder Kumar Gujral had 
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interpreted the diplomatic exercise as one of conveying a nuclear threat.140 In another example, 
Tanvir Ahmad Khan, then secretary of Information and Broadcasting, recalls being asked by 
the Pakistani Army to convey a message to the media in March–April that “we [Pakistan] are 
in a position to destroy targets of value. The implication was Bombay.” As Feroz Khan 
observes, Tanvir Khan “seems to support General Beg’s contention that signaling a nuclear 
threat to India was an approved policy of the government.”141 Certainly the nuclear threat was 
taken seriously in Delhi, with the Indian Prime Minister and Air Chief Marshal having, at the 
time of the crisis, having discussed contingencies regarding “hostile Pakistani aircraft carrying 
nuclear weapons”.142 
Thus, in 1990 Pakistan had assembled its first nuclear device and begun signalling its 
nuclear capabilities in order to deter a conventional military attack from India. Did, however, 
the Pakistani elite perceive that such signalling was effective in so deterring the Indians (the 
threshold of nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’ as defined in this study)? Evidence suggests that it 
was. Beg, for example, stated in a 1992 interview that 
In the case of weapons of mass destruction it is not the numbers that matter, but the 
destruction that can be caused by even a few. The strategy of terror starts working from the 
first notion that there is retaliation. The fear of retaliation lessens the likelihood of war 
between India and Pakistan. I can assure you that if there were no such fear, we would 
probably have gone to war in 1990.143 
Senior Pakistani diplomatic and military staff had similarly concluded in a 1999 article that 
“1990 was one instance when Pakistan’s nuclear capability deterred an Indian attack.”144 
Indeed, Hoodbhoy characterises a widespread belief in Pakistan that they had achieved nuclear 
deterrence during the crisis: 
Many Pakistani believers in nuclearization cite May 1990 as the nation’s first exercise of its 
nuclear muscle and offer it as proof of its power to deter. ... Enshrined as an article of faith is 
that Pakistan’s threat of nuclear devastation stopped Indian aggression dead in its tracks.145 
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Perkovich further states that “What changed after 1990 was the perception that India and 
Pakistan had nuclear weapon capabilities that were now affecting political and strategic 
decisions.”146 
Accordingly, from 1990 many Pakistani officials began extolling the virtues of nuclear 
deterrence in preventing further war on the subcontinent. Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) Beg 
wrote in 1994, for example, that “It is the nuclear deterrent that has kept wars in South Asia at 
bay”,147 and in subsequent interviews asserted that “We have no fear of war; [this lack of fear] 
has been possible because of nuclear deterrence which exists today on the subcontinent”,148 
and “Despite having a massive strength in conventional arms, India dare not attack Pakistan 
because of the fear of a nuclear strike”.149 Foreign Minister (1993; 1999-2002) Abdul Sattar 
was published in a 1995 book as saying that the “attainment of nuclear capabilities by Pakistan 
and India has helped promote stability and prevented dangers of war”.150 Jalil Jilani, a high-
ranking bureaucrat within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in an interview that “Since 
Pakistan’s acquisition of [an overt] nuclear capacity, Pakistan has felt much less threatened” 
by Indian conventional capabilities.151 Prime Minister (1988-90; 1993-96) Benazir Bhutto 
remarked in an interview that she and other Pakistani decision-makers had concluded that 
“having [a] nuclear capability would ensure that India could not launch a conventional war, 
knowing that it if did, it would turn nuclear”,152 and in another interview stated that “we thought 
our nuclear deterrent would prevent India from doing a war against us”.153 And in a report by 
the Kargil Review Committee, analysts commissioned by the Indian government to appraise 
the causes and implications of the 1999 Kargil War, it was argued that “It is evident from 
Pakistani pronouncements and the writings of those with access to the highest decision-making 
levels, that … Pakistan was convinced that its nuclear weapons capability would deter India’s 
superior conventional forces.”154  
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Though such public emphasises on the peace and security dividends of Pakistani 
proliferation were likely as much about justifying their own nuclear development as they were 
honest appraisals of Pakistani perceptions, similar sentiments were also echoed in the private 
forums of the Pakistani decision-making elite, suggesting a sincerity to these statements. For 
example, whilst on a tour of Pakistani positions in Siachen in 1999, Pakistan Army Chief of 
Staff (1998-2007) General Pervez Musharraf stated that, with both countries acquiring nuclear 
weapons, “there is zero chance of war”.155 Musharraf summed up Pakistani perceptions in a 
1998 meeting at the Corps Commanders Conference at Pakistan Army General Headquarters 
when stated that there was “no serious external threat to Pakistan”.156 
Notionally, such Pakistani perceptions as to the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence 
were only bolstered by the public statements of the Indian elite who declared that such 
deterrence was in effect. For example, former army chief General Krishnaswami Sundarji was 
quoted in the Indian press in 1990 as stating that “any sensible planner sitting on this side of 
the border is going to assume Pakistan does indeed have nuclear weapon capability.”157 Three 
years later, a “senior general of the Indian Army” was quoted in the Indian press as stating that 
“What the nuclear capability does is to make sure that the old scenarios of Indian armour 
crossing the Sukkur barrage over the Indus and slicing Pakistan into two are a thing of the 
past”.158 
Thus, 1990 appears the best determination as to Pakistani nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’ 
as defined in this study. That is, from 1990 Pakistan perceived that its nuclear weapons 
capabilities were increasing its survivability in anarchy, specifically with regards to an all-out 
attack by the conventionally superior Indian forces. On this basis, and according to the theories 
set out in chapter 2, we should see change in Pakistan’s foreign policy behaviour from this 
date. The following section tests this proposition by measuring and comparing Pakistani 
foreign policy aggression in the ten years immediately preceding and following nuclear 
weapons acquisition across four foreign policy indicators. 
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3.2 Indicators 
3.2.1 Indicator 1: Conventional military assets 
The first foreign policy indicator examined here is Pakistan’s procurement of conventional 
military assets, specifically combat tanks, aircraft and military personnel. In a defensive realist 
framework, we would expect Pakistan to eschew the pecuniary and balancing costs of 
conventional force build-ups following nuclear weapons acquisition, instead shifting the 
burden of defence to nuclear deterrence. In an offensive realist framework, on the other hand, 
Pakistan would continue to bolster its conventional capabilities, seeking to take advantage of 
the new strategic opportunities afforded by its nuclear capabilities in pursuing hegemony 
through conventional militarism. Table 2 shows that across all three measures Pakistan 
increased its conventional military strength from 16 to 39 percent at statistically significant 
levels (p < 0.05), consistent with the expectations of offensive realism. What’s more, and 
demonstrative of the Pakistani determination to bolster its conventional capabilities, this build-
up came despite real economic hardship. Average annual GDP growth had dropped nearly three 
percentage points from the 1980s,159 and the end of the Afghan War and the imposition of the 
US Pressler sanctions in 1990 had seen US military and economic aid all but disappear.160 
Pakistan’s persistence with military growth in a period of economic retrenchment was 
justified publicly by the ongoing military threat from India. Brigadier Syed Mujtaba had stated 
in August 1999, for example, that “Pakistan cannot afford to downsize its troops because it has 
to also keep a conventional force against India.”161 Given that Pakistan had expressed 
confidence in nuclear deterrence preventing an all-out conventional Indian assault, to the extent 
that such sentiments were sincere and such a build-up was defensive in nature, they likely 
reflected a concern with India’s ability to engage in limited warfare which, as discussed 
previously, often falls below the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Pakistani analysts, for 
example, whilst noting the ‘futility’ of all-out war, continued to preach vigilance to other means 
of Indian aggression such as covert destabilisation programs, state-sponsored terrorism, and 
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Table 2. Pakistan conventional military assets 1980-99 
 Combat tanks Combat aircraft Military personnel (‘000) 
1980 1,065 256 467 
1981 1,350 220 560 
1982 1,350 219 588 
1983 1,321 259 479 
1984 1,421 314 479 
1985 1,506 375 483 
1986 1,600 373 483 
1987 1,600 381 481 
1988 1,600 338 481 
1989 1,750 451 520 
1990 1,850 470 550 
1991 1,980 327 565 
1992 1,980 352 580 
1993 1,890 393 580 
1994 1,950 430 580 
1995 2,050 430 580 
1996 2,050 430 580 
1997 2,120 429 610 
1998 2,120 410 590 
1999 2,320 389 590 
    
Pre-nuclear avg. 1,456.3 318.6 502.1 
Nuclear avg. 2,031.0 406.0 580.5 
Change factor 0.39 0.27 0.16 
p* 0.0000 0.0078 0.0001 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
 
low-intensity conflicts.162 This explanation alone, however, is unsatisfying. For instance, it’s 
not clear why Pakistan would need 580,000 forces in being, 16% more than the pre-nuclear era 
where an all-out conventional war was still regarded as a possibility, to manage ‘low-intensity 
conflicts’, even given the perceived incorrigible militancy of India. 
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A second explanation that finds more purchase relates to the bureaucratic interests of 
the military. The military is a powerful political actor in Pakistan, with clearly defined spheres 
of influence around defence policy. Under the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq from 1978-
88 this political role was uncontested, though even following the transition to competitive 
democracy following Zia’s death in 1988 the military retained its control in defence policy. 
Following civilian politician Benazir Bhutto’s victory in the 1988 elections, for example, the 
military withheld her appointment until she entered into a deal in which she agreed, inter alia, 
to non-interference in military affairs, including the nuclear weapons program and budget 
outlays.163 According to Rizvi, the military is 
opposed to any unilateral cut in defence expenditure by civilian leaders. Its senior 
commanders are prepared to discuss budgetary issues with their non-military leaders, but they 
are opposed to critical public statements by government leaders or to any reduction that has 
not previously been cleared with them.164 
According to Nawaz, this unrestrained access to financing led to familiar pathologies in 
parastatal enterprises, including over-subsidisation, over-employment, and feather-bedding.165 
Such inefficiencies might readily have manifested in the procurement of conventional assets 
beyond minimum security needs. 
A third explanation, and one consistent with the expectations of offensive realism, is 
that Pakistan sought to take advantage of the strategic opportunities of nuclear weapons 
acquisition by more aggressively pursuing regional hegemony through conventional 
militarism, and required enhanced conventional capabilities to back this policy. This possibility 
is discussed in the following section. 
3.2.2 Indicators 2 and 3: Militarised conflict initiation and policies toward 
occupied/disputed territories 
The second and third foreign policy indicators examined here are Pakistan’s initiation of 
militarised conflicts and its policies toward occupied and disputed territories. For both, 
defensive realism predicts a reduction in foreign policy aggression, specifically in terms of 
fewer initiated conflicts and a greater willingness to compromise on its claims to disputed and 
occupied territories. Offensive realism, on the other hand, predicts that Pakistan would scale 
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up both its initiation of militarised conflicts, and more aggressively pursue its claims to 
occupied/disputed territories. 
With respect to militarised conflict initiation, Figure 1 shows that the average number 
of Pakistan-initiated conflict days remained fairly constant across the pre-nuclear and nuclear 
eras, dropping only 1% from an average of 277 to 274 (p = 0.9658).166 By this metric alone, 
neither offensive nor defensive realism finds support over the null hypothesis. However, whilst 
there was no net growth in Pakistani conflict initiation between the pre-nuclear and nuclear 
eras in quantitative terms, I argue that Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons did embolden 
its use of conventional militarised conflict in pushing its claims to the disputed territory of 
Kashmir, consistent with the expectations of offensive realism. Specifically, by using its 
nuclear deterrent as a shield to prevent Indian reprisal attacks, Pakistan utilised limited 
conventional attacks as a means of militarily pursuing territorial hegemony in Kashmir. This 
argument is developed below. 
 
Figure 1. Pakistan-initiated conflict days 
3.2.2.1 The Kashmir territorial dispute 
Kashmir is a 222,000 km2 mountainous region flanking the northeast of Pakistan and northern 
India. Kashmir was annexed into British India in 1846 where it enjoyed a ‘Princely State’ 
status, granting it a high level of governing autonomy subject to the paramountcy of the British 
Crown.167 At the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, Kashmir was presented with 
the choice of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or attempting to forge a path as an 
independent South Asian state. Opinion amongst the Muslim-majority population was divided, 
however the State’s Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, indicated a preference for autonomy, 
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declaring an ambition “to make Kashmir the Switzerland of the East–a State that is completely 
neutral.”168 Shortly afterward a violent insurgency by Pakistan-backed militants emerged in the 
region’s west seeking to take the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar and facilitate annexation with 
Pakistan. Hari Singh, in exchange for Indian military support, acceded to the Indian Union, 
with India committing to a plebiscite to resolve the question of Kashmir’s ultimate annexation 
to Pakistan or India “once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal 
conditions restored”.169 Following Kashmir’s accession India airlifted military forces and 
supplies to Srinagar and began clashes with the militants, who were later supported by regular 
Pakistani forces, thus beginning the 1947 Indo-Pak War.170 The War concluded in 1949 with a 
ceasefire line dividing Kashmir into Pakistani and Indian controlled hemispheres: Gilgit-
Balistan and Azad Kashmir belonging to Pakistan; and Jammu, Ladakh, and the Kashmir 
Valley (collectively referred to as Jammu and Kashmir; see Figure 2) belonging to India. The 
ceasefire line, which was formalised as a line of control (LoC) following the second Indo-
Pakistani War in 1971, has remained for the most part unchanged since its initial demarcation, 
marking the territorial status quo in the region. 
Divided control of Kashmir remains a sore point in Indo-Pakistani relations. India has 
since walked away from its commitment to a region-wide plebiscite in favour of the territorial 
status quo, though still formally claims the entirety of Kashmir under the 1947 Instrument of 
Accession.171 Pakistan, on the other hand, maintains that all of Muslim-majority Kashmir 
rightfully belongs to Pakistan under the terms of partition, and that the only legitimate way of 
determining sovereignty is the promised region-wide plebiscite, this line being anchored in the 
belief that such a plebiscite would fall in Pakistan’s favour.172 The only change in Pakistan’s 
claims to Kashmir came in 1963 when it ceded its claim to Shaksgam Valley (a.k.a. the Trans-
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Karakoram Tract), a 10,000 km2 region abutting Pakistani Gilgit-Baltistan and Chinese 
Xinjiang, to China under the Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement. Apart from this, Pakistan has 
retained its maximal claims to Kashmir to the present day. 
 
Figure 2. Kashmir. India-controlled areas in blue, Pakistan-controlled areas in green, and China-controlled areas 
in yellow. Throughout this study, the disputed region in its entirety is referred to as ‘Kashmir’.173 
Contemporary Pakistan has several geostrategic interests in Kashmir. Indian territorial 
holdings in Kashmir increase the Indo-Pak differential in territory and population, whilst 
granting India the capacity to flank Pakistan across its northern frontier in the event of a 
militarised conflict. It also places Indian territory perilously close to Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi, the political and military centres of Pakistan, respectively (the LoC is within 
100km of both), as well as the road and rail lines linking Lahore and Peshawar, two major 
industrial and population centres. Were the entire of Kashmir to come under Indian control, 
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Pakistan would also lose overland access to China, a key trading partner and arms supplier, and 
would face encirclement were India to form a united front with Afghanistan.174 
3.2.2.2 Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in the nuclear era 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s New Delhi had been engaged in a series of heavy-handed 
manoeuvres to solidify its control over Jammu and Kashmir, causing resentment within the 
local citizenry for the loss of the region’s autonomous status within the Indian union. 
Frustrations came to a head following the rigging of the 1987 Kashmiri state assembly 
elections, following which demonstrations, strikes and attacks against government targets 
became increasingly common.175 By 1990, coincident with Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons (discussed above), 
violent clashes between insurgents and security forces had become daily occurrences, leading 
the Indian government to dissolve the Kashmiri state assembly and place the territory under 
Governor’s Rule. A full-blown insurgency dedicated to overturning Indian rule in the territory 
had erupted.176 
For Pakistan, the emergence of an indigenous insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 
coupled with its acquisition of nuclear weapons offered a unique opportunity to push its claims 
to the disputed territory through a causal mechanism known widely in the literature as the 
‘stability-instability paradox’.177 Specifically, given its nuclear capabilities, Pakistan saw that 
India would be deterred from launching any major conventional offensive that could touch off 
a nuclear exchange. This would allow Pakistan to press its claims in Kashmir through a series 
of small militarily adventures, safe in the knowledge that doing so would not precipitate a wider 
conflict where India’s conventional advantage could critically threaten Pakistan: 
Pakistani decision-makers had convinced themselves that their achievement of rough nuclear 
parity with India now enabled them to probe along the LoC with impunity. In their view, the 
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Indian leadership, cognizant of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, would desist from using 
overwhelming force and also avoid a dramatic escalation or expansion of the conflict.178 
With an effective ‘nuclear shield’ protecting it from India’s conventional superiority, Pakistan 
was emboldened to renew its military campaign for Kashmir, specifically in the form of a proxy 
war in Jammu and Kashmir.179 By co-opting local Islamist militias and disaffected Kashmiris, 
and utilising tactics refined in the Pakistan-backed Afghan insurgency, Pakistan financed, 
trained, and deployed anti-India guerrillas from bases inside Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to 
fight on the Indian side of the LoC, sometimes supplementing local forces with international 
militants, Pakistani mercenaries, and even disguised Pakistan army regulars. Through such 
proxy warfare a nuclear Pakistan could impose costs on India that weakened the latter’s ability 
and resolve to continue defending its claims to Jammu and Kashmir whilst, at the same time, 
depriving India of effective options for retaliation. Even with the knowledge that Pakistan was 
actively facilitating this insurgency which was responsible for thousands of Indian army and 
Kashmiri civilian deaths, acts of terror, and a massive drain on Indian military resources,180 
India could not vertically escalate the conflict to take the fight directly to Pakistan for fear of 
catalysing a nuclear exchange. Instead, India was forced to respond to insurgent incursions 
through ad hoc counter-insurgency operations whilst Pakistan administered with near-impunity 
its low-cost war of attrition from across the LoC. 
Nuclear weapons were thus central to Pakistan’s policy of insurgency in Jammu and 
Kashmir. Swami described it as “a nuclear jihad, in the sense that it would have been 
unsustainable, even inconceivable, without Pakistan’s acquisition of the Bomb.”181 And, as 
stated by the Kargil Review Committee, 
It would not be unreasonable for Pakistan to have concluded by 1990 that it had achieved the 
nuclear deterrence it had set out to establish in 1980. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that it 
could sustain its proxy war against India, inflicting thousands of casualties, without being 
unduly concerned about India’s “conventional superiority”.182 
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This thinking was demonstrated in an interview with Benazir Bhutto, which S. Paul Kapur 
recapitulates thusly: 
Benazir Bhutto, who served her first term as Pakistani prime minister from 1988 to 1990, 
stated, “I doubt that the nuclear capability was [originally] done for Kashmir-specific 
purposes.” She admitted, however, that nuclear weapons quickly “came out” as an important 
tool in that struggle. “The Kashmiris were determined to win their freedom,” and the 
Pakistani government realized that it could now provide extensive support for “a low-scale 
insurgency” in Kashmir while insulated from a full-scale Indian response. “Islamabad saw its 
capability as a deterrence to any future war with India,” Bhutto asserted, because “a 
conventional war could turn nuclear.” Thus even in the face of substantial Pakistani support 
for the Kashmir uprising, “India could not have launched a conventional war, because if it 
did, it would have meant suicide.”183 
Pakistan, for its part, was also determined to avoid conventional war, both because of 
India’s conventional superiority and the mutual threat of nuclear escalation, and thus calibrated 
the intensity of the proxy war so as to not provoke escalation from India.184 “[M]ujahideen 
forces were never provided with equipment that would allow them to pose a serious threat to 
Indian logistics or military infrastructure” such as surface-to-air missiles, and critical Indian 
communications and logistics targets such as the Pathankot-Srinagar highway and Jawahar 
Tunnel were exempt from insurgent attack.185 As encapsulated by one senior Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) official, Pakistan’s aim was “to prick and bleed India … not to prick India so 
hard that it declares war against Pakistan”.186 
3.2.2.3 The Kargil War 
The proxy war in Kashmir came to a head in May 1999 when Pakistani paramilitaries (the 
Northern Light Infantry) under Pakistan Army command infiltrated the LoC and seized the 
highlands surrounding the city of Kargil, several miles inside Indian-controlled Kashmir. India 
responded to this incursion in force, with intense air and ground combat between Pakistani and 
Indian forces occurring on the Indian side of the LoC in the ensuing weeks. The conflict ended 
in July with the full withdrawal of Pakistani troops and an Indian declared victory. The scale 
and intensity of this conflict manifest in over 1,000 battle deaths in under a year of fighting, 
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affording the conflict the appellation of ‘war’ by Correlates of War standards,187 making it the 
first war fought between India and Pakistan since 1971. 
For Pakistan, Kargil was envisaged as a limited operation in which Pakistan-backed 
troops would capture territory in the Kargil highlands and “hold off Indian counterattacks until 
the onset of winter, which would close the passes, halt military operations, and allow Pakistani 
infiltrators to harden their positions. This military fait accompli would enable Pakistan to 
redraw the LoC.”188 Such an operation was seen to serve a number of political and military 
objectives for Pakistan, including bettering its bargaining position in Siachen, which had been 
occupied by Indian troops 15 years earlier; drawing Indian forces away from counter-
insurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley; and countering India’s interdiction of its lines of 
communication to the Neelum Valley by itself interdicting India’s strategic Srinagar-Leh 
highway.189 
In initiating the operation, the architects of Kargil (led by the CoAS Musharraf) 
assessed that India would be unwilling or unable to escalate the terms of the conflict, whether 
vertically or horizontally, thus limiting their ability to oust the intruders. This assessment was 
based on the Pakistani perceptions that Indian troops, demoralised and bogged down in 
counterinsurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley, would have insufficient capabilities to 
mobilise a major counter offensive or open another front along the LoC; and that the Indian 
response would be stifled by the difficult terrain and weather.190 A further Pakistani perception 
was that the Indian response, as with the broader proxy war, would be stifled by Pakistani 
nuclear deterrence, as stated by Benazir Bhutto: “To dislodge us [the Indians] would have to 
resort to conventional war. However, our nuclear capability [gave] the military confidence that 
India [could not] wage a conventional war against Pakistan.”191 Given its ability to inflict 
unacceptable damage upon India, Pakistan 
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now realized that India would be loath to dramatically expand the scope of a conflict for fear 
of escalation to the nuclear level. Consequently, the military became more risk-acceptant in 
planning a ‘limited probe’ to challenge Indian conventional deterrence.192 
This view appeared to predominate in the Pakistani decision-making elite. During the 
hostilities a senior Pakistan official stated that “[t]he Indians cannot afford to extend the war to 
other areas in Kashmir, leave aside launching an attack across the international boundaries” 
because of the “risk of nuclear conflagration”.193 In a 2004 interview, whilst reflecting on 
Kargil, Jilani stated that nuclear weapons had “deterred India” from an all-out conventional 
retaliation against Pakistan.194 Similarly, Bhutto stated in a 2003 interview that “elements 
within the military” believed that, “irrespective of the presence of troops and the threat of war, 
India could not have launched a conventional war” because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.195 
In addition to the expressed confidence in nuclear deterrence preventing Indian 
escalation, Pakistan also appeared to believe that the international community, keen to avoid a 
nuclear exchange in South Asia, would intervene in any Indo-Pak militarised crisis to constrain 
the actions of both states, thereby enforcing strategic stability from without – what Narang and 
others describe as ‘catalytic deterrence’.196 Thus, Pakistan perceived that its nuclear weapons 
would prevent a conventional war not only by placing an upper limit on the extent to which 
India could militarily respond, but also by inciting third-party states with a stake in avoiding a 
nuclear exchange in South Asia – principally the US – to put pressure on India to contain any 
retaliatory measures:197 
Pakistani planners assumed that foreign intervention would freeze hostilities at an early stage 
of the crisis, leaving Pakistan in possession of at least some of its gains across the LoC and 
thereby enabling it to bargain over Kashmir from a stronger position.198 
Supporting this proposition, an Indian review of Pakistani military tactics in Kargil revealed 
that many of Pakistan’s forward-occupied posts were operating with only a few days’ worth of 
rations, with resupply routes susceptible to Indian air and artillery interdiction. From this they 
deduced that Pakistan had anticipated that they would be able to “engineer international 
intervention” to stifle the Indian counter-attack and thereby facilitate resupply. The same Indian 
review also cited tapes of conversations between General Musharraf and then Chief of General 
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Staff Lieutenant General Aziz in which they discussed their shared “expectation of early 
international intervention”.199 In a review of Pakistani elite perceptions during the Kargil War, 
Tellis et al. similarly argue that “the government assumed that the international community 
would intervene within a few days or weeks (as had been the case in previous India-Pakistan 
conflicts) in the possible event that India perceived the operation as an act of war and reacted 
conventionally.”200 
3.2.2.4 Internationalising Kashmir 
Though Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities enabled it to pursue its claims to Kashmir through low-
level militarised violence, as the militarily weaker claimant it still faced an uphill battle in 
extracting concessions from India in a bilateral framework. Therefore, Pakistan sought 
diplomatic intervention from international third parties in reaching a settlement on Kashmir, 
both to bring greater pressure to bear on India to negotiate with Pakistan in the first place, and 
to build a coalition of political influence that would exercise greater collective leverage in 
extracting concessions from India, reflecting the view that “third-party intervention can result 
in a territorial settlement superior to any that the weak state [Pakistan] could have secured in 
purely bilateral negotiations with its stronger adversary [India].”201 Pakistan’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons gave it a new means of attracting international attention to its cause in 
Kashmir. By routinely instigating military conflicts with India over Kashmir, and with it the 
implied threat of such militarised conflicts escalating to a nuclear exchange, Pakistan could 
attract attention from international stakeholders with an interest in avoiding regional nuclear 
exchange to the causes of the conflict, and in doing so create incentives for these international 
parties to broker a lasting solution for the purposes of eliminating the nuclear threat in South 
Asia.202 (This mechanism of foreign policy aggression is consistent with the concept of ‘nuclear 
blackmail’ outlined in Table 1, p. 34.) 
Several Pakistani decision-makers have espoused this logic of conflict initiation in 
Kashmir. For example, Benazir Bhutto, in summarising her own views, and those of ‘other 
Pakistani leaders’ and the Pakistan Army, remarked that 
                                                 
199 Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, 224-25. 
200 Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, 38. 
201 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 31. 
202 See Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia”; Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited 
Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, 30; Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, 
197-99. 
Christopher J. Watterson 
74 
 
[the] ability to ward off [an Indian] conventional act may have led to the conclusion that a 
low-scale insurgency in the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir could focus international 
attention on the oldest item on the United Nations agenda, which had remained unresolved. 
Perhaps a low-scale uprising could convince India and the rest of the world community, 
including the United Nations, to address this very important dispute.203 
Similarly, Tellis et al., in summarising the views of Pakistan’s “retired army officers, political 
leadership, and analysts” on the 1999 Kargil War, stated that: 
One strategic objective was the internationalization of the Kashmir issue. By reminding the 
international community that Kashmir is a potential nuclear flashpoint, Pakistan hoped to 
rouse the comity of nations—particularly the United States and China—to force a peace 
process in Kashmir.204 
And, as stated by retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Pakistan’s military adventures in Kashmir 
have been initiated in the “hope that world powers would come to our rescue, intervene, bring 
about a cease fire, and somehow help us achieve our political objectives.”205 
Demonstrative of this policy, Pakistan had, in addresses to various international fora, 
talked up the threat of militarised violence as a result of the irresolution of the Kashmir dispute, 
demonstrating its willingness to use the implied risk of conflict between nuclear powers as a 
means to attracting international attention to its cause. For example, at the 1999 summit of 
eight Islamic Developing Countries, Nawaz Sharif stated that “If peace is to be permanently 
established, the cause of conflict and tension must be eliminated. The eye of the South Asian 
storm has been the unresolved Kashmir dispute. It has to be squarely addressed.”206 Pakistan’s 
ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi, stated in a 1995 speech to the China-America 
Foundation that “South Asia would remain the most dangerous place in the world without a 
just and peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute”.207 And, in a meeting with the Amir of 
Kuwait, Pakistan president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari stated that “Kashmir was a very 
explosive issue as it inspired a weapons race in the subcontinent which could have dangerous 
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consequences.”208 Indeed Pakistan had, on occasion, made explicit the threat of nuclear 
escalation as a result of the irresolution of the Kashmir dispute. In early 1994, for example, 
Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali warned of a “nuclear war” were Kashmir to remain 
unresolved.209  
Content analysis of Pakistani foreign policy statements also shows that Pakistan’s 
solicitations of international involvement in the Kashmir dispute began in earnest from 1990 
(see Table 3), with efforts in this vein including: dispatching ‘high-powered parliamentary 
delegations’ abroad to canvass support for Pakistan’s cause in Kashmir;210 forming the 
Parliamentary Special Committee on Kashmir in 1993 with the expressed purpose of 
“[mobilising] World [sic] opinion in support of the cause of right [sic] of self determination[sic] 
to the people of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the principle [sic] stand of Pakistan”;211 and, 
in 1994, instructing diplomatic envoys to “project the Kashmir dispute and draw public opinion 
on the human rights violations being committed by India in the Valley.”212 Indeed, Pakistan 
made no secret of its goal of drawing international attention to the resurgent Kashmir dispute, 
stating in numerous public fora their intention to ‘internationalise’ the Kashmir issue.213  
In addition to their value in inciting third parties with a stake in avoiding a South Asian 
nuclear exchange to seek a resolution to the territorial dispute, Pakistan also used its nuclear 
weapons as a bargaining chip in drawing international attention to its cause in Kashmir. 
Specifically, throughout the 1990s, Pakistan had appealed to regional powers with an interest 
in non-proliferation – again, principally the US – to bring about a resolution in Kashmir with 
the promise of rolling back its nuclear weapons program if such a resolution could be found. 
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Table 3. Pakistani attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue 
 CA1. General foreign 
policy statement on the 
need to resolve the 
Kashmir issue 
CA2. General foreign policy 
statement in support of a 
plebiscite, or the right to 
‘self-determination’ in 
resolving the Kashmir issue 
CA3. Pakistani requests for 
international involvement in 
the Kashmir issue 
1980 3 0 0 
1981 2 0 0 
1982 1 0 0 
1983 1 0 0 
1984 1 0 0 
1985 1 0 0 
1986 2 1 0 
1987 4 0 0 
1988 2 0 0 
1989 2 1 0 
1990 11 10 4 
1991 12 7 6 
1992 22 6 7 
1993 16 7 10 
1994 18 5 10 
1995 12 3 5 
1996 16 2 3 
1997 27 4 2 
1998 24 2 8 
1999 20 1 2 
    
Pre-nuclear avg. 1.9 0.2 0 
Nuclear avg. 17.8 4.7 5.7 
Change 8.37 22.5 - 
p * 0.0000 0.0007 0.0002 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution).  
Note: On the content analysis methodology see Appendix A. Content analysis methodology  
 
This policy began in the early 1990s, with Pakistan communicating a general interest 
in sacrificing gains in its nuclear weapons capabilities for a resolution in Kashmir. For example, 
in April 1993 Pakistan had sought US pressure on India for a “just resolution” of the Kashmir 
issue, with a Pakistani spokesman stating that “We impressed upon the Americans the 
relevance of a correlation between the resolution of the Kashmir problem and the resolution of 
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the nuclear proliferation problem in South Asia”.214 In July 1993 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
declared that “as long as the Kashmir issue was not resolved, Pakistan could not afford to 
overlook the deterrent value of nuclear weapons”.215 In October 1993 Caretaker Prime Minister 
Moeen Qureshi stated that “the maintenance of potential nuclear deterrence by Pakistan was 
necessary as long as the Kashmir dispute remained a flashpoint in the region.”216 And in 
October 1994 Lodhi, in an address to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, stated 
that the “resolution of Kashmir dispute was the key to agreement on both conventional arms 
and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia.”217 Though none of these statements set the 
specific terms of a bargain, nor attested to the extent to which Pakistan was genuinely 
committed to negotiating away its nuclear weapons, they imply a certain outward willingness 
exchange gains in its nuclear weapons program for outcomes in Kashmir, or at least a 
willingness to project that image to an international audience. 
Pakistan’s efforts in this vein became more focussed in the second half of the 1990s in 
that it offered specific compromises on its nuclear weapons program, though the stated 
bargaining objectives in Kashmir remained vaguely defined as a nondescript ‘resolution’ or 
‘settlement’ of the territorial dispute. For example, in July 1998 Pakistan expressed a 
willingness to “sign with India a non-aggression pact including non-use of nuclear weapons as 
part of a comprehensive disarmament pact based on a just and fair settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute.”218 In June and December 1998 Pakistan had also explicitly linked its signing of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) with “a solution of Kashmir dispute [sic] 
with India”219 and the Kashmir issue being “meaningfully addressed”,220 respectively.221 
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In sum, Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir remained maximal in the nuclear era. It explicitly 
rejected various options for compromise with India, such as turning the LoC into an 
international border;222 an endorsement of Kashmiri independence;223 or simply withdrawing 
its claims. What’s more, in the ten years following nuclear weapons acquisition, Pakistan 
became increasingly aggressive in the pursuit of these maximal claims through military and 
diplomatic mechanisms because of its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons 
provided Pakistan with strategic cover under which it could engage in low-level militarism 
across the LoC, whilst also placing pressure on the international community to broker a 
favourable solution to the dispute. I thus code both indicators 2 and 3 as supporting HOR. 
3.2.3 Indicator 4: Other acts of nuclear aggression 
The previous three indicators have examined the foreign policy implications of nuclear 
weapons acquisition for Pakistani conventional militarism and territorial disputes. These 
empirical foci do not, however, reflect the full theoretical implication of nuclear weapons 
acquisition on a state’s foreign policies. To expand the empirical scope of analysis and identify 
instances of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons affecting its foreign policies that might 
not have been captured in the preceding analysis, a final ‘catch-all’ indicator is advanced. 
Based on a review of the literature, I identify reported instances of Pakistan using its nuclear 
weapons for political gain in the period 1990-99, and assess whether they constituted legitimate 
acts of foreign policy aggression as I define it in this study – that is, one state seeking to increase 
its power (or influence) over another. Such an exercise is undertaken mainly to chronicle such 
variegated Pakistani applications of nuclear weapons for political gain, and induct from them 
broader lessons regarding the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy. Moreover, by 
identifying such instances of nuclear weapons-driven foreign policy aggression (or ‘nuclear 
aggression’, for short), we have additional data points in adjudicating between HOR and HDR. 
Given that, in general terms, offensive realism predicts more foreign policy aggression due to 
nuclear weapons acquisition and defensive realism less, the observance of other such instances 
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of nuclear aggression would support HOR, whereas the non-observance of such acts would 
support HDR. Through my survey of the literature I have identified four such examples in the 
case of Pakistan. They are discussed in sequence below. 
3.2.3.1 Gaining independence from the US 
One application of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in foreign policy aggression reported in the 
literature was its use in gaining independence from its super power patron: the US. Bell 
describes this mechanism as follows: 
By providing an internal source of military power that the state previously lacked, nuclear 
weapons can provide a state with less need to rely on external sources of military power, i.e. 
alliances. The alliance therefore becomes somewhat less valuable than it previously was. As a 
result, the costs of acting independently of the ally, or in ways contrary to the wishes of the 
ally, are reduced because the ally’s support is no longer required to the degree it was prior to 
nuclear acquisition.224 
With Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, it demonstrated an interest in so increasing its 
foreign policy independence. Pakistani military analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi wrote in a 
discussion of the military’s “major interests and concerns” that 
Strong and credible conventional defence and nuclear weapons capabilities are considered 
vital to ward off Indian pressures and to enable Pakistan to conduct independent foreign and 
domestic policies. Unless the military is satisfied that there are credible guarantees against 
India’s efforts to interfere, it will resist surrendering its nuclear-weapon option and advise 
caution on normalizing relations.225 
This thinking was demonstrated by the Pakistani officialdom. In April 1998, following the 
launch of the nuclear-capable Ghauri missile, the Pakistani Information Minister commented 
that “Now [the] country’s fate was not decided by superpowers.”226 Sharif expressed similar 
sentiments in June, following Pakistan’s nuclear tests, claiming that the tests “had brought 
glory to the Muslims of the world who would never bow before any super power now.”227 
Jingoism notwithstanding, it appears as though Pakistan had at least conceived of nuclear 
weapons as a tool for extricating itself from the influence of its super power patron: the US. 
This view was corroborated by a former US official, who had reportedly expressed the view 
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that “Pakistan, anticipating the end of the Cold War, knowingly pushed its nuclear program to 
allow it to move away from the United States.”228 
Table 4. Foreign policy similarity scores between Pakistan and other states 
 US Agreement China Agreement India Agreement 
1980 0.26 0.92 0.83 
1981 0.18 0.91 0.86 
1982 0.16 0.89 0.87 
1983 0.16 0.87 0.83 
1984 0.12 0.88 0.87 
1985 0.17 0.85 0.85 
1986 0.15 0.88 0.86 
1987 0.11 0.92 0.88 
1988 0.11 0.94 0.91 
1989 0.10 0.93 0.91 
1990 0.14 0.90 0.93 
1991 0.13 0.94 0.93 
1992 0.14 0.89 0.88 
1993 0.16 0.92 0.89 
1994 0.28 0.88 0.78 
1995 0.19 0.88 0.85 
1996 0.23 0.88 0.81 
1997 0.22 0.87 0.86 
1998 0.16 0.83 0.89 
1999 0.19 0.87 0.90 
    
Pre-nuclear average 0.15 0.90 0.87 
Nuclear average 0.18 0.89 0.87 
Change 0.21 -0.01 0.00 
p* 0.1599 0.3608 0.8778 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
Note: Similarity scores are derived using Lijphart’s index of agreement method based on UN General Assembly 
voting data.229 A value of ‘1’ means perfect convergence. A value of ‘0’ means perfect divergence. 
 
How specifically Pakistan intended to ‘use’ such independence in spite of US interests 
– i.e. for more or less foreign policy aggression – is unclear. In any case, despite Pakistan’s 
nuclear breakout and its declared interest in pursuing foreign policy independence, it did not, 
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in practice, increasingly distance itself politically from the US in the 1990s. A policy brief 
authored in July 1998 emphasised Pakistan’s need to “strengthen converging strategic interests 
and narrow differences” and “engage constructively with the United States”.230 Demonstrative 
of this imperative, in the following months and years Pakistan made various political 
concessions in courting US economic and military aid, including pledging to assist the US in 
Afghanistan231 and placing controls on transfers of nuclear technology.232 Table 4 also shows 
that, at the macro level, Pakistani foreign policy did not become more differentiated from the 
US in the nuclear era, but rather saw a net increase in similarity. 
There are a number of plausible explanations as to why Pakistan did not adopt greater 
independence from the US despite the security gains of nuclear weapons acquisition. Bell 
hypothesises generally that nuclear-armed states engaged in ‘serious territorial threats or 
ongoing wars’ will not pursue independence from senior allies, as “States in dire security 
environments are eager to accept assistance from other states, and do not wish to jeopardize 
their relationships with allies who may be able to help improve their security if at all 
possible.”233 This could be applied to the Pakistan case vis-à-vis the decades-long contest for 
Kashmir: with the contest for Kashmir entering its fifth decade, Pakistan would logically be 
more concerned with amassing all the good will it could to its cause rather than exploring the 
strategic opportunities of independence from the US. 
A second explanation was suggested by Feroz Khan, who argued that it was Pakistan’s 
need of the US to reign in South Asian military crises (i.e. ‘enforce strategic stability from 
without’ as in the Kargil War discussion above) that increased its dependence on the US.234 
Without the support and intercession of the US in South Asian crises, Pakistan would become 
increasingly vulnerable to conventional reprisals or a nuclear exchange following limited 
military aggressions against India. 
A third explanation is that Pakistan had sought to manage the adverse effects of US 
sanctions, imposed in 1990 and 1998 in response to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
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development,235 by remaining generally obedient to US policy preferences (if not with respect 
to non-proliferation). US sanctions had led to large losses in the Pakistani stock market and 
foreign currency reserves, a delay in the shipment of pre-paid F-16s, and the loss of over one 
billion dollars in IMF funding.236 
Assessing which of these explanations is superior is beyond the scope of this study. At 
this stage it is sufficient to say that Pakistan did not use its nuclear weapons program in 
pursuing more aggressive foreign policies by distancing itself from its superpower patron. 
3.2.3.2 Extending deterrence to Islamic states 
Another application of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in foreign policy aggression reported in the 
literature is through external balancing. A nuclear-armed state can expand its influence (i.e. 
power) over another state by offering it a security guarantee through extended nuclear 
deterrence. Under this arrangement, the protégé state must make concessions to the nuclear-
armed state in order to maintain the security benefits of extended deterrence. At any stage if 
the nuclear-armed state does not feel that sufficient concessions are being made, it can revoke 
its security guarantees from the protégé state. The nuclear-armed state therefore gains influence 
over the protégé state by trading on the security benefits of nuclear deterrence. This mechanism 
is the inverse of the abovementioned ability of nuclear-armed states to remove themselves from 
alliances. The latter mechanism gains power by increasing independence from a patron state, 
whereas this mechanism gains power by creating dependence in a client state. 
In the case of Pakistan, Islamabad had, from an early stage, expressed an interest in 
extending nuclear deterrence to other Muslim states in the Middle East. Such a policy was first 
suggested when Pakistani leaders began to emphasise the pan-Islamic character of the Pakistani 
nuclear program. In 1986, for example, Zia had suggested that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program could be used to redress the balance of power in favour of the Islamic states in the 
Middle East: “China, India, USSR and Israel in the Middle East, possess the atomic arms. No 
Muslim country has any [nuclear weapons]. If Pakistan has such a weapon, it would reinforce 
the power of the Muslim world”.237 In a private forum deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto similarly stated that “The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have this capability. 
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The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that 
position was about to change.”238 Such a policy was expounded by Beg following the 1998 
nuclear tests: 
The idea is only to provide the requisite deterrence to our Muslim countries who are under 
strategic bondage of Israel … Pakistan’s nuclear capability serves to maintain the correct 
level of deterrence against India, as well as provide a meaningful deterrent against Israel. This 
enhanced capability provides new geo-strategic options to Pakistan and opportunities, 
demanding a much more aggressive and dynamic foreign policy to strengthen the security of 
Pakistan and the entire region from the Middle East, to the Gulf, West Asia and South Asia … 
[The ability to play this role requires] understanding and support from friendly countries, [for 
Pakistan] to play the role of an equaliser and balancer of power in the region.239 
Though such a statement did not set any specific terms of a possible extended deterrent 
arrangement, and was made when Beg was no longer a military official, it provides a snapshot 
of Pakistani thinking on such a policy. Specifically, it was envisaged that extended deterrence 
might be used to procure “understanding and support” from Middle Eastern countries. What 
this meant in operational terms is unclear, though Pakistani analysts had suggested that a 
coalition of allied Middle Eastern states could help Pakistan both in balancing Indian military 
superiority and bringing greater pressure to bear for an international solution to Kashmir.240 In 
any case, Beg made clear his view that extended deterrence could facilitate a “much more 
aggressive and dynamic foreign policy”. 
Though it would be easy to do, it is perhaps not sufficient to write-off statements in 
support of such a policy as merely empty rhetoric or Islamic populism. As will be seen in the 
following section, military leaders, especially Beg, genuinely favoured nuclear cooperation 
with Islamic states as a way of increasing Pakistani regional influence and reducing its 
dependence on the US. Accordingly, such commentary appeared to have weight with foreign 
observers. Following Pakistan’s nuclear tests, for example, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal 
Kharrazi had stated that “Muslims now feel more confident that Pakistan’s nuclear capability 
would play a role of deterrence to Israel’s nuclear capability”.241 
Despite such sentiments, however, Pakistan has never formally entered into an extended 
deterrent arrangement, and during the 1990s it was far from certain that Pakistan would actually 
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intercede with offers of extended deterrence were an Israeli-Islamic conflict to emerge. Instead, 
the civilian leadership played down the prospects of extending deterrence to other Islamic 
states. In response to Kharrazi’s statement, for example, Sharif “refus[ed] to describe 
Pakistan’s nuclear program as part of the Islamic world’s struggle to alter the international 
balance of power in its favour”,242 stating instead that “bombs do not have religious identities, 
only national identities.”243 In a subsequent interview he declared that “Our decision to exercise 
the nuclear option was related solely to Pakistan’s requirements for national defence and was 
taken in our supreme national interest”.244 And when queried by the press on approaches to 
containing a nuclear-armed Israel, Yasmeen notes that Sharif “refrained from giving any hint 
that the Pakistani bomb could be used in the Middle East. Instead, he limited his comments to 
reaffirming his support for the peace process”.245 Similarly, in a 1998 survey of 898 policy 
elite, 0% expressed a view that Pakistan ‘could use nuclear weapons’ if “a major Islamic state 
were threatened”.246 
The reason for the civilian leadership’s unwillingness to back the proposals of former 
military leaders in extending support to the Islamic states (apart, presumably, from being drawn 
into a conflict with a state with a superior nuclear force) was seemingly the adverse 
implications of such a move for Pakistan’s relationship with the US. Pakistani analyst Eqbal 
Ahmad wrote that the leadership “knows that at the slightest hint of it [a policy of extended 
deterrence], the wrath of the United States shall fall on us; only then shall we experience real 
sanctions. It is a risk that cannot be taken, and our officials have been vowing not to take it.”247 
The apparent disagreement between civilian and military leaders on this policy brings 
us to a germane point, one alluded to in earlier discussions, regarding the complex and 
interpersonal nature of political power in Pakistan. Rather than a unitary and deliberative 
agency of foreign policy, Pakistani international behaviour is controlled by various competing 
fiefdoms with limited spheres of influence organised around powerful individuals from 
civilian, military, religious and scientific backgrounds. Within this anarchic structure, the 
civilian and military elite frequently butt heads on nuclear and security decision-making, with 
the military generally championing the more aggressive policy. The decision to test in May 
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1998, for example, came only after intense military pressure, with Prime Minister Sharif and 
his cabinet initially “reluctant to order nuclear tests because of their potential implications for 
Pakistan’s fragile economy.”248 In the case of extended deterrence, for whatever reason, the 
civilian leadership won the policy debate and nuclear restraint was exercised, though this 
instance does demonstrate the susceptibility of Pakistani foreign policy to the aggressive 
influence of the military, a point returned to below. 
3.2.3.3 Trading its nuclear secrets with nuclear aspirants 
Another application of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in foreign policy aggression reported in the 
literature is through transferring nuclear capabilities. Through this mechanism a nuclear-armed 
state transfers sensitive nuclear technologies and materials from its nuclear weapons program 
to other states in exchange for political concessions. By enticing the receiving party to make 
political concessions in exchange for nuclear technology, the nuclear-armed state has 
effectively increased its influence, or power, over that state. This in analogous to the more well-
known instrument of political foreign aid. In this case, however, rather than money or civilian 
technology, the ‘carrot’ of political patronage is nuclear weapons technologies. Nuclear-armed 
states may also trade their nuclear weapons capabilities for hard currency or reciprocal 
exchanges of technology, rather than political concessions. Such behaviours, whilst 
opportunistic, are not strictly ‘aggressive’ as I define in section 2.2.2, as they do not directly 
increase the nuclear-armed state’s influence (or power) over the receiving state. Rather, they 
represent a simple commercial exchange between sovereign equals. 
Pakistan had, in the earliest stages of its nuclear weapons program, indicated an interest 
in trading on its nascent nuclear weapons capabilities with other states. Following the Indian 
nuclear tests of 1974, for example, Pakistan had reportedly reached out to Saudi Arabia and 
Libya for financial assistance and nuclear fuel in exchange for future access to its nuclear 
technology and the promise “that Pakistan’s nuclear program would serve the interests of the 
entire Islamic community.”249 Such sentiments were repeated by Zia in 1986: “They [Western 
states] are fearful that if an Islamic country such as Pakistan acquires this [nuclear weapons] 
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technology they will spread it. … It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire 
this technology, the entire Islamic world will possess it with us.”250 
Hard evidence of such Pakistani nuclear transfers came in 2004 when eminent Pakistani 
nuclear scientist and former head of KRL A.Q. Khan confessed to facilitating the transfer of 
sensitive nuclear materials to other nuclear aspirants, including Iran, North Korea and Libya. 
From the mid-1980s to the early 2000s Khan, drawing on the same covert procurement 
networks and tactics that he had established in building the Pakistani bomb, had directly 
engaged and traded with foreign governments.251 Following these disclosures Islamabad 
vehemently denied any knowledge of Khan’s activities, though speculation was rife that 
Pakistan was not only aware of the activities of the ‘rogue’ scientist, but was complicit in, and 
profiting from them.252 
A number of studies have sought to determine any such official sanction of Khan’s 
activities.253 In answering the question “were nuclear exports a personal initiative or a State 
policy?”, Tertrais writes “The answer is: a little bit of both, in various proportions, according 
to the circumstances.”254 According to Tertrais, some officials supported to some extent some 
of the trades and derived some benefit from them, with “Khan likely exceed[ing] whatever 
mandate he received from Pakistani leadership.”255 Thus, and demonstrative of the diffuse 
nature of decision-making discussed above, such trades, where officially sanctioned, were 
determined by the interests and initiatives of individual officials rather than crystallised state 
policy. Khan’s operational autonomy, poor internal controls of nuclear materials and 
equipment, the secrecy (internal and external) and compartmentalisation of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program, and fractious civil-military relations created an environment that was 
conducive to ad hoc and opportunistic nuclear deals organised by cabals of government and 
non-government elites. 
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Take, for example, nuclear cooperation with Iran in the late 1980s and early 90s. In 
1989 the Pakistani military – led by pro-Iranian CoAS General Beg – had independently 
offered to transfer nuclear technology to Iran. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsandjani contacted 
Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto to seek her blessing for this arrangement, which she refused.256 
Despite Bhutto’s opposition, the deal went ahead after, as claimed by Khan, Bhutto’s own 
military advisor, General Imtiaz Ali, expressed his support for the trade. Two years later Beg 
put his case forward for ongoing Iranian nuclear transfers directly to Prime Minister Sharif as 
a “way to finance the defense budget and ISI operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir, especially 
in light of coming U.S. sanctions.”257 Sharif refused, though, as stated by former US 
ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, this “did not necessarily mean that Beg and A.Q. Khan 
did not go forward”.258 Indeed, subsequent investigations have found evidence that Khan 
transferred “outdated hardware” to Iran in early 1991, and that he had made Beg aware of this 
transfer.259 
Were such trades, where they were sanctioned by government or military officials, acts 
of nuclear aggression? To constitute a legitimate act of foreign policy aggression, so defined, 
such trades must have been undertaken with the intention of extracting political (rather than 
monetary) concessions from the recipient state. The author could find no evidence of an explicit 
political quid pro quo set as a term of any exchange, proposed or completed. By all accounts 
such transfers were predominantly commercial in nature, with Pakistan seeking to fill the 
material void left by US sanctions. To the extent that such exchanges were political (i.e. not 
determined by commercial interests), they instead appear to have been directed at increasing 
Pakistan’s power over a third party: the US. This leads to the fourth purported mechanism of 
Pakistani nuclear aggression. 
3.2.3.4 Blackmailing the US for economic and military support 
The final application of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in foreign policy aggression addressed here 
is through the mechanism of nuclear blackmail. Nuclear blackmail involves a nuclear-armed 
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state explicitly threatening some form of nuclear harm – a nuclear strike, transfer of sensitive 
nuclear weapons technologies etc. – unless political concessions are made. By so extracting 
political concessions from another state, the nuclear-armed state increases its influence, or 
power, over that state. As I demonstrate in section 3.2.2, Pakistan had been engaged in nuclear 
blackmail in its use of the threat of nuclear war in South Asia (nuclear harm) to draw 
international advocacy for a resolution of the Kashmir dispute (political concession). I identify 
here a purported second instance of Pakistani nuclear blackmail: Pakistan threatening the US 
with transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies to other states (nuclear harm) unless the US 
withheld sanctions on Pakistan (political concession). 
Reports of such a policy in action came in a 2004 article by the Associated Press, in 
which former Pentagon official Henry Rowen recounted a January 1990 meeting with Beg 
whereby Rowen cautioned that Pakistan’s continued nuclear weapons development could lead 
the US to cut off aid. In response, according to Rowen, “Beg said something like, ‘If we don’t 
get adequate support from the U.S., then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with 
Iran’”.260 Rowen downplayed the incident, declaring that “I didn’t take it all that seriously,”261 
and word of the exchange was not passed on to the subsequent Clinton administration.262 
Moreover, Beg’s alleged threat was never independently verified, nor seemingly repeated, and 
Beg subsequently denied the allegation.263 
Thus, beyond Rowen’s testimony, there is not a strong evidentiary basis to conclude 
that Beg’s alleged statement was a cut-and-dried act of foreign policy aggression. I note, 
however, that such a statement would have been consistent with Beg’s personal policy 
preferences during this period. Unlike the civilian leadership, which was protective of 
Pakistan’s relationship with the US, Beg was, as stated by Tertrais, “a staunch opponent of 
U.S. influence in the region”, and had sought through a policy of ‘strategic defiance’ to wean 
Pakistan from dependence on the US by bolstering its supply of conventional arms and hard 
currency through nuclear transfers with Iran.264 Thus, notionally, Beg would have been less 
inhibited about jeopardising the US relationship with such statements, and more likely to 
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endorse nuclear cooperation with Iran. Absent confirmatory evidence, however, I do not code 
this as an instance of nuclear aggression. 
Thus, across all four purported acts of nuclear aggression reported here, I found none to 
be legitimate. Pakistan had not sought to use the security gains of nuclear weapons acquisition 
to distance itself from the US, instead remaining a pliant ally seeking relief from crippling 
sanctions. Pakistan’s civilian leadership demurred from early and vague commitments to 
extend nuclear deterrence to Middle Eastern states. Though Pakistan did export sensitive 
nuclear technologies to other states through ad hoc, quasi-official exchanges, these were 
commercial, not political transactions, and therefore not warranting of the label of ‘aggression’. 
And, though a senior Pakistani official had reportedly blackmailed a US official with the threat 
of nuclear transfers to Iran, this was an isolated and unverified case, and therefore fell below 
the threshold for measurement as a clear-cut example of nuclear aggression. Thus, whilst 
nuclear aggression was certainly entertained by the Pakistani elite as a foreign policy option, 
there was not sufficient evidence to suggest that Pakistan had, in the period 1990-99, actively 
pursued this policy beyond matters of conventional militarism and territorial disputes 
(discussed in the preceding three indicators). Indicator 4 is therefore coded as supporting HDR. 
3.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the effect of nuclear weapons acquisition on Pakistan’s foreign 
policy across four foreign policy indicators. The results are displayed in Table 5. Overall, 
offensive realism does a better job explaining the Pakistani case than defensive realism. 
Pakistan had used its nuclear capabilities to pursue relative power gains, principally in 
Kashmir, through aggressive foreign policies. Such a finding is inconsistent with HDR, which 
predicts that a nuclear Pakistan would eschew the costs of further competitive foreign policy 
behaviour, instead finding satisfaction in the status quo under the security of nuclear deterrence. 
Table 5. Coding results for the Pakistan case 
 Conventional 
military 
assets 
Militarised 
conflict 
initiation 
Policies toward 
occupied/ disputed 
territories 
Other nuclear weapons-
driven acts of foreign policy 
aggression 
Supported hypothesis Offensive 
realism 
Offensive 
realism 
Offensive realism Defensive realism 
 
In addition to these general findings, thick analysis revealed a number of ‘unit-level’ 
variables that had a role in determining Pakistani foreign policy outcomes. Foremost amongst 
these was the military role in decision making. Across several of the indicators the involvement 
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of the military in decision making pushed the calculus of Pakistani foreign policy toward 
aggression. The military role had, for example, arguably led to wasteful procurement of 
conventional military assets and militarised conflict initiation without civilian oversight. There 
had also been examples of military officials pushing the use of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities 
in various other forms of nuclear aggression, such as in attempting to extend deterrence to other 
Islamic states, only to have such policies vetoed by the civilian leadership. One could induct 
from these observations the hypothesis that, as the political systems of states tend toward 
military authoritarianism, the general character of their foreign policy will become more 
aggressive. Such a hypothesis seems logically plausible. For example, a tendency toward 
worst-case scenario planning might make military institutions more acceptant of the costs of 
aggression – i.e. it might be better to risk facing a balancing coalition in the long term than 
catastrophic military defeat in the short term. Alternatively, bureaucratic self-interest might 
dictate that militaries inflate their import to the nation by initiating and dealing with the fallout 
of international aggression. In the context of nuclear weapons acquisition, we might expect 
such aggressive tendencies to be emboldened by nuclear weapons acquisition in a manner 
generally consistent with the logic of nuclear weapons and offensive realism expounded in 
chapter 2. 
A second unit-level variable of import to Pakistani foreign policy in the nuclear era was 
its relationship with the US: Pakistan’s primary major power patron and guarantor of the non-
proliferation regime. Pakistan’s need to keep the US onside, principally to avoid sanctions 
emergent from its nuclear weapons program, on several occasions appeared to restrain 
Pakistan’s aggressive use of nuclear weapons, for example in extending nuclear deterrence to 
other Islamic states. The US was thus able to use sanctions to impose a relationship of 
dependency on Pakistan, and with this indirectly moderate Pakistani foreign policy, including 
with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, 
those instances where Pakistan did resort to nuclear weapons-driven foreign policy aggression 
were often directed toward an international, and in particular US, audience, for example in 
invoking the risk of a nuclear exchange in South Asia to draw international attention to 
Kashmir. For Pakistan, the existence of a major power with a vested interest in avoiding a 
nuclear exchange and an ability to intercede in regional conflicts to affect outcomes opened 
opportunities to manipulate its nuclear forces for political gain, whilst its dependence on this 
power for economic and military aid restrained it so. This demonstrates the dilemma of super 
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power patronage with nuclear weapons acquisition: it can both encourage and restrain foreign 
policy aggression.265 This point is returned to in the concluding chapter. 
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4 South African nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
On 24 March 1993 South African President Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk announced in a 
joint sitting of parliament that “At one stage South Africa did indeed develop a limited nuclear 
deterrent capability”, confirming what had been a widely held international suspicion dating 
back to the mid-1970s. According to de Klerk, South Africa had produced six fission devices 
under the tutelage of the state arms procurement and production agency Armscor, with 
knowledge of the program limited to a small quorum of scientists and ministers on a ‘need-to-
know’ basis. De Klerk went on to detail the manner in which South Africa had, by 1991, 
decided to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, disassembled its nuclear devices, repurposed its fissile 
material for non-weapons purposes, and acceded to NPT and IAEA safeguards.266 Thus, by the 
time South Africa had finally announced its nuclear weapons capability it had already been 
abolished. In the pantheon of nuclear weapons proliferators South Africa occupies a unique 
position. Not only is it the only African state to have acquired a nuclear weapons capability, 
but it is also the only state to date to have both voluntarily acquired and forfeited such a 
capability. 
As with the Pakistan case study, this chapter assesses whether offensive or defensive 
realism does a better job of explaining South African foreign policy subsequent to nuclear 
weapons acquisition. Did nuclear weapons lead to a satiated, peace-seeking South Africa that 
luxuriated in the security dividends of nuclear deterrence? Or an increasingly aggressive, 
hegemony-seeking South Africa that used its nuclear weapons to subjugate its regional rivals? 
In making this determination this chapter proceeds in two stages. First, I determine the critical 
juncture of nuclear weapons acquisition. That is, when South Africa began to perceive security 
gains due to its nuclear weapons capabilities. Second, change in South African foreign policy 
is measured across four indicators: conventional arms build-ups, militarised conflict initiation, 
policies toward occupied/disputed territories, and other acts of nuclear aggression. 
4.1 Nuclear weapons acquisition 
South Africa’s initial interest in nuclear technology was driven by industrial and commercial 
applications. Seeking to exploit its large mineral stocks, in 1948 South Africa established the 
Atomic Energy Board (AEB) – later renamed the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) – to 
control the production and sale of uranium, and by 1955 was operating 19 mines and 12 
extraction plants. Throughout the 1950s and 60s South Africa built its nuclear expertise and 
                                                 
266 House of Assembly Debates, 24 March 1993, 3465-71. 
Christopher J. Watterson 
93 
 
technological base through cooperation with advanced western states such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, and by 1969 South Africa had finalised plans 
for the construction of a pilot uranium enrichment facility known as the Y-Plant, or 
‘Valindaba’.267 The exact date that South Africa decided to apply its nuclear technological base 
to the development of nuclear weapons remains disputed, though various informed accounts 
note a military shift in the South African nuclear enterprise from the late 1960s to the mid-
1970s, with the development of a “secret nuclear deterrent” by the AEB formally mandated by 
Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes (BJ) Vorster in 1977-78.268 In July 1979 a high-level 
steering committee on nuclear weapons policy resolved to develop seven deliverable atomic 
bombs in order to establish a “credible deterrence capability”, with overall responsibility for 
this program being transferred from the AEB to Armscor.269 
South Africa’s first two nuclear devices were constructed in 1977 and 1978, though 
neither were deliverable by aircraft and both lacked a HEU core given inadequate indigenous 
production capacity at the time. These first devices were instead reserved for testing and 
‘demonstration purposes’. South Africa’s first operational weapon was constructed in 1982. 
This device, codenamed ‘Hobo’ and later ‘Cabot’, was a prototype 6kT device which could, 
according to an Armscor official, “be kicked out the back of a plane” as an unguided bomb.270 
From 1986 to 1989 South Africa then built a series of five pre-production and production model 
“smart” television-guided glide bombs (the ‘Hamerkop’ series) with yields approximating 
20kT.271  
In the late 1980s a changing geostrategic environment in southern Africa, a shrinking 
defence budget, and a rapidly liberalising domestic political context precipitated a fundamental 
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rethink of the country’s nuclear weapons program. Shortly after his election as president in 
September 1989, FW de Klerk 
ordered an investigation on how to completely dismantle the country’s nuclear deterrent 
capability, with the aim of acceding to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The first 
report was submitted to the president in November 1989, which he and his “small Cabinet 
committee” approved in principle.272 
Cochran provides a neat summary of the events that followed: 
on 26 February 1990, President de Klerk provided written instructions to start the 
dismantlement process. Instructions were given the following day to dismantle the six 
completed nuclear weapons-to destroy the non-nuclear hardware, destroy the technical 
documentation, recast the HEU and return it to the Atomic Energy Corporation, and 
neutralize the Armscor facility before acceding to the NPT. … In early July 1991, the last 
weapon was dismantled. The Armscor facility was decontaminated and returned to the AEC 
and switched to making medical equipment. South Africa acceded to the NPT on 10 July 
1991, signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 16 September 1991, 
and provided IAEA with an inventory of nuclear materials and facilities on 30 October 
1991.273 
In a speech to parliament in March 1993, FW de Klerk both officially acknowledged the nuclear 
weapons program’s existence and announced that it had been dismantled.274 
This section evaluates when, within this timeline of technical milestones, South Africa 
had effectively ‘acquired’ nuclear weapons. As outlined in chapter 2, this study defines nuclear 
weapons acquisition as the point in time at which that state began perceiving that its survival 
in anarchy was assured because of nuclear deterrence. To make this determination, this section 
proceeds in two stages. Section 4.1.1 characterises South Africa’s nuclear deterrent strategy. 
And section 4.1.2 identifies the point in time at which South Africa began to perceive that its 
survival was assured as per its nuclear deterrent strategy (nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’, so 
defined). 
4.1.1 South Africa’s nuclear deterrent strategy 
South Africa’s interest in nuclear weapons emerged alongside the increasing military and 
diplomatic presence of global communist forces in southern Africa in the 1960s and 70s. The 
fiercely anti-communist Afrikaner elite in Pretoria assessed that the forces of global 
communism, principally the Soviet Union, would seek to, as stated by Vorster, “establish a 
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Marxist dictatorship throughout Africa.”275 Pretoria also took as an article of faith that the 
communists’ ultimate objective in establishing such a dictatorship was the conquest of South 
Africa, South Africa being a valuable target for communist expansion due to: (a) its strong 
capitalist economy and its traditional links with the west, making it a bulwark of first world 
interests in southern Africa; (b) its stocks of natural resources; and (c) its strategic location 
abutting the sea route joining the South Atlantic and Indian oceans.276 BJ Vorster outlined this 
view in a 1977 speech to a National Party rally in Pietermaritzburg: 
It is the grand strategy of the Soviets, ultimately, to control the southern tip of Africa well 
knowing that if they control the southern tip of Africa then they not only straddle the Cape 
Sea route, then not only have they got a terrific advantage in the case of a conventional war 
because then they will be controlling Africa, but they can cut the life-line of Europe. Twenty-
four thousand ships passing around the Cape carrying two-thirds of Europe’s oil, much of its 
food, and other necessities. But in addition, if they have the minerals of South Africa together 
with what they have, then they’ve got the monopoly in the world of that which the Western 
world must have. It is the grand strategy of the communists to subvert, not only other 
countries in Africa, but this southern tip of Africa.277 
For South Africa, the communist threat was conceived in two stages: first, the 
communists would seek to destabilise South Africa by fomenting internal unrest, principally 
by aligning with anti-government black nationalist forces that had become increasingly active 
since the imposition of apartheid from 1949; and second, once South Africa was sufficiently 
weakened through internal turmoil, they would engage in a liberating conventional war to 
install a puppet regime in Pretoria.278 The threat was expressed as one of a ‘total onslaught’, 
which Minister of Defence General Magnus Malan described as “a communist-inspired 
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onslaught” aimed at “the overthrow of the present constitutional order and its replacement by 
a subject communist-oriented black government”.279 
Of particular concern to Pretoria was the extent to which communist states were 
increasing their military footprint in Africa, which could be used to prop up ideologically 
compatible black nationalist militant groups to destabilise South Africa, and ultimately threaten 
South Africa with conventional war. South Africa held the regional balance of military power 
in terms of southern African states alone,280 however the extent to which communist states – 
principally the USSR, China and Cuba – were heaping military aid to friendly regimes and 
guerrilla groups in southern Africa threatened to tip the balance of power back to the forces of 
black nationalism/communism.281 Demonstrating this communist military penetration into 
Africa, by 1976 the USSR was providing military assistance to 17 sub-Saharan African states, 
had more than 2,000 military advisors in the region, and had supplied more than 340 million 
USD of military hardware in the preceding two years (equivalent to approximately 20% of 
South African annual military expenditure).282 China was active in 14 states, with nearly 1,000 
military advisors and 28 million USD military aid in the preceding two years. Cuba also had 
close to 8,000 troops and advisors in Africa who were active principally in the Angolan civil 
war which had begun the year prior.283 
South Africa’s 1977 Defence White Paper made clear their concerns with this growing 
military presence: “African states do not possess the ability to successfully initiate aggression 
against the RSA, but some African countries are supported by a superpower [the USSR] with 
the ability to simultaneously wage integrated revolutionary and conventional warfare.”284 
Former officials of the South African nuclear program shared a similar view, stating of the task 
of “holding back (for any substantial length of time) a Soviet expeditionary modern fighting 
force” that South Africa “simply was not up to the task”: 
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Its [South Africa’s] aircraft fleet was limited and (comparatively) rather long in the tooth, its 
strategic reconnaissance and patrol resources were particularly curtailed, its comparative 
maritime strength negligible. To sustain a conventional deterrent on a scale of two divisions, 
or more, for any length of time, was a logistical nightmare and a terrible drain on the already 
overstressed economy. In short, although the SADF [South African Defence Force] could 
certainly have been considered as a superpower in Africa, it was no match against a major 
global power (not even the proxy forces of a global power).285 
In his March 1993 address FW de Klerk confirmed that South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
capability was initially developed in response to this threat: “The decision to develop this 
limited capability was taken as early as 1974 against the background of a Soviet expansionist 
threat in Southern Africa, as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the 
Warsaw Pact members. … The build-up of the Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards 
reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary”.286 This outlook was corroborated by 
other officials,287 including heads of the nuclear-scientific establishment,288 who emphasised 
the “Soviet expansionist threat”, the “invasion peril” and, in particular, the Soviet-Cuban 
conventional force build-up in Angola as the basis for nuclear weapons development. In the 
words of PW Botha (then defence minister) in 1976, South Africa needed “a deterrent to be 
able to resist a fairly heavy conventional attack on South Africa.”289 
A South African Soviet deterrence doctrine was formalised in April 1978 when Prime 
Minister BJ Vorster approved a three-stage nuclear weapons strategy directed solely toward 
the deterrence of a Soviet-backed invasion. 
• Stage one, the strategy of ‘nuclear ambiguity’, involved South Africa intimating a 
nuclear weapons capability without ever confirming or denying their actual 
possession, creating uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors that restrains 
their behaviour (general deterrence). This opaque approach to deterrence was seen to 
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provide a number of benefits compared with the more traditional practice of overt 
disclosure and nuclear testing. It would: avoid international recriminations for overtly 
crossing the nuclear threshold, including probable economic sanctions and restrictions 
on the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials; reduce pressure on the Soviet Union to 
bolster its African clients with armaments or security guarantees that could be turned 
against South Africa; and maintain good relations with South Africa’s western patrons 
that oppose nuclear proliferation, such as the US, Britain and France.290 
• Stage two, which was to be enacted “in case of an escalating conflict with pro-Soviet 
forces”,291 involved South Africa disclosing its nuclear weapons capabilities in secret 
to its western patrons (principally the US) in order to provoke western intervention 
that would pacify the communist forces for fear of triggering a wider conflict 
(catalytic deterrence). 
• Stage three, which was to be enacted if the security condition deteriorated to a point 
where Pretoria “had its back to the wall”, would involve South Africa declaring its 
nuclear weapons capabilities publicly, likely though a nuclear test.292 Such a 
demonstration was intended to signal to the aggressor a South African ability to 
punish further aggression (immediate deterrence).293 
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There was also an inchoate ‘stage four’ to this strategy, which was apparently “discussed” 
though “never approved by the politicians”, involving the tactical use of nuclear weapons on 
troops attacking South Africa.294 
Thus, for South Africa, nuclear weapons would assure survival by deterring an all-out 
attack by Soviet-backed conventional forces through a combination of general, catalytic and 
immediate deterrence. Thus, in the case of South Africa, nuclear weapons acquisition can be 
conceived as the moment at which South Africa began to perceive that the Soviet client states 
of southern Africa and their communist patrons would be deterred from launching an all-out 
conventional attack on South Africa due to the latter’s nuclear weapons capabilities. The 
following section identifies when such a shift in the perceptions of the South African elite 
occurred. 
4.1.2 Nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’ 
From the early 1960s, well before the militarisation of its nuclear program, South African 
officials had been both emphasising South Africa’s ability to produce nuclear weapons and 
exercising ambiguity as to their ultimate intentions in this area. In 1962, for example, senior 
AEB official Ampie Roux stated that South Africa was capable of producing its own nuclear 
explosives, though added “It is my sincere hope that we shall never be called upon to engage 
in this activity.” Three years later Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd stated that “It is the duty 
of South Africa to consider not only the military uses of the material, but also to do all in its 
power to direct its uses to peaceful purposes.”295 This ambiguous rhetoric persisted after the 
militarisation of the nuclear program, with the senior elite continuing to invoke the possibility 
of a nuclear breakout well into the 1970s. In 1976, for example, Prime Minister BJ Vorster 
expressed to a Newsweek correspondent that “We are only interested in the peaceful application 
of nuclear power. But we can enrich uranium, and we have the capability. And we did not sign 
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.”296 
Under this cloud of uncertainty, and amid South Africa’s developing nuclear weapons 
capabilities, in August 1977 Soviet intelligence alerted the US to a South African military 
installation in the Kalahari Desert which carried the features of a nuclear test site. US 
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intelligence corroborated the Soviet assessment, concluding independently that the features and 
security of the installation provided “a strong case that the site was being prepared for a nuclear 
test.”297 The international reaction was severe, with the US, France, Britain and West Germany 
acting in concert to issue a number of threats to South Africa were it to proceed with a nuclear 
test, ranging from the termination of nuclear fuel and reactor contracts to a full break in 
diplomatic and trade relations. Pretoria responded to these threats by denying that the site was 
intended for nuclear tests,298 making assurances as to their benign intentions, and ultimately 
dismantling the Kalahari site, staying further international criticism though with the US vowing 
to “continue to monitor the situation there very closely.”299 In October that year Vorster 
reaffirmed South Africa’s non-nuclear intentions, writing in a letter to US President Jimmy 
Carter that South Africa “does not have nor does it intend to develop a nuclear explosive device 
for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise … and there will be no nuclear testing of any kind in 
South Africa.”300 In a follow-up media interview Vorster restated South Africa’s commitment 
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to the “peaceful development of nuclear facilities”. Though the US and others had, at least 
publicly, accepted South Africa’s assurances, in the same year South African Minister of 
Information Connie Mulder injected some uncertainty into proceedings when he, whilst 
denying the possession of nuclear weapons, stated that “if we are attacked no rules apply at all, 
if it comes to a question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal, whatever they 
may be. It is true that we have just completed our own pilot plant that uses very advanced 
technology, and that we have major uranium resources.”301  
International concerns regarding the South African nuclear program were again aroused 
on 22 September 1979 when a US Vela nuclear test detection satellite recorded an optical event 
in the South Atlantic Ocean consistent with a nuclear explosion. Despite a positive reading 
from the Vela satellite, gaps in corroborating evidence meant that analysts could not produce 
an airtight case that a nuclear event had taken place, with most instead concluding that the Vela 
satellite signal was “probably, but not certainly” a nuclear explosion.302 In identifying the 
source of a probable nuclear explosion in the area, South Africa was immediately identified by 
US intelligence as the “likeliest perpetrator”. It was assessed that South Africa, possibly in 
league with Israel and/or Taiwan, had likely conducted its first nuclear test.303 Suspicions were 
further piqued when Prime Minister Pieter Willem (PW) Botha, just three days after the Vela 
satellite detection, told a provincial congress of the ruling National Party that “South Africa’s 
enemies might find out we have military weapons they do not know about.”304 Then, on 24 
October, Botha, 
addressing an anniversary dinner attended by past and present members of the AEB as well as 
members of the local diplomatic corps, reportedly paid tribute to the South African nuclear 
scientists who had been engaged in secret work of a strategic nature. He reportedly said that, 
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for security reasons, their names could not be mentioned and that they would never gain the 
recognition in South Africa or abroad that they deserved.305 
The US announced the Vela satellite detection publicly on 26 October, leading to 
widespread allegations of a South African nuclear test.306 The official South African response 
to these allegations was to deny having done so, though with a familiar degree of ambiguity as 
to their ultimate nuclear intentions. For example, Botha 
ridiculed speculation that South Africa had conducted a nuclear explosion, but also declined 
under questioning to say unequivocally that South Africa had not done so and that it did not 
intend to acquire nuclear weapons. On 6 November the Foreign Minister… said he was 
dismayed by allegations in the UN General Assembly that South Africa had violated the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty… But he did not take the opportunity to deny that South Africa had 
a nuclear weapons program.307 
Though nuclear ambiguity was a common feature of the South African rhetoric dating 
back to the early 1960s, I argue that South Africa’s ambiguous nuclear rhetoric took on a new 
hue in the aftermath of Vela. Though Pretoria had been talking up its ability to produce nuclear 
weapons well before the decision to do so, in the wake of Kalahari it had provided assurances 
that it was not in possession of nuclear weapons and that it did not intend to acquire them. 
There were no such assurances offered in the wake of Vela. Given international suspicions of 
Pretoria’s involvement in the Vela detection and the harsh international reaction to the Kalahari 
event of 1977, it seems unlikely that Pretoria would risk adverse fallout by not staunchly 
disavowing its nuclear intentions were it not otherwise interested in sending a signal to other 
states. Indeed, Botha appeared to be intimating to an international audience South Africa’s 
covert possession of these weapons through the statement that “South Africa’s enemies might 
find out we have military weapons they do not know about.” Although Botha avoids use of the 
word ‘nuclear’, we can be almost certain that he is referring to a South African nuclear bomb. 
Firstly, it’s hard to imagine another type of ‘military weapon’ that could warrant such 
enigmatic language. Though South Africa also had a covert chemical and biological weapons 
(CBW) program, this program only began in earnest from 1981, before which CBW 
development had been for the most part rejected as unfeasible.308 Secondly, chronologically, 
Botha’s statement followed the Vela satellite detection by only three days, and was shortly 
followed by a laudation of South Africa’s nuclear scientists, who had, as stated by Botha, been 
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engaged in “secret work of a strategic nature.” For South Africa to make such statements so 
close to the Vela event without the intention to engage in some manner of nuclear signal would 
be highly coincidental if Pretoria wasn’t aware of the Vela detection, or poorly advised if it 
was. And thirdly, by the time of the Vela incident, South Africa did actually possess two 
nuclear devices, if very crude and undeliverable ones.309 
This shift to more tendentious rhetoric might not be considered surprising when we 
recall that South Africa had, the year prior, formalised the exercise of nuclear ambiguity as the 
first of its three-stage nuclear strategy. Malan seemingly betrayed such intentions when he later 
revealed that he had instructed South Africa’s Ambassador to the US not to deny involvement 
in the incident as “We wanted the Russians to notice. We did not do it [a nuclear test] but it 
suited us”.310 Thus, by Malan’s account, there had been an explicit anti-Soviet dimension to 
the nuclear ambiguity expressed post-Vela as well as some perceived security dividend from 
doing so.  
In the years that followed Vela South Africa held firm to stage one of its nuclear strategy 
by actively cultivating an environment of uncertainty regarding its nuclear capabilities. For 
example, Commodore H. F. Nel stated in a 1980 speech to the South African Institute of 
Strategic Studies that “It is unquestionable that the Republic of South Africa has the 
technological capacity to manufacture nuclear arms as well as sophisticated systems of delivery 
with the desired accuracy and penetration.”311 Later, in 1988, Foreign Minister Roelof ‘Pik’ 
Botha similarly stated in a news conference that “We have the capability to make one (a 
bomb)… should we want to” whilst refusing to comment as to whether or not South Africa 
already possessed nuclear weapons.312 Though not confirming an actual nuclear weapons 
capability, there was a widespread belief in South Africa that, as subsequently put by one 
Armscor official, “most Western governments were aware of South Africa’s arsenal”.313 
Though South Africa could not express openly the perceived security gains of nuclear 
deterrence for the need to maintain opacity, in private they made clear that it was having a 
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positive effect. Notes from a meeting between Botha and Reagan in May 1981, for example, 
reveal that Botha had refused to sign the NPT as  
It would terminate speculation on South Africa’s possession of the bomb. This would mean 
that South Africa would be deprived of an important deterrent of major psychological value. 
South Africa was not preparing or intending to explode a nuclear device but ‘we could not 
afford publicly to surrender this position.’314 
Botha added that “I suspect the USSR also suspects us of having the capacity, so don’t remove 
this deterrent.”315 A 1988 DFA memo similarly 
recommend[ed] the continuation, for as long as possible of a “strategy of uncertainty” 
whereby a conflicting set of perceptions regarding SA’s nuclear weapons capability is 
created. The greater the uncertainty created, the greater the deterrent effect of South Africa’s 
presumed capability.316 
These accounts show that South Africa saw its nuclear weapons capabilities as an “important 
deterrent of major psychological value.” These sentiments were supported by three members 
of the South African nuclear-scientific executive, who wrote that nuclear weapons 
Gave South Africa the necessary breathing space to find the non-military solutions [in 
Southern Angola]. The stand-off between South Africa and the USSR in Southern Africa is a 
classical example of deterrence (with a nuclear component) and (thank goodness) this time it 
worked before some showdown was necessary.317 
Similar sentiments were expressed by a senior South African naval officer in a circumspect 
statement to a South African periodical in October 1980 when he declared that South Africa 
was able to “ward off a combined onslaught by African states, even if this involved limited 
intervention by outside powers”, also emphasising South Africa’s “right to put its nuclear 
expertise to practical use.”318 
Despite general perceptions of a deterrent dividend from nuclear weapons acquisition, 
some in Pretoria continued to express concern over the possibility of a Soviet-backed invasion 
of South Africa. Early in 1980 PW Botha, as prime minister, had expressed scepticism at the 
possibility of a direct invasion, stating that “The present [Soviet] strategy against us avoids a 
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direct, conventional onslaught, because such an excursion is too expensive and because the 
threshold is too high to launch a direct conventional onslaught on us. That is why they avoid 
it”.319 Despite the belief that a direct invasion would be “too expensive” in the short term, a 
subsequent account of PW Botha’s threat perceptions as president (1984-89) confirmed a view 
that such a conflict was inevitable: “he believed firmly that the country’s problems could only 
be resolved through a war, through military means. He believed it. Why else do you think this 
tremendous arms industry? Why else the billions that went into the defence effort including the 
nuclear bomb? He wanted to be prepared for the war which he considered to be inevitable”.320 
In military circles the possibility of a Soviet-backed invasion was similarly regarded as 
unlikely in the short term, though still a contingency for which the military needed to be 
prepared. The Soviet-Cuban military build-up, in particular, had raised South African 
suspicions, with Malan assessing in September 1985 that the build-up was beyond the needs of 
Soviet-Cuban interests in southern Angola, and suggested that it was instead a “prepositioning 
of military equipment to be used, ultimately, against South Africa”, adding that the 
“Communists” want to “attack our country with conventional military forces”.321 This view 
was shared by Pik Botha, who took the Soviet-Cuban military build-up as a harbinger of a 
wider conflict: “if you are told that there are now 300 tanks in Mozambique and 250 in 
Zimbabwe and 340 in Angola, and if you are told that they now have airfields with radar 
installations which will make it impossible for any of your aircraft to fly through that network; 
if furthermore you have Presidents like President Reagan who started what he called ‘the star 
war system’ against Soviet aggression in regional areas all over the world, particularly after 
Afghanistan, etc., then with all respect it is not so easy to [negate the possibility of a Soviet-
backed invasion].”322 Such sentiments were reflected in the 1984 South African defence white 
paper, which stated that the Soviet Union’s “sustained supply of advanced weapons and 
personnel to [southern African] states” was upsetting the regional military balance and creating 
a situation that the Soviet Union could exploit “should it decide on direct action against the 
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RSA”.323 The same year South Africa conducted an 11,000-man military exercise, codenamed 
Thunder Chariot, involving the defence of South Africa from a conventional assault across the 
Orange River separating South Africa and Namibia.324 In discussing the contingency of 
breaking opacity and disclosing their nuclear capabilities,325 the officialdom were similarly 
circumspect regarding the perceived effectiveness of deterrence. Pik Botha, for example, 
expressed a view that the disclosure of South African capabilities would provide “some form 
of a deterrent”,326 and André Buys, former AEB scientist and Armscor general manager, 
recounted that “We thought that this might work”.327 
The reason for Pretoria’s ambivalence regarding the deterrent value of its nuclear 
weapons against a Soviet-backed conventional attack on South Africa was most likely to do 
with its inability to strike Soviet territory, “given that it lacked a large arsenal, delivery systems, 
and second strike capability.”328 While South Africa could credibly threaten Soviet interests in 
southern Africa (i.e. military bases and allied states and populations) with a nuclear strike, it 
could not credibly threaten ‘unacceptable’ damage upon the Soviet homeland. On this basis, 
(a) the Soviets would be less deterred from launching an all-out attack on South Africa as the 
damage of any South African nuclear retaliation would be limited; and (b) South Africa, 
knowing this, would be less inclined to launch a regional nuclear strike in the first place given 
the Soviet ability to punish South Africa with nuclear strikes with impunity. PW Botha 
demonstrated such reasoning when he stated in September 1985 that “these devices [nuclear 
weapons] will never be used offensively by South Africa as it would be suicide.”329 Some had 
even suggested that it would be “better to throw in the towel, and let the Soviet Union take us” 
than to counter Soviet aggression with a nuclear strike, as “The Soviet Union would have every 
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excuse then to actually attack us with nuclear weapons. We were no match for that. Then we 
would still lose, but we would destroy the country and the people as well.”330 
Thus, while South Africa had perceived some general deterrent dividend vis-à-vis a 
Soviet-backed invasion from its posture of nuclear ambiguity, the perceived strength of 
deterrence was less than absolute, and indeed owing to its small arsenal and under-developed 
capabilities South Africa would not reach this defensive ideal during its short tenure as a 
nuclear-armed state. This invites the question as to whether or not South Africa can be 
considered a true case of nuclear weapons acquisition in the terms set by this study. In section 
2.3.1.1 I define nuclear weapons acquisition as the point in time at which the state perceives 
that “the probability of [its] survival in anarchy [has increased] by some positive increment due 
specifically to its nuclear weapons capabilities.” Though South Africa’s nuclear arsenal 
remained under-developed, the evidence presented above suggests that South Africa did indeed 
perceive that the probability of its survival, specifically with respect to communist forces in 
southern Africa, had increased. South Africa’s nuclear weapons gave it the ability to increase 
the costs of communist aggression against South Africa and incite the US to intervene in any 
future conflict between South Africa and Soviet-backed forces, and South African officials 
began expressing such sentiments, albeit circumspectly, following the Vela incident of 1979. 
Thus, while South Africa was not assured of its survival in anarchy due to nuclear deterrence 
(indeed few states could ever hope for such an outcome), evidence suggests that, from 1979, 
South African officials perceived that the state’s survivability had increased “by some positive 
increment” due to its nuclear capabilities (i.e. nuclear weapons acquisition), thus we should 
expect to see foreign policy change consistent with the expectations of offensive or defensive 
realism. That being said, the confounding effects of South Africa’s limited nuclear weapons 
capabilities are addressed later in this chapter and in section 6.2.1. 
Attention now turns to observing change in South African foreign policy consistent with 
the established critical juncture of 1979.331 Specifically, the following section measures and 
compares South African foreign policy aggression in the ten years immediately preceding and 
following nuclear weapons acquisition across four foreign policy indicators. 
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4.2 Indicators 
4.2.1 Indicator 1: Conventional military assets 
The first foreign policy indicator examined here is South Africa’s procurement of conventional 
military assets, specifically combat tanks, aircraft and military personnel. In a defensive realist 
framework, we would expect the security gains of nuclear deterrence to offset the need for 
conventional military strength, leading to a plateau or decline in a state’s stocks of such assets. 
In an offensive realist framework, on the other hand, South Africa’s innate desire for hegemony 
will lead it to grow its conventional capabilities in taking advantage of the new strategic 
opportunities afforded by its nuclear capabilities. Table 6 shows that, across all three measures, 
South Africa increased its conventional military strength from 51 to 65 percent at statistically 
significant levels (p < 0.05), consistent with the expectations of offensive realism. 
Table 6. South Africa conventional military assets 1969-88 
 Combat tanks Combat aircraft Military personnel (‘000) 
1969 200 230 55 
1970 200 240 40 
1971 240 163 60 
1972 120 100 75 
1973 120 100 40 
1974 120 100 45 
1975 161 108 50 
1976 161 133 59 
1977 170 362 67 
1978 260 345 78 
1979 270 416 70 
1980 310 204 70 
1981 310 239 78 
1982 250 211 78 
1983 250 313 77 
1984 250 304 97 
1985 250 356 95 
1986 250 372 90 
1987 250 366 102 
1988 250 324 100 
    
Pre-nuclear avg. 175.2 188.1 56.9 
Nuclear avg. 264.0 310.5 85.7 
Change factor 0.51 0.65 0.51 
p*  0.0002 0.0066 0.0001 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
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Divining the intentions of this precipitous military build-up across the pre-nuclear and 
nuclear eras is made easier by testimony from PW Botha, who served as Minister of Defence 
from 1966-80 and head of state from 1978-89. When asked why South Africa needed “such 
an incredibly strong defence force”, Botha responded: 
To a certain extent we introduced national service to train young men in various directions of 
life. And secondly, we had to protect our borders from terrorists. And thirdly, the defence 
force inspired the nation as a whole.332 
Thus, in addition to nation-building functions, military growth was seen to increase South 
African security with respect to ‘cross-border terrorists’. Here Botha is referring to militant 
black nationalist groups that were increasingly active from the mid-1970s. 
4.2.1.1 The militant black nationalist threat 
It was in response to the institutionalisation of white rule in South Africa through the 
instruments of apartheid that ‘black nationalism’ emerged as a competing political force, 
eventually taking the form of sub-national militancy under the helm of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and its military arm Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK; ‘Spear of the Nation’).333 The 
ANC had been banned as a political unit in South Africa from 1960, and without the ability to 
operate from South African territory it instead established a network of military bases in 
sympathetic neighbouring African states (initially Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia and others) from 
which to launch cross-border military operations against South Africa, predominantly sabotage 
attacks against economic targets. In 1969 the ANC, drawing on the Chinese communist 
experience, adopted a strategy of ‘protracted armed struggle’ which sought to establish a 
political and military presence in the South African countryside from which to engage in a full-
fledged ‘People’s War’ that would eventually topple the government. Finding little support in 
the South African countryside, however, in 1978 the ANC expanded their strategy to include 
urban warfare and the mobilisation of the urban working class. It was around this time that the 
Soweto riots of 1976 saw a mass exodus of students from South Africa, many of whom signed 
with the ANC in exile leading MK membership to increase from 300 to 8,000.334 The 
withdrawal of the Portuguese from southern Africa in 1975 also allowed the ANC to establish 
bases in Angola and Mozambique, putting the ANC on the doorstep of the white regime in 
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South Africa and overcoming issues of logistics and supply that come with staging attacks from 
bases further afield.335 
For Pretoria, the rise of an ANC-led black nationalist insurgency against South Africa 
constituted a military crisis. This crisis was compounded by the rise of a second insurgent front 
in the South African territory of Namibia (known then as ‘South West Africa’ and occupied by 
South Africa since WW1), led principally by the South West Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) and their military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). From 
1965 SWAPO had sought, through insurgency, to liberate Namibia from South African rule 
under its own socialist leadership, a contingency that was anathema to South Africa given 
SWAPO’s links with the Soviet Union. Like the ANC, SWAPO’s banned status in South Africa 
and Namibia meant that it had to base itself in neighbouring states (principally Angola and 
Zambia), from which it launched military operations in Namibia in the form of hit-and-run 
attacks, sabotage and assassinations. Following the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 
1975 SWAPO received increased support from the new socialist MPLA (People’s Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola) regime in Luanda and its Soviet and Cuban patrons in the form 
of military assistance and greater freedom of movement in southern Angola. Consequently, 
there was a dramatic increase in PLAN activity in northern South-West Africa during the late 
1970s and tactics changed from ‘hit-and-run’ attacks in the border zone to establishing semi-
liberated zones in Ovamboland and launching deeper infiltrations meant to attack white farms 
further south. By late 1977, the SADF claimed that there was an average of one hundred 
skirmishes a month between security forces and insurgents, and that 300 PLAN fighters were 
operating inside South-West Africa with 2000 based in southern Angola and 1400 in western 
Zambia.336 
In responding to this threat, Pretoria approved a number of security outlays that 
favoured increased activity in internal policing and counter-insurgency: a five year defence 
expansion program was approved in 1974; from 1975 the South African police began patrolling 
the borders with black African states in order to stem cross-border infiltrations by militants; a 
specialist counter-insurgency task force was established in 1976; and in 1972 and 1977 
mandatory military service for white youths was extended to one and two years, respectively.337 
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In 1979 such operations were bolstered with the establishment of dedicated counter-insurgency 
special forces units under the SADF and South African Police which would “not need to answer 
to Parliament, but only to the SSC [State Security Council]”, the latter being dominated by the 
South African security agencies.338 This move preceded a dramatic expansion in South African 
counter-insurgency, which came to include targeted assassinations, cross-border raids against 
insurgent bases located in neighbouring African states, specialist insurgent reconnaissance 
units, and the co-optation of foreign militants and mercenaries.339 
Where South Africa perceived some general deterrent dividend to a Soviet-backed 
invasion from its 1979 acquisition of nuclear weapons (as argued in section 4.1.2), there were 
no similar security dividends with respect to the black nationalist insurgency, forcing the 
reliance on conventional capabilities for managing the threat. The only evidence for the 
exercise of nuclear deterrence against insurgent targets comes from a declassified 1975 South 
African memo which “pinpointed rebel – that is, ANC – bases in neighboring countries as 
potential targets of tactical nuclear weapons”340 with the apparent intention of either deterring 
insurgents directly or, more likely, placing pressure on African states hosting ANC outposts to 
exile them for fear of attracting a nuclear strike. Accordingly, there had reportedly been 
“lingering suspicions among many ANC leaders and supporters that the Afrikaner-dominated 
government might have planned to use nuclear weapons against black South Africans or ANC 
opponents in neighboring states.”341 
Despite such suspicions, there is no evidence that Pretoria ever adopted such a strategy. 
The official line regarding nuclear weapons and sub-state threats was that “South African 
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nuclear weapons were of no use and could not be employed against civilian or revolutionary 
targets”.342 Indeed, as argued by Jaster: 
A nuclear weapon would be virtually useless against guerrillas, either as defence or deterrent. 
To the extent that small bands of ANC or SWAPO operatives, or their camps across the 
border, can be located and identified, South Africa’s conventional forces are capable of 
dealing with them effectively. … In so far as the threat of nuclear attack might pressure 
neighbouring states into denying the guerrillas sanctuary, South Africa’s conventional and 
unconventional warfare methods have already accomplished that[.]343 
Subsequent testimony from South African officials demonstrates the perceived irrelevance of 
nuclear weapons to fighting the insurgency. Constand Viljoen, an SADF general from 1980-
85, for example, had justified his resistance to the nuclear weapons program on the basis that 
“at that stage I felt the threat was from a revolutionary war. It was not one in which nuclear 
capabilities would have counted. I often said: ‘Let’s rather buy tanks or guns.’”344 General Jan 
Geldenhuys, SADF chief from 1985-90, had similarly stated that “adventurous transgressions 
of borders” were of “such small scale that nuclear capability never came into the picture.”345 
Thus, to a large extent, South Africa’s conventional force build-up in the nuclear era 
was a response to the military threat of black nationalism, for which South Africa’s limited 
nuclear deterrent was of little to no strategic value. Therefore, despite the observed correlation 
between nuclear weapons acquisition and a South African conventional military build-up, in-
depth analysis has revealed a compelling alternate explanation vis-à-vis the black nationalist 
threat. Absent any evidence of a causal relationship between South Africa’s precipitous 
conventional force build-up and nuclear weapons acquisition, I code this indicator as 
supporting the null hypothesis. 
4.2.2 Indicator 2: Militarised conflict initiation 
The second foreign policy indicator examined here is South Africa’s initiation of militarised 
conflicts. In a defensive realist framework, South Africa will seek peace in the status quo, 
leading it to eschew international conflicts under the protection of nuclear deterrence. In an 
offensive realist framework, on the other hand, nuclear weapons should embolden South 
Africa’s innate desire for hegemony, leading it to increasingly engage in militarised conflict in 
growing its regional power. Figure 3 shows that South Africa’s militarised conflict initiation 
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increased markedly in the nuclear era, growing from an average of 151 to 430 conflict days 
(+184%, p = 0.0011),346 consistent with the expectations of offensive realism. 
The single largest South African military engagement in this period was the ‘Border 
War’,347 fought on the Namib-Angolan border from 1975 to late 1988 (83% of South Africa’s 
5,815 recorded conflict days in the 20-year period of interest). Following the withdrawal of 
Portuguese rule in Angola in 1974-75, a civil war emerged between three primary contenders 
for political control of the liberated Angolan state: the People’s Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA), backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba; and the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), 
both backed by the US and South Africa. South Africa’s and the US’s backing of UNITA and 
the FNLA against the MPLA was an attempt to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold in 
Angola through an MPLA government, and from 1975 both provided extensive support to their 
clients, including military hardware, training, logistical support, and from August South 
African boots on the ground. Despite such support, major Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA, 
including Cuba’s dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola from November 1975 to April 1976,348 
turned the military tide in favour of the MPLA, and in December 1975 the US, smarting from 
Vietnam, ceased its involvement in the operation. The South Africans, now without US 
support, were forced to follow suit shortly after, leaving the MPLA to consolidate its control 
over Angola and form government.349 Despite South Africa’s defeat, it continued to provide 
support to UNITA, which controlled portions of southern Angola, both in fighting its civil war 
with the MPLA and in competing for territory with other black nationalist groups present in 
southern Angola (specifically those that posed a threat to South African interests in Namibia; 
mainly SWAPO). This support included military and economic aid, as well as covert military 
operations into Angola in support of UNITA objectives, including hit-and-run attacks on 
military and economic targets and the limited occupation of territories. For the most part such 
South African operations came under the counter-insurgency mandate detailed in the preceding 
section, though as the conflict wore on it became increasingly ‘conventionalised’, with Soviet 
and Cuban regular forces beginning to fight alongside Angolan and SWAPO forces. 
                                                 
346 Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
347 Correlates of War dispute number 1441. 
348 Piero Gleijeses, “Moscow’s Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, 
no. 4 (2006): 3. 
349 Barber and Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 190-96; “Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear 
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Figure 3. South African-initiated conflict days 
For South Africa, operations in Angola were seen as essential to stemming SWAPO 
incursions into Namibia and maintaining a territorial buffer in southern Angola that would stop 
the downward advance of Soviet-Cuban forces. Were South Africa to remove its military 
presence in Angola, according to PW Botha, the Russians’ and Cubans’ “next target would be 
South West Africa [Namibia], followed by Botswana and then South Africa.”350 
Though this conflict had begun in 1975, Bell observes that South African operations in 
Angola became qualitatively more ‘aggressive’ following nuclear weapons acquisition in 1979. 
Specifically, the operations became more frequent, deeper into Angolan territory, of larger 
qualitative and quantitative force commitments, and the South Africans were more willing to 
occupy Angolan territory and less inclined to hide their role.351 What’s more, he argues that 
this change was caused by nuclear weapons. Based on a series of interviews with former South 
Africa officials, Bell concluded that 
Although South African elites do not typically say outright that they believed nuclear 
weapons were useful in facilitating aggression [in Angola] (and for a variety of reasons, we 
would not expect them to do so), from their statements one can piece together a coherent 
causal logic linking nuclear weapons to increased South African aggression. Specifically, 
South African elites confirm that South African foreign policy and conduct in the Border War 
was constrained by the need to avoid potential escalation; that nuclear weapons would allow 
South Africa to better control that escalation should it happen; and that South Africa became 
more tolerant of escalation, and were thus prepared to engage in greater aggression, in the 
period after acquiring nuclear weapons.352 
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The cohesive logic of this causal chain was seemingly confirmed in a circumspect statement 
by former foreign ministry official Victor Zazeraj, also interviewed by Bell: “The military felt 
that nuclear weapons had a purpose. The military thought that as long as their enemy believed 
that South Africa had nuclear weapons and acted accordingly, it made their lives a whole lot 
easier.”353 This assessment of increasing South African intensity in its conduct of the Border 
War from 1979 finds support in the literature. Lord shows that the number of major South 
African military operations in the conflict increased from an annual average of 2 in the period 
1975-78 to 18 in 1979-88.354 Scholtz similarly observes that SWAPO losses increased by over 
50% in the immediate aftermath of nuclear weapons acquisition.355 Accordingly, South African 
military historian Robert Jaster remarks that “The war against SWAPO began in earnest in 
1979.”356 
South Africa’s scaling up of its military campaign in southern Angola consequent to 
nuclear weapons acquisition is consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox 
observed in the Pakistan case. Specifically, nuclear weapons restrained Soviet-Cuban-Angolan 
escalation of the Border War, giving South Africa the confidence to more aggressively pursue 
its objectives in southern Angola through conventional militarism without fear that such 
provocations could lead to a strategic conflict with the communist forces. 
As an aside, there is also evidence to suggest that, within the context of the Border War, 
and contrary to official accounts which stress that South Africa never moved past phase one of 
its three-phase nuclear strategy (nuclear ambiguity), South Africa did in fact move to stage two 
(covert disclosures) when, in October 1988, it began reopening the Kalahari test site for what 
appeared to be preparations for a nuclear test. From late-1987 South Africa’s position in 
southern Angola was becoming increasingly tenuous. Infusions of Soviet equipment and Cuban 
troops coupled with the degradation of South Africa’s air superiority had meant that the 
military balance was turning against Pretoria, with Cuban and Angolan troops able to push into 
UNITA-controlled southern Angola for the first time between August 1987 and June 1988. 
According to Buys the war was reaching a “semi-conventional state”,357 and “for the first time 
                                                 
353 Ibid., 184. 
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the government started considering the possibility that we might lose the war militarily”. It was 
this perception that led to the Kalahari test site being ‘revisited’.358 
For Pretoria, advancing to stage two of its nuclear strategy was seen as a way of 
soliciting US support should its position in Angola deteriorate further. PW Botha had 
reportedly quipped in a private conversation in late 1987 that “Once we set this thing off, the 
Yanks will come running.”359 Supporting the proposition that the reopening of the Kalahari test 
site was a nuclear signal consistent with phase two of South Arica’s nuclear strategy, an 
unnamed retired South African counter-intelligence officer recounts that, though a number of 
measures were undertaken to hide the preparations from reconnaissance satellites, “that was 
part of the plan. ... They believed we were getting ready to first-test a nuclear device (which 
we would have been forced to do if they’d called our bluff), then deploy it.”360 (Armscor 
officials had also purportedly expressed a view that “the activity at the test site was designed 
to strengthen South Africa’s bargaining position.”)361 According to the same counter-
intelligence source, these measures were successful: “I cannot say for sure, but I heard from 
impeccable foreign intelligence sources that the reopening of the Vastrap facility gave the West 
and the Soviets a hell of a fright. … Soviet and Western intelligence were suddenly convinced 
we were serious about nuclear weapons and the West began to put pressure on the Soviets to 
get the Cubans to withdraw from Angola.”362 Former officials of the South African nuclear 
program similarly concluded that “For sure, the availability of a credible nuclear option made 
a decisive difference to the outcome of the war in Angola”.363  
4.2.3 Indicator 3: Policies toward occupied/disputed territories 
The third indicator of foreign policy aggression examined here is South Africa’s policies 
toward occupied/disputed territories. South Africa’s only occupied/disputed territory in the 
period of interest was Namibia, ruled by South Africa as ‘South West Africa’ following the 
German withdrawal from the colonial territory in World War 1. From 1975 South Africa had 
been committed to Namibian independence,364 seeing withdrawal as a means of both lessening 
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the financial burden of administering and protecting the territory militarily (amounting to over 
half of the total defence budget for South Africa proper);365 and winning international favour, 
which was overwhelmingly in favour of Namibian independence. 
Despite this commitment, South Africa stubbornly refused to end its military presence 
in Namibia or accede to Namibian independence until the Soviet and Cuban forces had 
withdrawn from Angola. For Pretoria, Namibia was a geographical buffer to the southward 
creep of Soviet influence. Were South Africa to have abandoned Namibia, it would have almost 
certainly fallen to Soviet-aligned SWAPO,366 thereby offering the Soviets a staging area for an 
invasion of South Africa proper. According to Pik Botha, 
we were not ready to exchange on the Cunene [River, on the Namib-Angolan border,] for a 
war on the Orange [River, on the Namib-South African border,] … if Southwest Africa 
[Namibia] was governed by SWAPO there would be a serious risk that the Russians would 
threaten South Africa from that territory.367 
Pretoria thus made its withdrawal from Namibia contingent upon the withdrawal of communist 
forces from Angola. “[T]he minute this happens,” said PW Botha in 1985, “I will be prepared 
to settle all our military forces inside South Africa”.368 In the interim, and as demonstrated in 
the preceding sections, South Africa’s stake in Namibia increased in terms of increasing 
defence outlays and attacks in southern Angola. 
South Africa’s commitment to Namibian independence was realised in December 1988 
when, amongst the declining global influence of the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola and South 
Africa signed the Tripartite Accords that made for both the removal of communist forces from 
Angola and Namibian independence. Shortly afterward South Africa began implementing 
Namibian independence through the instrument of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
435 (1978), with independence realised in March 1990.369 Pik Botha cites in particular “the 
assumption that the Soviet withdrawal [from Afghanistan, begun in May that year] was genuine 
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and therefore … that other withdrawals would also come into being [i.e. in southern Africa]” 
as the basis for South Africa’s assent to Namibian independence.370 
Pretoria ceasing its occupation of Namibia following a Soviet-Cuban agreement to 
withdraw from Angola is wholly consistent with the logic of defensive realism: states only 
aggress (i.e. occupy territory) to overcome imminent threats (i.e. a Soviet-backed invasion of 
South Africa). Once those threats are removed, so too is the need to aggress. Given such 
preferences, we might ask in the context of this study why South Africa didn’t end its 
occupation ten years earlier when it acquired nuclear weapons. In theory, South Africa’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons should have yielded the same security dividends as a 
communist withdrawal from Angola – that is, removing the threat of a Soviet-backed invasion 
of South Africa. However, as argued in section 4.1.2, South Africa did not regard its 
rudimentary nuclear deterrent as reliable vis-à-vis Soviet aggression, and thus likely desired 
the failsafe of Namibian defence in depth should deterrence fail. If this deduction is accurate 
then inference is confounded by the limited deterrent value of South Africa’s rudimentary 
nuclear capabilities in the period 1979-88. Absent sufficient security dividends from nuclear 
weapons acquisition, South Africa retained a security-based incentive for territorial 
aggrandisement, even whilst seemingly harbouring defensive realist preferences. 
Overall, the coding of this indicator is difficult. For the majority of the period of 
measurement South Africa was unwilling to cede its control of Namibia, and indeed (as argued 
above) used its nuclear capabilities as a shield under which it could expand its military 
campaign to defend the territory from communist forces in southern Angola (consistent with 
the expectations of offensive realism). And yet, it did ultimately agree to cease the occupation 
of Namibia (consistent with the expectations of defensive realism), though did so for reasons 
seemingly unrelated to nuclear deterrence (i.e. the withdrawal of communist forces from 
Angola). Neither offensive or defensive realism found uniform empirical support. However, to 
the extent that nuclear weapons acquisition did determine South Africa’s policy toward the 
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occupation of Namibia, it lead to this policy becoming increasingly aggressive viz. its military 
campaign against southern Angola in defence of the occupied territory. On this basis, I code 
this indicator as in support of HOR. 
4.2.4 Indicator 4: Other acts of nuclear aggression 
This final indicator is concerned with describing instances of South African nuclear aggression 
not captured in the preceding analysis. Through a survey of the literature I identify one 
additional reported instance of South Africa utilising its nuclear weapons for political gain. 
4.2.4.1 Bargaining on nuclear restraint 
One political application of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities reported in the 
literature was their use as a ‘bargaining chip’. A nuclear-armed state can offer to freeze, 
rollback, eliminate, or otherwise modify its nuclear weapons program in exchange for political 
concessions. By enticing the second party to make these political concessions, the nuclear-
armed state has effectively increased its influence, or power, over that state. This mechanism 
was demonstrated in the Pakistan case, when Pakistan offered to rollback its nuclear weapons 
program (bargaining chip) if the US interceded to bring about a resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute (political concession). Pakistan had, through the agency of its nuclear weapons 
capabilities, attempted to influence (or exert power over) US decision making. 
A similar application of nuclear weapons was observed in the case of South Africa. 
South Africa had twice offered to exercise restraint in its nuclear weapons program in exchange 
for political concessions from the US.371 The first instance occurred in June 1978 when South 
Africa offered to sign the NPT in exchange for “the resumption of deliveries of enriched 
uranium for their research reactor and the power stations, assured technology for the 
enrichment plant and US support to reinstate South Africa on the Board of Governors of the 
IAEA”.372 Here South Africa was ostensibly offering to forego its nuclear option in an attempt 
to reintegrate itself into various international organisations and trade arrangements from which 
it had been ostracised due primarily to its policy of apartheid. It’s unclear whether these 
manifold requirements represented the terms of a sincere bargain (South Africa had formalised 
its nuclear weapons strategy two months prior, and thus was perhaps not interested in now 
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giving up the option) or an attempt to head off further US entreaties to sign the NPT by setting 
the terms of accession impractically high. In any case nothing would come of this offer. 
A second nuclear bargaining event occurred in May 1981 when Pik Botha, in a meeting 
with US President Ronald Reagan, offered assurances that South Africa would not conduct a 
nuclear test without first consulting the US.373 Reagan accepted the assurance, and also 
withdrew his opposition to the supply of reactor fuel to South Africa, even presenting South 
Africa with an arrangement to acquire enriched uranium from a third party in Europe (South 
Africa’s supply of US enriched uranium having been banned the year prior by Jimmy Carter). 
It’s unclear whether these mutual concessions were exchanged explicitly as a quid pro quo, 
though Pik Botha certainly believed that this was the arrangement, stating in a subsequent 
interview that “We owe it all [the delivery of enriched uranium] to Reagan and the conversation 
that day… [this formula of] ‘we will not do a test without first consulting with you’ enabled 
him to allow the French to deliver the fuel component to Koeberg.”374 
South Africa had successfully bargained with the carrot of nuclear restraint (specifically 
notice of an intention to test) for a US political concession (allowing the supply of reactor fuel). 
South Africa had, through use of its nuclear weapons capabilities, influenced the behaviour of 
another state. South Africa had, therefore, committed an act of nuclear aggression (HOR 
supported). 
There were no further examples of South African nuclear bargaining in the period of 
measurement observed in the literature. De Klerk had speculated that a statement by Botha in 
1987 declaring an interest in joining the NPT “might have reflected an interest in exploring 
whether the nuclear program could be used as a bargaining chip to relieve economic 
sanctions”,375 though there’s no indication that the terms of such a bargain were ever 
established. Unlike the practices of general, catalytic and immediate deterrence enshrined in 
South Africa’s three-stage nuclear deterrent strategy discussed above, it appears as though the 
practice of nuclear bargaining was exercised in a more limited and ad hoc manner. 
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4.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the effect of nuclear weapons acquisition on South Africa’s foreign 
policy across four foreign policy indicators. The results are displayed in Table 7. Overall, 
offensive realism does a better job explaining the empirics of South African foreign policy in 
the nuclear era than defensive realism, though with a large caveat. South Africa’s observed 
foreign policy aggression with respect to conventional militarism and territorial occupation had 
legitimate security explanations, specifically reducing the probability of a Soviet-backed 
invasion, which was still regarded a contingency worth preparing for in the nuclear era.376 Thus, 
whether the observed South African foreign policy aggression was directed toward establishing 
regional hegemony (as predicted by offensive realism) or simply a minimally secure 
international environment (as predicted by defensive realism) is not entirely apparent. Both 
explanations are feasible. Herein lies the empirical challenge of testing systemic theories of 
foreign policy: it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure state preferences. We rely on 
observable behaviour as a proxy for such preferences, but where competing theories predict 
the same behaviour, adjudication is impossible. 
Table 7. Coding results for the South Africa case 
 Conventional 
military assets 
Militarised 
conflict 
initiation 
Policies toward 
occupied/ disputed 
territories 
Other nuclear weapons-
driven acts of foreign policy 
aggression 
Supported 
hypothesis 
Null hypothesis Offensive 
realism 
Offensive realism Offensive realism 
 
At the core of this indeterminate result is a major confounding unit-level: the weakness of 
South Africa’s nuclear deterrence. Unlike Pakistan, which expressed confidence in nuclear 
deterrence vis-à-vis a major conventional Indian attack, for South Africa nuclear deterrence 
was insufficient on two grounds. Firstly, though Pretoria envisaged some general deterrent 
dividend from 1979 vis-à-vis the Soviets, the inability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the 
Soviet homeland meant that it could not be certain (to the extent that such an ideal is possible) 
that the Soviets would be deterred from conquering South Africa militarily. Secondly, nuclear 
weapons were unable operationally to deter the other major military threat to the South African 
state: black nationalist militias. Thus, in a defensive realist sense, the treatment and therefore 
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observable treatment effect was limited – nuclear weapons did not provide the security ideal 
that could allow South Africa to extricate itself from the balance of power game.  
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5 Israeli nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
Established under a UN mandate in 1948, the small Middle Eastern state of Israel has spent 
most of its short life locked in a battle for its right to exist alongside its territorially contiguous 
Arab neighbours. To shore up its longevity in a hostile neighbourhood, Israel began developing 
a ‘nuclear option’ sometime in the mid-1950s. The Israeli ‘option’ became a functional nuclear 
weapons capability some 10-20 years later, though Israel has never officially acknowledged its 
existence and extreme secrecy surrounds all levels of official deliberation regarding the 
program on both technical and political grounds. 
As with the previous case studies, this chapter assesses whether offensive or defensive 
realism does a better job of explaining Israeli foreign policy subsequent to nuclear weapons 
acquisition. Did nuclear weapons lead to a more peaceful or more aggressive Israel? In making 
this determination this chapter proceeds in two stages. First, I determine the critical juncture of 
nuclear weapons acquisition. That is, when Israel began to perceive security gains due to its 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Second, change in Israeli foreign policy aggression is measured 
across four foreign policy indicators. 
5.1 Nuclear weapons acquisition 
This section evaluates when Israel effectively ‘acquired’ nuclear weapons. As outlined in 
chapter 2, this study defines nuclear weapons acquisition as the point in time at which that state 
began perceiving that its survival in anarchy was assured because of nuclear deterrence. To 
make this determination, this section proceeds in two stages. Section 5.1.1 characterises Israel’s 
nuclear deterrent strategy, specifically in terms of how it envisaged that nuclear weapons could 
be utilised to prevent threats to its survival. And section 5.1.2 identifies the point in time at 
which Israel began to perceive that its survival was assured as per its nuclear deterrent strategy 
(nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’, so defined). 
5.1.1 Israel’s nuclear deterrent strategy 
From the late 19th Century Jews began immigrating to Palestine to escape religious persecution 
in Russia, Europe and elsewhere, drawn to the region by its significance in the religious 
traditions of Judaism. Following the withdrawal of the British colonial authorities from 
Mandatory Palestine in 1948 the local Jewish population, which by that time amounted to 
approximately one-third of Palestine, with the backing of the UN declared an independent 
Jewish homeland, Israel, the territory of which covered approximately one half of Mandatory 
Palestine. For the regional Arabs, the establishment of the state of Israel was illegitimate in that 
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it had deprived native Arab Palestinians of their territorial birthright and made them a political 
minority within their own lands. This central issue, supplemented with an array of parochial 
religious, economic, cultural and political grievances, has driven a persistent and intense 
campaign by national and sub-national Arab actors against Israel’s existence, characterised by 
a near-constant state of low-intensity conflict interspersed by episodes of major interstate and 
civil war.377 
This constant state of conflict with the Arab world was seen as problematic in Israel as 
it viewed itself as on the wrong side of the conventional military balance. The Arab states had 
more territory, larger populations, and larger militaries, both in terms of personnel and materiel. 
For David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, this would mean that  
Israel’s recovery from future armed clashes would become a long and agonizing process, 
while the Arab world, with its vast material and human reserves, would be in a stronger 
position to weather Israel’s onslaught and recuperate its losses. ... Israel would never be able 
to “totally defeat” the Arab states because the superpowers would intervene before such an 
eventuality occurred. Therefore, Israel had to accept the geopolitical reality that even in the 
best scenario it could only chalk up tactical victories in the form of short-termed reprieves in 
the fighting. By contrast, the Arabs had to win only once in order to realize their goal—the 
annihilation of the Jewish state.378 
Facing hostile adversaries and an unfavourable balance of conventional military power, 
the Israeli elite began emphasising ‘science’ and ‘modern weapons’ (code for nuclear weapons) 
as a source of security, specifically in deterring Arab aggression. In a 1963 address to Israel’s 
Weapons Development Authority (RAFAEL), for example, Ben-Gurion stated that 
Our numbers are small, and there is no chance that we could compare ourselves with 
America’s 180 million, or with any Arab neighboring state. … science can provide us with 
the weapons that are needed to deter our enemies from waging war against us. I am confident 
that science is able to provide us with the weapon that will secure the peace, and deter our 
enemies.379 
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In 1965 Deputy Defence Minister and future Prime Minister Shimon Peres similarly wrote that 
“Israel can bring it [peace] closer – if she convinces the Arabs that with the help of science, we 
can eliminate their chance of defeating us, not only in the present, but also in the future.”380 
That year Peres also identified as an issue requiring “special military attention” “strategic 
deterrence and the ability to destroy the enemy with new weapons, if deterrence should fail”.381 
Five years later Peres would implicitly extol the values of deterrence through unacceptable 
damage: “The world is advancing increasingly to the point where the launching of war by 
anyone would be utter madness. The Middle East cannot lag far behind this development.”382 
As time passed Israel’s general concept of deterrence became more refined. Based on 
a series of interviews with former Israeli defence officials, Avner Cohen described a two-tiered 
doctrine of Israeli nuclear deterrence developed from 1966.383 The first dimension was the use 
of nuclear weapons as a “last resort” in an extreme political or military situation in defence of 
Israel’s vital interests. Within this framework, Israel would resort to the use of nuclear weapons 
if one or more of following four ‘red lines’ were crossed: 
(a) a successful Arab military penetration into populated areas within Israel’s post-1949 
borders; (b) the destruction of the Israeli Air Force; (c) the exposure of Israeli cities to 
massive and devastating air attacks or to possible chemical or biological attacks; (d) the use of 
nuclear weapons against Israeli territory. Each of these scenarios was defined, in qualitative 
terms, as an existential threat to the State of Israel against which the nation could defend itself 
by no other means than the use of atomic weapons, which would be politically and morally 
justified.384 
Importantly, up until such a moment of ‘last resort’ was reached, Israel would not publicly 
disclose its nuclear capabilities. The Israeli rationale for nuclear opacity was multifaceted: to 
prevent other Arab states from feeling impelled to themselves proliferate in order to match 
Israel’s capabilities; to reduce the possibility of a preventative strike by Arab forces fearful of 
Israel’s development of the bomb; to reduce the possibility of other powers (in particular the 
Soviet Union) extending nuclear guarantees to the Arab states; and to reduce international 
pressure on Israel to rescind its nuclear weapons program. Even absent a public declaration of 
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capabilities, it was reasoned that general Arab suspicions of Israel’s nuclear capabilities would 
be enough to effect general deterrence and forestall an all-out attack.385 
Whilst nuclear weapons would be responsible for defending its vital interests, Israel 
would rely on its conventional capabilities to defend militarily its peripheral interests. The 
consolidation of conventional capabilities would also, therefore, become a high priority in the 
Israeli military establishment, with Peres identifying, along with ‘strategic deterrence’, a 
“tactical ability and making the most of strategic possibilities with the force of a conventional 
army” as an issue requiring “special military attention”.386 To this end, Cohen identified as the 
second dimension of Israeli nuclear deterrence a type of “insurance vis-à-vis the United States”, 
in which Israel would extort conventional military supplies from the US by threatening to break 
nuclear opacity and publicly deploy its nuclear arsenal. The US, with an interest in both keeping 
nuclear weapons out of the Middle East and maintaining the sanctity of the NPT, would 
therefore be compelled to provide conventional military aid to Israel to stay its hand.387 In other 
words, the US would be forced to keep Israel conventionally strong enough that it would not 
find itself in a position of last resort requiring a public declaration of its nuclear capabilities. 
Thus, nuclear weapons were to increase Israel’s survivability through two mechanisms: 
(1) guaranteeing Israel’s conventional capabilities as a first line of defence against Arab 
hostility; and (2) deterring an existential Arab attack in a moment of last resort. As per the 
conceptual framework set out in chapter 2, the moment at which Israel began to perceive that 
one or both of these mechanisms was at work is the moment of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. In the following section I describe Israeli perceptions during its development of 
nuclear weapons, and identify this moment. 
5.1.2 Nuclear weapons ‘acquisition’ 
The exact date of Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons is uncertain, though Shimon 
Peres, then Director-General of the Defense Ministry, stated that the decision to develop a 
‘nuclear option’ came in 1955,388 coincident with the announcement of a Czech-Egyptian arms 
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deal which was set to double Egypt’s conventional military strength.389 In early 1958 and with 
French assistance Israel began construction of a secret nuclear reactor and plutonium 
reprocessing plant outside the Israeli city of Dimona in the Negev desert.390 The reactor went 
critical in 1962 and the plutonium reprocessing plant was completed in 1965. 
Most informed foreign accounts suggest that Israel assembled its first two nuclear 
devices, deliverable by French-made Vautour light bombers,391 in the weeks leading up to the 
Six-Day War in June 1967.392 These external assessments were corroborated by an account of 
Munya Mardor, founder of RAFAEL, who wrote in his diary on 28 May that he had visited 
with teams that were “assembling and testing the weapon system, the development and 
production of which was completed prior to the war. … Their facial expression was solemn, 
inward, as if they fully recognized the enormous, perhaps fateful, value of the weapon system 
that they brought to operational alert”.393 Though this account doesn’t explicitly identify the 
“weapon system” as Israel’s ‘nuclear option’ (nor would we expect it to given Israel’s doctrine 
of nuclear opacity), it’s uncertain what other weapons system he could be referring to with such 
sober language. 
Open hostilities in the Six-Day War began on June 5 when Israel launched a pre-
emptive ground and aerial assault against the mobilised Egyptian forces, inflicting massive 
damage on troops and materiel and taking control of large stretches of Egyptian territory. The 
Six-Day War concluded on June 10 in a decisive Israeli victory, with Israel taking control of 
the Arab territories of the Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula. 
Interestingly, despite having assembled two nuclear bombs in the weeks leading up to the 
conflict, and despite Israeli leaders having couched the crisis as an explicit threat to their 
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survival,394 Israel had declined the exercise of its nuclear option. Peres reported in his memoirs 
that, during the crisis, “I submitted to [Defense Minister Moshe Dayan] a certain proposal 
which, in my opinion then – and in my opinion today, nearly three decades later – would have 
deterred the Arabs and prevented the war. My proposal … was considered – and rejected.”395 
Though Peres shirked from going into greater detail “for reasons of state security”, his language 
is consistent with the nuclear option. Cohen claims that such “ideas [of nuclear deterrence], 
even if they were entertained, apparently never reached the level of formal discussion.”396  
Israel’s decision to not flex its nuclear muscle at this juncture could have been animated 
by numerous concerns, for example: that doing so would’ve provoked the Soviets to extend 
nuclear guarantees to their Arab clients; that Israel’s nuclear capability at that stage was too 
small, unsophisticated and untested to effect credible deterrence; that doing so would’ve 
damaged its relations with the US and forgone any possibility of US assistance to Israel in 
resolving the crisis; or that there was not adequate time for Israel to have incorporated its 
nuclear capabilities into its political and military strategy, meaning that any gains to have been 
derived from such an exercise were not clearly conceived.397 In any case, Israel’s conventional 
success in the early stages of the war obviated any need to reconsider this position.398 
Thus, though Israel had first assembled its nuclear weapons in 1967, this action did not 
yield any security gains. As stated by Cohen: 
If physical possession is the criterion for the nuclear status of a state, then, by May 1967, 
Israel was a nuclear state. If, on the other hand, the nuclear status of a state is defined in terms 
of its readiness to use that weapon militarily, or politically as a deterrent, then Israel was not a 
nuclear weapons state. It did not make, directly or indirectly, any political use of its nuclear 
capability. … Ultimately, the June 1967 War had no direct nuclear dimension in the sense that 
Israel and the Arabs did not perceive nuclear weapons as being a direct factor in the 
conflict.399 
(This quote demonstrates explicitly the importance of distinguishing between technical and 
cognitive milestones in inferring nuclear weapons acquisition, as discussed in section 2.3.1. 
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Though Israel had the technical ability to produce atomic bombs in 1967, it would, as argued 
below, take several years before the elite effectively incorporated such capabilities into their 
strategic decision-making, thereby leading to the theorised effects of nuclear weapons on 
foreign policy.) 
The perceived irrelevance of Israel’s nascent nuclear capabilities in the Six-Day War is 
evidenced by Israel’s initial decision to initiate hostilities. If Israel felt that its nuclear weapons 
were able to deter an Arab attack across the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL; i.e. the pre-
1967 borders), then it should not have seen a need to pre-empt Arab aggression with its aerial 
assault into Sinai on June 5.400 The belief in the inevitability of an Arab attack across the ADL 
(and, by logical extension, the inefficacy of nuclear deterrence) was expressed numerous times 
in the lead-up to the War. On 3 June, for example, Dayan had expressed in a meeting with 
Prime Minister Eshkol that the only alternative to a pre-emptive attack “was to wait for the 
Egyptians to attack first and that meant the loss of the Land of Israel. Waiting a week, added 
Dayan, would entail thousands of casualties”.401 
In the years following its sweeping victory in the Six-Day War Israel took a number of 
steps to bolster and operationalise its nascent nuclear weapons capability. In 1968 Dimona 
began the full-scale production of nuclear warheads, producing four to five annually; from 
1969 Israel began receiving US-made F-4 Phantoms capable of delivering a nuclear strike as 
far as Moscow; and by 1971 Israel had acquired a battery of fixed and mobile nuclear-capable 
Jericho missile launchers capable of striking the Arab capitals.402 
It was around this time that Israel’s nuclear status shifted from a matter of international 
secrecy to general knowledge. On 18 July 1970 the New York Times’s front page featured an 
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article titled ‘U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts’, in which it was claimed 
that “For at least two years the United States Government has been conducting its Middle East 
policy on the assumption that Israel either possesses an atomic bomb or has component parts 
available for quick assembly”.403 The Israeli ambassador to the US, Yitzhak Rabin, neither 
confirmed nor denied the story.404 Journalist Seymour Hersh reports that in the early 1970s 
Israeli intelligence had also uncovered a Soviet spy-ring embedded in the upper echelons of 
the Israeli intelligence and defence establishments that was relaying to Moscow “major secret 
decisions” related to its nuclear weapons program,405 information that almost certainly 
would’ve been passed on in some form to the Soviet Union’s Arab clients. Israel had reportedly 
even broken its own veil of secrecy to communicate to Moscow its nuclear capabilities, with 
Hersh claiming that “by 1973” the Israeli Mossad had communicated to the KGB that Israel 
was capable of producing warheads “small enough to fit into a suitcase… The Soviets 
understood that no amount of surveillance could prevent Israeli agents from smuggling nuclear 
bombs across the border in automobiles, aircraft, or commercial ships.”406 
With Israel now possessing an arsenal of deliverable nuclear weapons and with its 
enemies and allies having an informed suspicion of such a capability, it would seem that all the 
necessary pieces were in place for effective two-tiered Israeli nuclear deterrence. This 
proposition was tested on 6 October 1973 when Egypt and Syria, seeking to regain the 
territories lost in 1967, launched a coordinated attack on Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula 
and Golan Heights. Despite early losses to an effective assault of Arab infantry and armour the 
Israelis rallied, and with the help of a US airlift of military equipment managed to effectively 
fight back the advancing Arab forces. The conflict, known as the Yom Kippur War, ended on 
24 October in an Israeli military victory and with little change to the territorial boundaries 
established in the Six-Day War.407 
In the context of this conflict the nuclear option entered into Israeli calculations on 
October 7 when, at a meeting of Golda Meir and other insiders of the Israeli security 
establishment, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan recommended making “technical preparations” 
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for a “nuclear demonstration” (likely a nuclear test). This option was rejected by Golda Meir 
on the grounds that Israel was capable of mounting a sufficient conventional response.408 
Accordingly, it was decided that, as put by Minister Yisrael Galili, Israel would “fight with 
conventional weapons without involving any other means, directly or indirectly.”409 By the 
evening of October 8, however, with losses in Sinai and the Golan Heights mounting, 
independent reports by Time magazine410 and journalists Seymour Hersh411 and Richard Sale412 
state that Meir agreed to assemble 13 nuclear bombs and ready Israel’s nuclear-capable missiles 
and aircraft.413 According to these reports, the intention of this move was consistent with 
Israel’s two-tiered nuclear strategy. Firstly, it was intended that the preparations would be 
discovered by the Soviets, whether through satellite imaging or human intelligence, who 
would, in turn, “urge their allies in Egypt and Syria to limit their offensive and not attempt to 
advance beyond the pre-1967 borders.”414 Secondly, these preparations would also be detected 
by the US, encouraging it to backstop Israel’s worsening conventional military position in Sinai 
and the Golan Heights and prevent Israel from resorting to breaking nuclear opacity. 
Accordingly, Israel resolved to “arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse 
and … it would inform Washington of its unprecedented nuclear action – and unprecedented 
peril – and demand that the United States begin an emergency airlift of replacement arms and 
ammunition needed to sustain an extended all-out war effort.”415 Consistent with this approach, 
Meir is reported to have sent Nixon a message that stated, in substance, that “Israel’s very 
existence is endangered. If the United States does not begin immediately to resupply Israel on 
a massive scale, it might soon be forced to use every means at its disposal to ensure its national 
survival”.416 
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The implementation of Israel’s two-tiered nuclear strategy appeared to work. 
According to the abovementioned journalistic accounts, on 9 October Israeli intelligence 
detected a signal from the Soviets to both Cairo and Washington warning of Israel’s arming of 
its nuclear devices.417 That same day, when Syria was at the precipice of retaking the Golan 
Heights from the bushwhacked Israeli troops, the Syrian front-line retreated. The Syrian forces 
did not cut the bridges linking the Heights with Israel proper, nor did it push its advantage in 
the northern sector which would’ve enveloped the southern Israeli front, giving Syria effective 
control over the Golan Heights and putting it in a position to invade Israel proper. Van Creveld 
inferred from this move, inexplicable from a military stand-point, that Syria may have been 
responding to Israeli ‘nuclear sabre-rattling’.418 Later, on the evening of October 9, the US 
approved an airlift of military supplies to Israel, including tanks, aircraft, ordnance and 
electronic equipment. The first shipment arrived on October 14 on an ‘air bridge’ capable of 
ferrying nearly one thousand tons of military hardware daily. The airlift was instrumental both 
in facilitating the decisive Israeli military victory, and in improving Israel’s overall military 
strength and bargaining position at the conclusion of the conflict.419 
This mainstream account of the role of Israeli nuclear weapons in the Yom Kippur War 
has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. The most comprehensive critique to date 
was published by the Center for Naval Analyses in 2013. This report, titled The Israeli 
“Nuclear Alert” of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis, was compiled by leading experts 
on the Israeli nuclear program, and drew on an array of publicly available primary and 
secondary evidence, closed documents from US government agencies, and interviews with 
experts on and participants in the crisis.420 This chapter will not rehash all of the evidence 
marshalled on either side of the debate, nor the analysis contributed in this 58-page report, 
though it does regard the assessment as the most informed to date, with the report concluding 
that, based on the available evidence: (a) Israel did make preparatory steps in readying its 
                                                 
417 Hersh, Samson Option, 227, 29. 
418 van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 231-32. See also Shlomo Aronson, “The Nuclear 
Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” The Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 1-2 (1984): 118-20, 27-29; Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and Strategy 
of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991, an Israeli 
Perspective (New York: State University of New York, 1992), 139-49. 
419 “Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 9 October 1973, 6:10-6:35 P.M,” in The October War 
and U.S. Policy (1973); Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 476-77; Farr, The Third 
Temple’s Holy of Holies, 13. 
420 Elbridge Colby et al., “The Israeli “Nuclear Alert” of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis,” 
(Arlington VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2013). 
Christopher J. Watterson 
133 
 
nuclear arsenal in the early stages of the crisis; (b) such steps were primarily technical in nature, 
though for lower levels of decision-making (specifically, agents of the military) the intention 
may have been to create a nuclear signal; (c) the US did detect the nuclear preparations, though 
this only had a modest impact on the US decision to initiate the airlift to Israeli; (d) the Soviets 
also likely detected the nuclear preparations, and this probably had some general pacifying 
effect on Soviet-Arab military activities; and (e) general knowledge of the Israeli nuclear 
program likely had a greater effect on US-Soviet-Arab decision-making than any specific 
Israeli manipulation of its nuclear forces during the crisis. 
Thus, by all accounts there was, at the very least, a general and limited effect of Israeli 
nuclear weapons on US-Soviet-Arab decision-making consistent with the intentions of Israel’s 
two-tiered nuclear strategy. What’s more, it’s likely that Israel perceived such dividends in the 
wake of the crisis. On deterring an all-out Arab attack, take, for example, the abovementioned 
military restraint demonstrated by the Syrians in the Golan Heights. Though more recent 
analysis would argue that Arab intentions were limited from the outset,421 in the first days of 
the conflict when Israel was suffering major losses, the highest levels of Israeli decision-
making were convinced that they were engaged in an all-out battle for survival. Dayan, for 
example, had characterised the fight as being “over the entire land of Israel”, and declared that 
the Arab forces intended “to conquer Israel, to eliminate the Jews”. After returning from the 
northern front and seeing the damage being inflicted upon the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), he 
famously lamented that “this is the end of the Third Temple.”422 Golda Meir had similarly 
stated that “there is no reason why they [the Arabs] would stop … they already tasted blood.”423 
There had reportedly even been discussion of the “distribution of antitank weapons to every 
citizen, and last-ditch resistance in the civilian population centers.”424 The Syrian reluctance to 
push their military advantage in the Golan Heights, especially in the immediate aftermath of 
the reported Soviet detection of Israeli nuclear preparations, would likely have created the 
impression in Jerusalem that these nuclear preparations exercised some deterring effect. Absent 
specific Israeli testimony it is difficult to confirm this assessment, though academic Shlomo 
Aronson draws a similar conclusion in writing that 
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it does seem plausible that in [Major General and future Minister of Defence (and later Prime 
Minister) Ariel] Sharon’s view the nuclear option played a role in those events, and that he 
saw it as having constrained Egyptian and Syrian freedom of action. The nuclear option 
dictated the limited war that otherwise might have escalated, and which he felt could escalate 
in the future if Israel’s credibility in this and other respects was undermined.425 
On soliciting US military aid, there was a similarly rapid change in US policy consistent 
with Israeli nuclear preparations. The US had initially been reluctant to resupply Israel, seeking 
instead to increase its standing in the Arab world, avoid a regional military entanglement with 
the Soviets, and force Israel toward progress on Arab-Israeli peace initiatives.426 The day after 
the reported Israeli decision to initiate technical preparations of its nuclear weapons, then US 
Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger recounts that “[Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger 
just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical” in urging an Israeli resupply. Schlesinger 
added that “Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear 
exchange … there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a 
collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them.”427 This testimony was 
corroborated by Hermann Eilts, former Ambassador to Egypt, who recalled that “Henry 
[Kissinger] threw in that there was concern that the Israelis might go nuclear. There had been 
intimations that if they didn’t get military equipment, and quickly, they might go nuclear.”428 
The following day the airlift was approved. Such a sudden shift in US policy following the 
purported Israeli signal would have supported the supposition in Jerusalem, rightly or wrongly, 
of the decisive role of nuclear weapons in facilitating US resupply. 
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict Israel demonstrated a commitment to its 
newly tested two-tiered nuclear strategy. Early in 1974 General Orwin C. Talbott, Deputy 
Commander of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, whilst touring Israel to 
discuss lessons from the 1973 War, was engaged by the Israeli Chief of Staff David ‘Dado’ 
Elazar on Israeli nuclear strategy during the War. Talbott commented that “My impression at 
the time was that he was trying through me to let Washington know how serious the situation 
was – approaching the point where they were ready to use them [nuclear weapons]. … I 
assumed Dado was trying to get a message to us.” This account was corroborated by Colonel 
Bruce Williams, the US Army attaché in Israel, also present at the Talbott-Elazar meeting: “the 
message was clear: Israel was prepared to use nuclear weapons against the Syrians if they’d 
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broken through.”429 Aronson similarly reported that both Dayan and his successor as Minister 
of Defence, Shimon Peres, had, “following the Yom Kippur War… publicly introduced a vague 
nuclear threat into Arab-Israeli conflict”,430 adding that “covert nuclear threats [existed] as a 
major variable in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the early 1970s”.431 
The perceived security dividends of nuclear weapons demonstrated in 1973 appeared 
to sustain in the years following the Yom Kippur War. With respect to soliciting US support, 
US economic and military aid to Israel increased drastically in the nuclear era (see Table 8). 
Observing the role of nuclear weapons in determining this outcome is difficult given that 
neither side is likely to openly admit to it: Israel to maintain nuclear opacity and the US to both 
maintain Israeli nuclear opacity and to not be seen to be succumbing to nuclear blackmail. 
Indeed, according to a former high-level Israeli official, it is “likely” that Israel never explicitly 
invoked its nuclear capabilities in such negotiations.432 Instead, as expressed by Evron, “the 
nuclear option gradually became a tacit bargaining card in Israel’s arms transfer negotiations 
with the United States.”433 This supposition is backed up by testimony from former National 
Security Council staffer William Quandt, who wrote in 1991 that 
There has long been a sense among American policymakers that providing Israel with 
conventional weapons was justified, in part, by the concern that Israel would otherwise feel 
compelled to rely excessively on a nuclear defense. This widespread view is rarely mentioned 
in policy deliberations, but I am convinced that it has had an impact on decisions.434 
Given the apparent efficacy of the 1973 threat coupled with subsequent US patronage, 
it would not have been unreasonable for Israel to have viewed the US as committed to 
guaranteeing Israeli conventional superiority. There were, however, also bases for Israeli 
concern. Though the US-Israel relationship was mostly stable, the US occasionally wavered in 
its support, for example by delaying arms shipments or refusing to back an Israeli response to 
a regional crisis,435 usually to win favour with Arab states (thereby weakening Soviet influence) 
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Table 8. US military and economic assistance to Israel (1982 USD million)436 
 Economic Military 
 Loans Grants Loans Grants 
1963 162.6 17 38 0 
1964 89.9 13.4 0 0 
1965 119.9 13.4 34.4 0 
1966 95.6 2.4 240.1 0 
1967 14.2 1.6 18 0 
1968 128.3 1.2 61.9 0 
1969 85.3 1.4 200.9 0 
1970 91.2 0.9 67.2 0 
1971 118.8 0.6 1,166.3 0 
1972 111.6 104.5 622.2 0 
1973 117 99.2 602.7 0 
1974 0 92.6 1751 2,672.7 
1975 14 561.2 326 163 
1976 375.8 745.7 1,177.4 1,177.4 
1977 373.7 726.7 741.5 741.5 
1978 368.8 725.7 691 691 
1979 337.7 668.8 3,439.9 1656.3 
1980 303.3 610.2 581.2 581.1 
1981 0 810 954.2 530.1 
1982 0 806 850 550 
     
Pre-nuclear avg. 101.74 15.64 244.90 0.00 
Nuclear avg. 189.03 584.61 1,111.49 876.31 
Change 0.86 36.38 3.54 - 
p* 0.1574 0.0001 0.0162 0.0065 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
 
or force Israeli compliance with US interests.437 This wavering commitment, coupled with the 
absence of a formal defence treaty and the US’s international retrenchment manifest in the 
1973 and 1975 withdrawals from Vietnam and Angola, respectively, 438 created an ambivalent 
attitude in Jerusalem as to the extent and reliability of future US support. Some, such as Rafael, 
argued that “beyond the occasional differences of views, all administrations remained loyal to 
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the United States’ commitment to Israel’s existential needs.”439 While others, such as Moshe 
Dayan, were more sceptical, as stated by Aronson: 
Dayan had developed a growing feeling the United States might be a world power in retreat, 
unable to use its tremendous capabilities to subdue a determined little foe (North Vietnam) 
who enjoyed unlimited Soviet aid. Israel, as a result of this basic perceptions, should have 
developed every possible, even if marginal, measure of leverage over the superpowers and the 
Arabs at the same time.440 
Demonstrating such concerns, in 1976 Dayan called for a reappraisal of Israeli strategic 
doctrine given “America’s current weakness and the limitations of its mediating role”,441 and 
in 1975 Peres submitted to the Knesset a defence budget calling for increased domestic 
production of conventional arms should “the United States [decide] to cut back military aid.”442 
Whether Israel perceived that the US would let Israeli conventional capabilities deteriorate to 
a point that manifestly threatened Israeli survival is perhaps another question, though in general 
terms the US guarantee was not seen as ironclad. 
In terms of Israeli perceptions of the effectiveness of strategic nuclear deterrence vis-
à-vis the Arab states, the growing media coverage of Israel’s nuclear capabilities443 coupled 
with reported Israeli signalling to the Soviets and Arabs during and subsequent to the 1973 
War444 meant that the Arabs were aware of Israel’s covert nuclear capabilities. Though the 
Arab states were predictably reluctant to acknowledge the deterrent effects of the Israeli 
capabilities publicly,445 in the private halls of the Arab capitals this appeared to be an 
established fact. For example, state records captured from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq reveal 
that, between 1978-82, Saddam Hussein had sought to acquire nuclear weapons directly from 
the Soviets in order to militarily challenge Israel, believing that “Israel’s nuclear monopoly in 
the Middle East made taking major military action to accomplish this goal [defeating Israel] an 
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unacceptably risky proposition.”446 Similar motivations also appeared to animate Egypt’s and 
Libya’s requests for turn-key nuclear weapons in the early 1970s from the Soviets and Chinese, 
respectively.447 A 1977 Iraqi memorandum to the Arab League also warned that “Israel would 
very probably use nuclear weapons in a fifth war with the Arabs.”448 And in formulating a 
military solution to retaking the Golan heights “between the mid-seventies and late eighties”, 
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad appeared to implicitly acknowledge Israel’s deterrent 
capability by, as stated by van Creveld, “toying with several possibilities” that would not risk 
“nuclear war”: 
At times he returned to the pre-1967 notion of a popular war, using Algeria, Vietnam, “and 
other countries which I do not wish to mention” as analogous cases. At times he insisted that 
since Israel was such a small country it would not be able to use any nuclear weapons it had. 
At other times he referred to something called “strategic parity,” either announcing that the 
Arabs too would acquire nuclear weapons or appearing to put his trust in chemical warfare as 
a means for offsetting the Israeli nuclear threat.449 
To the extent that Israel was aware of such Arab perceptions, it would have felt increasingly 
assured of its survival, specifically due to nuclear deterrence. Such perceptions would only 
have been bolstered by the Arab press, which was more loquacious in discussing the 
implications of Israel’s nuclear monopoly, stating that Israel’s nuclear status would “ensure her 
survival”,450 that since Israel’s nuclear development there has “never been the realistic 
possibility of a total Arab victory”,451 and that “the sands [have] run out for the Arabs.”452 Shai 
Feldman wrote in 1982 that 
My own survey of Arab attitudes since the October 1973 war indicates a grave Arab concern 
about the paralysing effect of a possible Israeli nuclear posture. This concern is reflected 
indirectly in the sheer frequency with which the Arabs address themselves to the issue, and 
directly in the extent to which they recognize the need to develop viable responses.453 
Though the Israelis were predictably reserved about expressing publicly their view 
nuclear weapons were deterring an Arab attack, in one unguarded moment Peres stated in a 
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1976 interview that Israel’s ‘nuclear option’ had “served us well until now”, “so Israel should 
not relieve the Arabs of their anxiety about it”.454 
Thus, based on both the Israeli perceived efficacy of nuclear deterrence during and 
subsequent to the Yom Kippur War, 1973 appears the best candidate as to when Israel began 
to perceive the security dividends of nuclear weapons – ‘acquisition’, as defined in this study. 
Though Israel had functional nuclear weapons as early as 1967, Israel’s conventional 
superiority obviated the need to lean on these capabilities in managing the Arab military threat. 
The conventional situation had changed by 1973, however, and following the massive 
conventional losses in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War, Israel activated its nuclear 
strategy through covert nuclear signalling to the US and Soviet Union. The apparent response 
of the US and Arabs to these signals would have validated Israel’s nuclear deterrent strategy in 
the eyes of the Israeli elite, and demonstrated the security dividends of its nuclear weapons 
capabilities.455 In other words, from 1973, Israel saw its survival in anarchy as assured due to 
its nuclear weapons capabilities. Based on the theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
developed in chapter 2, it is from this point that we would expect to see changes in Israel’s 
foreign policy (either more or less aggression). The following section tests this proposition by 
measuring and comparing Israeli foreign policy aggression across four indicators in the ten 
years immediately preceding and following nuclear weapons acquisition. 
5.2 Indicators 
5.2.1 Indicator 1: Conventional military assets 
The first foreign policy indicator examined here is Israel’s procurement of conventional 
military assets, specifically combat tanks, aircraft and military personnel. In a defensive realist 
framework, we would expect the security gains of nuclear deterrence offset the need for 
conventional military strength, leading to a plateau or decline in a state’s stocks of such assets. 
In an offensive realist framework, on the other hand, Israel’s innate desire for hegemony 
will lead it to grow its conventional capabilities in taking advantage of the new strategic 
opportunities afforded by its nuclear capabilities. Table 9 shows strong growth across all three 
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measures of conventional military assets at statistically significant levels (p < 0.05). Tanks and 
military personnel more than tripled and doubled in absolute terms, respectively, with combat 
aircraft seeing 69% growth. 
Table 9. Israel conventional military assets 1963-82 
 Combat tanks Combat aircraft Military personnel (‘000) 
1963 - - 65 
1964 400 - 65 
1965 600 - 65 
1966 800 - 65 
1967 990 230 75 
1968 800 270 95 
1969 255 275 100 
1970 1,050 330 105 
1971 1,050 374 130 
1972 1,700 432 130 
1973 1,700 488 130 
1974 1,900 466 182 
1975 2,765 461 172 
1976 2,765 543 172 
1977 3,065 549 179 
1978 3,065 543 179 
1979 3,115 576 181 
1980 3,115 535 196 
1981 3,500 602 201 
1982 3,600 634 205 
    
Pre-nuclear avg. 849.44 318.50 89.50 
Nuclear avg. 2859.00 539.70 179.70 
Change factor 2.37 0.69 1.01 
p* 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Note: measurements prior to 1964 are not available. Prior to 1967 the dataset does not distinguish between 
‘aircraft’ and ‘combat aircraft’, thus these measurements were excluded. 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
 
Though a strong showing for HOR, there did appear to be other ‘unit-level’ factors that 
were driving this precipitous military build-up. The first is ‘bureaucratic inertia’: what Halperin 
describes as the tendency of bureaucracies to “keep doing what they have been doing.”456 Prior 
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to 1973 Israel had relied on its conventional superiority to defend against Arab militarism, 
including fighting off two Arab attempts to expunge Israel in 1948 and 1967. Accordingly, 
there was an existential demand to maintain a robust conventional force, and Table 9 
demonstrates this impetus, with strong average annual growth of combat tanks, aircraft and 
personnel in the ten years preceding nuclear weapons acquisition (163, 40 and 6,500, 
respectively). Israel’s historic reliance on conventional capabilities and the ingrained nature of 
conventional military doctrine may have prevented the elite from shifting, both cognitively and 
operationally, the burden of strategic defence to nuclear weapons.457 
The non-integration of Israel’s nuclear capabilities into its military strategy date back 
to 1963, when Ben-Gurion had reportedly “decided not to restructure the IDF and its military 
doctrine so as to base it on nuclear weapons. Rather, he would continue to develop a nuclear 
option without changing the IDF doctrine and basic organization.”458 This would place greater 
pressure on the maintenance of a robust conventional force for Israel’s security, even with the 
security dividends of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, in April 1976 Prime Minister Rabin 
expressed the view that “Conventional power suffices to guarantee Israel’s security in the near 
future”, adding that “Attempts to rely on mystical [i.e. nuclear] weapons are negative.”459 The 
Israeli public appeared to agree, with public opinion polling in the early 1980s finding that 
whilst the majority of Israelis believed that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, that it should not 
base its national security on such weapons.460 In writing on the evolution of military doctrine 
during Israel’s development of the nuclear option, Cohen also notes that 
To the extent that a handful of senior Israeli military officers in the mid-1960s knew about 
this debate [on nuclear strategy], they apparently viewed it as both theoretical and irrelevant 
to their own military mission. … They were committed to the notion that the IDF mission was 
to prevent these scenarios [of ‘last resort’] from ever coming to pass. Allon’s idea of a 
“preventative counterattack,” which meant that the IDF denied that the Arabs could ever force 
Israel to a point of last resort, was ingrained in military thinking. To accomplish this mission, 
Israel needed a strong tactical air force and a massive armored force.461 
Thus, many within Israel had seemingly not sought to take advantage of the full strategic 
implications of nuclear weapons acquisition, leading to a belief in the continued importance of 
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conventional strength as a defence against military conquest, thereby justifying the observed 
conventional force build-up. 
One might counter that such sentiments, at least from military officials, were self-
serving; that the desire for conventional strength reflected the avarice of military institutions 
rather than a legitimate assessment of security needs, as was observed in the case of Pakistan. 
I argue against this, however, as civilian control over defence allocations and growing popular 
resistance to massive defence outlays in the midst of the Israeli economic crisis of the 1970s 
had actually pushed the sands of bureaucratic self-interest toward military retrenchment.462 
Indeed, a number of other cost-saving measures were implemented in this period, including 
reductions in the length of compulsory military service and the downscaling of costly 
mobilisation exercises.463 
Contributing to Israel’s apparent disinterest in shifting the burden of defence to nuclear 
weapons might have been the opaque nature of the program itself. For a state with an opaque 
nuclear weapons program, we might expect that the operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent 
would be stifled by two factors: (1) the inability to exercise its nuclear weapons capabilities in 
any manner that would risk breaking opacity (nuclear tests, threats of nuclear strikes etc.), 
limiting its options for effecting deterrence; and (2) the inability to effectively implement 
nuclear strategy down a chain of command given the need to limit even internal awareness of 
the program as much as possible for fear of leaked information. Such factors appeared to be at 
play in the case of Israel. Take, for example, Israel’s non-use of its nuclear option in the Six-
Day War. Despite having assembled functional nuclear weapons in 1967, and despite the 
existential terms of the conflict, Israel did not press for US concessions under the implied threat 
of breaking nuclear opacity as it would do six years later. In other words, it chose not to exercise 
its nuclear weapons capabilities for security gains, even in a period of crisis. This could be 
explained by Israel’s clearer-cut conventional preponderance in 1967, as well as the absence 
of a period of concentrated losses as in 1973. Another explanation is that the secrecy of this 
project at this stage (i.e. prior to the 1970 New York Times expose and subsequent reporting) 
prevented the internal deliberation on such a strategy. As described by Aronson: 
His [Eshkol’s] endeavors to exploit Israel’s bargaining advantages vis-à-vis Washington – 
advantages gained also by bargaining with the nuclear option – could not be carried on in full 
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public view. Nor could he explain persuasively that he needed time to exhaust this approach 
while the public and some members of his cabinet pressed in on him hysterically.464 
This means that Israel’s ability to take full advantage of its nuclear capabilities was limited 
operationally by nuclear opacity. Even post-1973, when Israel’s nuclear weapons program was 
an open secret and it had begun to reap security dividends from their possession, we might 
assume that internal restrictions on deliberation would have left a strategic vacuum that was 
filled with tried and tested conventional capabilities. Indeed, in a 1976 lecture to the Israeli-
American Chamber of Commerce, Dayan had suggested adopting an open nuclear posture 
specifically for the purpose of “decreas[ing] the defence expenditures needed for a new 
conventional arms race.”465 Evidently there was a view amongst the Israeli elite of a trade-off 
between nuclear opacity and conventional force retrenchment. 
Applying this observation more broadly, we might expect a nuclear-armed state that 
adopts a posture of nuclear opacity to retain a security-based incentive for maintaining robust 
conventional force capabilities. This hypothesis is not falsified by the earlier case studies, both 
of which were opaque proliferators (Pakistan until 1998 only) and demonstrated strong growth 
in capabilities across all three measured conventional assets in the range 16-237%. 
A further unit-level explanation for Israel’s conventional force build-up in the nuclear 
era is that, independent of strategic concerns, Israel sought to maintain a robust conventional 
force for fighting limited conflicts. Though the Arab states still countenanced the destruction 
of Israel, they also had more immediate and limited political objectives that they pursued 
through limited militarised conflicts, principally the return of territories lost in the 1967 war. It 
was this objective that animated the wars of 1969-70 and 1973 (both immensely costly from 
Israel’s perspective), as well as the Arab states’ prolonged campaign of limited incursions into 
the occupied territories, such as through artillery strikes or backing Palestinian militants, 
designed to bleed Israel and reduce its will to occupy these territories. Given the limited stakes 
of such conflicts, i.e. territories beyond the ADL, Israel could not rely on nuclear deterrence to 
forestall such Arab militarism. Indeed, this assumption was built into Israeli nuclear strategy; 
Israel’s abovementioned four ‘red lines’ of nuclear use only related to the ADL territories, and 
intelligence analyst Harold Hough assessed from Israel’s placement of “their nuclear deterrent 
in the centre of the country … a defendable area that would be one of the last parts of Israel to 
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fall to an enemy” that “Israel does not consider the nuclear option to be a first-strike weapon 
but a last resort device that would only be used if the state of Israel is threatened with 
annihilation.”466 With Israel’s nuclear weapons serving no deterrent function in the occupied 
territories, the Israelis must’ve relied on their conventional strength to protect their interests in 
these areas, justifying a robust conventional force.467 
In sum, in statistical terms, Indicator 1 provides strong empirical support for HOR, 
though unit-level variables offer persuasive explanations for this outcome other than Israel’s 
inherent desire for hegemony. Absent any evidence of a causal relationship between Israel’s 
nuclear weapons acquisition and precipitous conventional force build-up, I code this indicator 
as supporting the null hypothesis. 
5.2.2 Indicator 2: Militarised conflict initiation 
The second foreign policy indicator examined here is Israeli militarised conflict initiation. Did 
Israel avoid the costs of militarised conflict under the peace dividends of nuclear deterrence as 
per defensive realism, or did it exploit the strategic dividends of nuclear acquisition to more 
aggressively pursue an expansionist agenda through conflict initiation (as per offensive 
realism). Figure 4 shows that the average number of Israeli-initiated conflict days per year 
dropped from 829 to 432 in the nuclear era (-48%, p = 0.0041),468 consistent with the 
expectations of defensive realism. 
Those Israeli conflicts that were initiated in the nuclear era for the most part came under Israel’s 
strategy of conventional deterrence, which from the 1950s had emphasised the use of 
conventional reprisal attacks as a means of imposing costs on the limited use of force by the 
Arab states in order to establish a regime of deterrence by punishment.469 The logic of this 
strategy was set out by Dayan: 
We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion and every tree from uprooting. We cannot 
prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard [or] a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set 
a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab 
government to think it worth paying. We can see to it that the Arab villages oppose the raiding bands 
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that pass through them, rather than give them assistance. It is in our power to see that Arab military 
commanders prefer a strict performance of their obligation to police the frontiers rather man suffer 
defeat in clashes with our units.470 
 
 
Figure 4. Israeli-initiated conflict days 
 
Figure 5. Israeli days spent in Arab-initiated militarised conflict 
 
                                                 
470 Quoted in Uri Bar‐Joseph, “Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli 
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Accordingly, as such limited Arab incursions decreased in the nuclear era from an 
annual average of 954 days to 523 (-45%, p = 0.0146; see Figure 5), there was the observed 
commensurate reduction (-48%) in Israeli-initiated conflict. Kuperman demonstrated this 
relationship statistically, showing from 1949-82 a statistically significant correlation between 
Arab attacks yielding Israeli casualties and Israeli reprisal attacks.471 Thus, at the macro level, 
Israel’s use of conventional militarised conflict in the nuclear era appeared to be oriented 
toward deterring future Arab aggression, rather than establishing regional hegemony. 
5.2.3 Indicator 3: Policies toward occupied/disputed territories 
Following Israel’s successes in the Six-Day War it had occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza 
Strip (formerly Egyptian territory), the West Bank (formerly Jordanian territory) and the Golan 
Heights (formerly Syrian territory; see Figure 6). Though Israel would relinquish Sinai back to 
Egypt as part of the 1978-79 peace process, it would retain control over the other three 
territories until the present day. This section describes change in Israel’s policies toward these 
occupied territories across the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras. 
Following the Six-Day War Israel agreed to return the captured Arab territories in 
exchange for Arab assent to peace treaties with Israel (the ‘land for peace’ formulation). Egypt 
and Jordan agreed to this arrangement in principle (hard-line Syria rejected any negotiation 
with Israel), though differences emerged in two key respects. First, whether an agreement on 
peace was to precede withdrawal from the occupied territories (Israel’s preferred arrangement) 
or vice versa (the Arabs’ preferred arrangement). Second, how much of the occupied territory 
would be returned: a complete withdrawal (the Arabs’ preferred arrangement) or a partial 
withdrawal based on renegotiated boundaries (Israel’s preferred arrangement).472 The 
occupation was thus to be maintained until suitable arrangements could be found with the Arab 
claimants. This did not come cheaply for Israel, however, with occupation increasing the 
geographic defence burden, inciting Arab attacks to reclaim the areas (including the War of 
Attrition and Yom Kippur War), pushing the Arab states closer to the Soviets, and changing 
the demographic profile of the Israeli state leading to domestic divisions.473  
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Figure 6. Border changes following the Six-Day War.474 
In 1978-79 Israel and Egypt entered into a bilateral peace treaty that made for the return 
of Sinai to Egypt, Egypt relinquishing its claim to Gaza, the demilitarisation of Sinai, and free 
Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. Though consistent with Israeli 
preferences under the land for peace regime, ceding Sinai back to Egypt did carry some risk 
for Israel. Effectively Israel was giving up the territorial buffer of Sinai and establishing 
Egyptian sovereign territory along the ADL. The first failsafe to the resumption of violence 
under this new regime, the peace treaty, could not be considered foolproof as there were 
powerful internal and external forces pushing Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to renounce 
peace and resume hostilities with Israel.475 The second failsafe, the demilitarisation of Sinai, 
was similarly tenuous as, following the 1956 Suez Crisis, Israel had occupied and returned 
Sinai to Egypt under a similar arrangement of demilitarisation only to be fighting a war for its 
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survival there ten years later after Egypt expelled the peacekeepers. Reflecting such concerns, 
Rabin queried in a 1976 press conference: “Is Israel able to concede significant parts of Sinai 
which gives it strategic depth in return for a promise of non-belligerency, while it has no 
guarantee that Egypt will in fact, honor it when aggressive acts occur on other Arab fronts?”476 
A 1979 CIA intelligence memorandum similarly assessed that “The Israelis see Egyptian 
noncompliance with the treaty as a real possibility”.477 Despite such concerns, Israel completed 
the withdrawal from Sinai by 1982. 
Outcomes in the Golan Heights went the other way. After occupation in 1967, and 
despite Syrian intransience on any negotiations with Israel, Israel had expressed a general 
willingness to compromise on a return of the captured territory to Syria. The Labour Alignment 
(in power until 1977) was willing to return “most or even all of the territory” in exchange for 
a peace settlement and guarantees against Syrian aggression. Even the conservative Likud 
government (in power from 1977) had “no official policy opposing territorial compromise on 
the Golan and rarely even mentioned the area when proclaiming its unshakable commitment to 
Israel’s permanent retention of the West Bank and Gaza.”478 And yet, in December 1981, with 
a Israeli-Syrian disengagement of forces agreement in place and UN military observers on the 
Golan Heights,479 the Knesset passed a bill annexing the former Syrian territory, changing 
Israeli policy from one of occupation to territorial aggrandisement. 
With respect to the West Bank, though Israel would formally annex East Jerusalem in 
1980, its policy regarding to the remainder of the territory was more measured. As mentioned 
above, Likud had proclaimed an ‘unshakable commitment’ to retaining the West Bank. And 
yet, instead of outright annexation as with the Golan Heights, Israel sought to build its control 
over the West Bank through more subversive methods. Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
(outside of Jerusalem) more than quadrupled from 18 in 1973 to 77 by 1982;480 Israeli 
government communications began to emphasise the Jews’ historical claims to ‘Judea and 
Samaria’ (the ancient titles for the areas of the West Bank), declaring the region a “paternal 
                                                 
476 Wagner, “Israeli Perceptions of American Security Policy,” 70. 
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right” of the Jewish nation;481 and there was active suppression of Palestinian nationalism in 
the region, such as through closing universities, stifling protests, and censoring the media.482 
Thus, in the nuclear era Israel witnessed three discrete policies toward its occupied 
territories. Outright aggression in the Golan Heights (consistent with the expectations of 
offensive realism), the earnest pursuit of peace and mutual accommodation in Sinai (consistent 
with the expectations of defensive realism), and a measured approach to progressively growing 
its influence in the West Bank (somewhere between the expectations of offensive and defensive 
realism). 
Explanations for these divergent outcomes appear to reside at the unit-level. In the case 
of the West Bank, there were two factors beyond international security (the theoretical scope 
of neorealism) determining policy. The first was Israeli domestic politics.483 In the immediate 
aftermath of the 1967 conflict religious-nationalist groups began advocating for the retainment 
of Gaza and the West Bank in incorporating the ancient Jewish Kingdoms of Israel and Judah 
into the modern Israeli state. The election of the conservative Likud party in 1977 enshrined 
this objective as government policy,484 and Likud had even rejected returning to the Arabs 
those parts of the West Bank that did not possess geostrategic value.485 
The second factor, which appeared more frequently in the international rhetoric, was 
the sub-national threat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964 to 
seek, through insurgency, the expungement of Israel and the creation of an independent Arab 
Palestinian state across all of Mandatory Palestine. Israel reasoned that relinquishing control in 
the West Bank and Gaza would offer the PLO staging areas for an attack on Israel proper, as 
stated by Begin in 1980, 
I think this is an absolute necessity to assure peace in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza district 
and all over the Middle East. Otherwise, into the vacuum will come the so-called PLO with 
                                                 
481 “Interview with Prime Minister Begin in Mayo Magazine,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(1982), viewed 18 October 2017, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/120%20Interview%20with
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Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 506. 
482 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 549-53. 
483 On the interface between structural and domestic political determinants of foreign policy 
behaviour, see ‘neoclassical realism’: Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, Neoclassical Realism, the 
State, and Foreign Policy. 
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all the weapons supplied by the Soviet Union and then we will be in mortal danger and there 
will be permanent bloodshed. So, therefore, the main pillars of the arrangement of the Camp 
David [sic] is autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs living in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza 
district, and security for Israel. And Israel’s responsibility for that security.486 
Though likely a sincere concern, the extent of the PLO military threat from an independent 
West Bank and Gaza was probably overstated for political effect (particularly re the emphasis 
on the Soviet connection) given that the PLO had staging areas for such attacks outside of Gaza 
and the West Bank (Jordan until 1970 and Lebanon onward), and that, from 1974, the PLO 
began to progressively moderate their objectives from independence across Mandatory 
Palestine to independence in the West Bank and Gaza only.487 As with South Africa and the 
ANC/SWAPO, nuclear weapons were seemingly viewed as irrelevant to countering the sub-
state threat of the PLO. Israeli academic Zaki Shalom, for example, wrote that “The main 
threats currently stem from low-intensity warfare and terrorism. In the struggle against these 
phenomena, the nuclear option is practically irrelevant.”488 
Regarding Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, domestic politics too appeared to 
be at work. Yael Yishai, in a detailed study of the Israeli decision to annex Golan, concluded 
that external factors, such as the ongoing rivalry with Syria and the need to test Egyptian 
intentions in Sinai, played only “a minor role”, and could “hardly be regarded as the 
determinant of annexation”. Instead “domestic factors”, such as the well-executed pro-
annexation campaign of the Golan kibbutzim (settlement communities) and Begin’s need to 
appease the political right “played a more decisive role.”489 Demonstrating this domestic 
political imperative, in the lead up to December 1981, popular support for annexation was at 
over 70%, and the Golan kibbutzim had launched a pro-annexation petition signed by 750,000 
citizens, nearly 20% of the entire population of Israel.490 
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Sinai, on the other hand, with fewer settlements and absent any historical import to the 
Jewish nation, was, as put by Minister of Defence Ezer Weizmann, “much more negotiable 
than other parts.”491 Accordingly, and consistent with the expectations of defensive realism, a 
land for peace deal was realised. 
Demonstrating the causality of nuclear weapons in producing this outcome is 
complicated by the usual disinclination of the parties to acknowledge any role of nuclear 
weapons: Israel in maintaining its nuclear opacity, Egypt in not appearing to succumb to Israeli 
nuclear threats, and international observers such as the US in maintaining the illusion of Middle 
Eastern non-proliferation. In a defensive realist framework, the security dividends of nuclear 
deterrence would have rendered unnecessary the Israeli need to maintain defence in depth in 
Sinai, allowing it to withdraw to the ADL. Suggesting such thinking within the halls of 
Jerusalem, Weizmann had reportedly identified to an Iranian emissary Israel’s nuclear-capable 
missiles as a “source of Israel’s strength and readiness to make concessions” with Egypt.492 
Additionally, according to Aronson, Peres was willing to use Israel’s “nuclear options as a tool 
to promote a political process entailing some territorial concessions”.493 Peres did demonstrate 
such reasoning elsewhere in declaring that “Science [i.e. nuclear weapons] is more important 
than land.”494 Indeed, such Israeli perceptions would only have been bolstered by Egyptian 
writings calling for peace with Israel on the basis of the latter’s nuclear capability. The pro-
Sadat press had, for example, endorsed Sadat’s controversial trip to Jerusalem preceding the 
Egypt-Israel peace treaty on the basis that 
the alternative to peace is terrible: a holocaust that the modern state has never sustained [i.e. a 
nuclear strike] … Should a fifth war break out, it will be more horrible than all the previous 
ones. It will be a war based on elements of fear and despair and such a campaign is the most 
criminal in the history of all peoples.495 
Most scholarly explanations of Israel’s concessions in Sinai tend to rest on pressure 
from the US coupled with an Israeli willingness to take risks in Sinai in seizing the opportunity 
for peace with Egypt, recognising that an agreement with Egypt was the sine qua non of a 
comprehensive regional peace.496 Based on the evidence presented above, it appears that 
                                                 
491 Quoted in Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, 161; van 
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underpinning Israel’s willingness to take risks in Sinai was its nuclear weapons capabilities, 
which gave Israel the ‘confidence’ that Sadat would be deterred from initiating a second war 
across the ADL and ultimately the strategic space to pursue land for peace with Egypt, 
consistent with the expectations of defensive realism. 
Overall, in terms of coding this indicator, the results were mixed. Unit-level variables 
had a clear role in determining outcomes in the West Bank and Golan Heights, and the 
territorial compromise in Sinai suggested that, where such variables were controlled for (i.e. 
irrelevant to decision-making), HDR finds support (this indicator so coded). This outcome also 
demonstrates the manner in which systems-level theories of foreign policy interact with unit-
level variables in determining outcomes (see section 2.1.1). Overall, nuclear weapons 
acquisition had seemingly given Israel the confidence to cede defence in depth to its 
adversaries, believing that they would be deterred from further attacks on Israel’s vital interests. 
However, even with the permissive conditions for compromise in place, unit-level variables – 
specifically aggressive domestic political constituencies and sub-national military threats – 
intervened to push Israeli foreign policy toward aggression in the Golan Heights and West 
Bank. Ultimately, systemic forces can set the permissive conditions for particular international 
outcomes, but the observance of these forces on foreign policy is frequently obscured by other 
foreign policy determinants at lower levels of analysis. 
5.2.4 Indicator 4: Other acts of nuclear aggression 
This final indicator is concerned with describing instances of Israeli nuclear aggression not 
captured in the preceding analysis. Arguments of Israel utilising its nuclear arsenal for political 
gain are infrequent in the literature, perhaps as a result of the secrecy surrounding the program. 
Through a survey of the literature I identify one additional reported instance of Israel utilising 
its nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. 
5.2.4.1 Preventing Arab proliferation 
One political application of Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities was suggested by Israeli 
scholar Yair Evron whereby he refers to an Israeli policy dictum from the mid-1960s and 1970s 
that “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, nor will it 
be the second”.497 From this he deduced that Israel “apparently actively sought” to “use” the 
Israeli “threshold posture” to “[deter] the Arab world from acquiring a nuclear capability”.498 
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Evron was not clear with his reasoning, though one could interpret the statement to mean that 
Israel would use the Arab fear of an Israeli nuclear breakout to place pressure on the Arab states 
to not take steps that could push Israel in that direction, i.e. by themselves acquiring nuclear 
weapons. This could be conceived as an example of Israeli nuclear blackmail, with Israel 
implicitly using the threat of a nuclear breakout (nuclear harm) to force nuclear restraint 
(political concession) in the Arab states. 
Apart from the absence of evidence supporting this interpretation of Israeli policy, there 
are several reasons to doubt Evron’s argument. Firstly, Evron was probably overestimating the 
bargaining power contained in an implicit Israeli threat to break opacity vis-à-vis the Arab 
states. Whereas the US had an interest in keeping Israel’s nuclear program under wraps (that 
is, protecting the sanctity of the NPT and reducing Soviet guarantees to Arab states), for the 
Arabs it was Israel’s de facto possession of the bomb that posed the threat. Israel’s nuclear 
capability would limit Arab military options to retake the lost territories and ultimately expunge 
Israel whether or not that capability was openly acknowledged. 
Secondly, for whatever prestige losses that the Arab states would have suffered were 
Israel to break opacity and reveal its nuclear superiority,499 they also stood to gain from such 
an Israeli move, for example in driving a wedge between Israel and the US, attracting Soviet 
support, justifying their own nuclear aspirations, and painting Israel as a nuclear aggressor. 
Thirdly, some of the Arab states were going nuclear, and in these cases Israel relied on 
more conventional means, such as sabotage, to stifle their development. In response to Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions, for example, in 1979 Israel bombed the French plant constructing nuclear 
reactors for export to Iraq, and in 1981 launched an air strike against the repaired reactor in 
Iraq before it went critical.500 If Israel did adopt such a policy of nuclear blackmail to prevent 
Arab proliferation, it was both ineffective and supplemented by other tactics.501 
Thus, there is not a sufficient basis to accept Evron’s suggestion that Israel had been 
engaged in nuclear blackmail of the Arab states to stay their nuclear ambitions. A more 
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mainstream interpretation of the Israeli dictum that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons into the Middle East is that Israel was seeking to keep its options open whilst sating 
US non-proliferation demands.502 Absent any certain examples of Israel exercising nuclear 
aggression beyond those argued in the previous three indicators, I code indicator 4 as 
supporting HDR. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the effect of nuclear weapons acquisition on Israel’s foreign policy 
across four foreign policy indicators. The results are displayed in Table 10. 
Table 10. Coding results for the Israel case 
 Conventional 
military assets 
 
Militarised 
conflict 
initiation 
Policies toward 
occupied/ disputed 
territories 
Other nuclear weapons-
driven acts of foreign policy 
aggression 
Supported 
hypothesis 
Null hypothesis Defensive 
realism 
Defensive realism Defensive realism 
 
The Israeli case provides strong support for defensive realism. Nuclear weapons 
acquisition correlated with a decrease in militarised conflict initiation; a greater willingness to 
compromise with respect to the occupied Arab territories (after controlling for unit-level 
variables); and otherwise general restraint in terms of seeking political gain through nuclear 
aggression. Though nuclear weapons acquisition did also correlate with a major conventional 
force build-up, unit-level variables offered persuasive explanations for this outcome other than 
Israel’s inherent desire for hegemony. 
In-depth analysis also unearthed a number of ‘unit-level’ variables that had a role in 
determining foreign policy outcomes in the case of Israel. One was the opacity of Israel’s 
nuclear weapons program. Israel faced barriers in shifting the burden of strategic deterrence to 
its nuclear weapons due to its need to maintain the secrecy of its nuclear weapons program. 
Specifically, such secrecy restricted internal deliberation on nuclear policy and recognition of 
the strategic dividends of nuclear acquisition, causing the defence establishment to default to 
conventional military strategy, seemingly contributing to Israel’s massive conventional force 
build-up in the nuclear era. 
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A second unit-level variable determining foreign policy outcomes in the Israel case was 
the presence of a sub-national military threat (the PLO) which was capable of launching attacks 
across the ADL. As was the case with the ANC and SWAPO in South Africa, sub-national 
groups are unsusceptible to nuclear deterrence given their diffuse and decentralised operational 
structures. When facing such military threats, the security-based incentives for aggression, such 
as South Africa’s conventional military build-up or Israel’s forward posture in the West Bank, 
can remain in the presence of nuclear weapons. 
A third such unit-level variable was the powerful domestic constituencies pushing 
Jerusalem toward territorial aggrandisement, specifically the kibbutzim and religious-
nationalist parties. Whilst nuclear weapons had empowered Israel to pursue territorial 
concessions in Sinai, these domestic groups placed pressure on the elite to extend Israeli control 
in in Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, even in cases where the territory lacked 
strategic value. On this basis it could be hypothesised that, generally speaking, nuclear-armed 
states engaged in territorial disputes that attract strong popular support may find it difficult to 
disengage from the dispute even when the security dividends of nuclear weapons acquisition 
deprive such territories of strategic value. Supporting such a hypothesis, scholars such as Huth 
have demonstrated empirically that domestic political variables, such as ethnic and linguistic 
ties with target populations, are associated with higher levels of diplomatic and military conflict 
over disputed territories.503 In Sinai and Namibia, such domestic political factors were not at 
play (indeed, in the case of South Africa, even the pro-National Party press were calling for a 
withdrawal from Namibia due to the exorbitant costs of occupation),504 and in both cases 
territorial compromise was reached. 
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6 Quantitative tests 
The above case analysis demonstrates mixed results with respect to HOR and HDR. Pakistan and 
South Africa conform more closely to the expectations of offensive realism, whereas Israel 
aligns with defensive realism. Given this uncertainty, one tool for strengthening inference in 
adjudicating between the two hypotheses is to increase the number of observations.505 In other 
words, “find[ing] as many observable implications of your theory as possible and [making] 
observations of those implications.”506 In doing so the ‘noise’ of unit-level effects becomes 
increasingly cancelled out and the true treatment effect becomes easier to observe. There are 
two general approaches to increasing the number of observations: (1) draw more observable 
implications from the sample of cases; or (2) expand the sample of cases. This chapter takes 
the latter approach, testing HOR and HDR against a greater number of nuclear-armed states, 
specifically using the same quantitative indicators as in the above case analysis. In this 
endeavour we are limited by the relatively few number of states to have acquired nuclear 
weapons historically (n = 9 or 10 by most valuations), though in quantitative terms this is still 
more than tripling the sample size from the case analysis. 
6.1 Quantitative methodology 
As with the above case studies, this statistical exercise will measure change in foreign policy 
across individual nuclear-armed states consistent with the critical juncture of nuclear weapons 
acquisition. Also, as with the case studies, measurements will be limited to ten years either side 
of the critical juncture for the same methodological reasons outlined in section 2.3.1. 
This exercise examines two of the quantitative foreign policy indicators utilised in the 
case studies: conventional military assets and militarised conflict initiation. The third and 
fourth foreign policy indicators utilised in the case studies, policy toward occupied/disputed 
territories and other acts of nuclear aggression, are not included in this exercise as there is no 
ready available quantitative dataset for this purpose. Though this limits the number of 
observations per nuclear-armed state, this deficit is more than made up by the increased number 
of nuclear-armed states observed. 
Quantitative measures of the two foreign policy indicators will be undertaken as per the 
methodology outlined in section 2.3.1, though measurements of conventional military assets 
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will be limited to military personnel (numbers of combat tanks and aircraft not included as 
separate measures). The number of combat tanks and aircraft were not included in this exercise 
as these data are taken from a dataset that only goes back as far as 1961, which would affect 
measures of the early proliferators. Though a less ‘complete’ measure of the states’ 
conventional force assets, there’s no reason to believe that changes in military personnel 
wouldn’t correspond with those of combat tanks and aircraft, as was observed in all three case 
studies. 
In terms of measuring the critical juncture of nuclear weapons acquisition for non-case 
study states, space limitations require utilising pre-prepared chronologies of nuclear weapons 
acquisition. To this end I draw from the chronology of nuclear weapons proliferation given by 
Singh and Way.507 Though Singh and Way adopt technical benchmarks for measuring 
acquisition,508 as opposed to the cognitive benchmarks of this study (see section 2.3.1 on the 
importance of this distinction), I anticipate general correlation between our results as, across 
my three case study states, there was in total only one year of difference between our respective 
measures of nuclear weapons acquisition.509 
As in the case analysis, a result of 10% or more growth at p < 0.05 in the nuclear era 
will be considered as supporting HOR, whereas a 10% or more decline at p < 0.05 will be 
considered as supporting HDR. Conformation with neither of these outcomes would support the 
null hypothesis.  
6.2 Discussion 
The results of the 12 statistical tests are displayed in Table 11, and the outcomes in terms of 
the hypotheses are displayed in Table 12. Overall, offensive realism slightly outperforms 
defensive realism (17 to 11%, respectively), though both are far outperformed by the null 
hypothesis (72%). There are two striking features of these results. The first is the strong 
performance of the null hypothesis, suggesting that nuclear weapons are less likely than more 
to have an observable impact on foreign policy aggression. The second is the clustering of the 
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positive results around the case study states (four of the five positive results). Each of these 
findings are discussed in sequence below.  
Table 11. Results of the statistical tests 
 United States USSR/Russia United Kingdom 
 Conflict Personnel Conflict Personnel Conflict Personnel 
Pre-nuclear average 119.40 2812.70 348.00 4694.00 294.80 2401.20 
Nuclear average 224.10 3499.90 314.60 4960.00 200.00 702.10 
Change factor 0.88 0.24 -0.10 0.06 -0.32 -0.71 
p* 0.2885 0.6810 0.7051 0.7960 0.1894 0.0155 
 France China India 
 Conflict Personnel Conflict Personnel Conflict Personnel 
Pre-nuclear average 95.50 783.80 534.80 2898.80 160.40 1191.80 
Nuclear average 15.20 677.50 440.90 2820.00 210.70 1270.00 
Change factor -0.84 -0.14 -0.18 -0.03 0.31 0.07 
p* 0.1371 0.1099 0.5532 0.6010 0.5059 0.0211 
* Based on a student’s t-test (heteroscedastic, two-tailed distribution). 
 
Table 12. Support for hypotheses from statistical tests 
 Conflict Conventional assets 
United States Null Null 
USSR/Russia Null Null 
United Kingdom Null Defensive realism 
France Null Null 
China Null Null 
Israel* Defensive realism Null 
South Africa* Offensive realism Null 
India Null Null 
Pakistan* Offensive realism Offensive realism 
Probability estimates 
Offensive realism 0.22 0.14 
Defensive realism 0.11 0.14 
Null hypothesis 0.67 0.71 
* Results taken from earlier case analysis. 
 
6.2.1 Strong performance of the null hypothesis 
The strong performance of the null hypothesis suggest one of three things: (1) that, generally 
speaking, structural models (i.e. drawing on systemic theories of international politics) alone 
are not sufficient for reliably explaining the foreign policy implications of nuclear weapons 
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acquisition, at least in the terms set by this study; (2) that the theorised foreign policy effects 
of nuclear weapons acquisition are not being reliably observed due to measurement error or a 
misspecification of the causal model; or (3) that, generally speaking, nuclear weapons do not 
have a precipitous effect on states’ foreign policies,510 at least in the terms set by this study. 
The first possibility speaks to the importance of unit-level analysis in examining the 
effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy, work advanced by scholars such as Bell, Kapur 
and Cohen, and supplemented in an unstructured way in this study through the identification 
of unit-level variables found to modulate the causality of nuclear weapons on the foreign 
policies of Pakistan, South Africa and Israel. Further studies into unit-level theories of nuclear 
weapons and foreign policy would validate or invalidate this contention. 
The second possibility is an inherent limitation of structured empirical research, though 
one that could be diminished through experimenting with new measures of nuclear weapons 
acquisition and foreign policy aggression and new causal models. In the concluding chapter I 
draw from the lessons of this study in making such recommendations for future scholars 
working in this space. 
The third possibility would be a controversial, though perhaps not illogical conclusion. 
There are a number of reasons to think that the effect of a state’s nuclear weapons capabilities 
in emboldening underlying preferences for more/less aggression could be diminished, if not 
obviated all together (i.e. reducing the treatment and therefore the observed treatment effect). 
The first of these is the high costs of nuclear use. To use nuclear weapons aggressively, from 
simple nuclear threats to outright nuclear conquest, comes with costs, principally diplomatic, 
economic or military retaliation by the targeted state or a third-party. The reason that the Soviet 
Union did not bomb the US during the Cold War, for example, was presumably because the 
costs of doing so (mutual assured destruction) outweighed any political benefit that could be 
gained, pushing the utility function of such a policy toward abstinence and removing this as a 
legitimate policy option. The costs of such policies of nuclear aggression vary across types of 
nuclear aggression used and the target states. Presumably State A destroying State B with 
nuclear weapons would attract a stronger response than that if State A merely threatened to 
destroy State B. Presumably China would have to think harder about dropping a nuclear bomb 
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on Japan than it would Bhutan. What’s more, the costs of nuclear use can also apply to 
defensive applications of nuclear weapons as offensive. For example, Israel and South Africa 
were both inhibited from bolstering their nuclear deterrent through openly declaring their 
nuclear capabilities to their adversaries, such as through a nuclear test, due to the costs of likely 
US sanctions that would follow. In another example, Israel initially demurred from open 
nuclear preparations to effect immediate deterrence vis-à-vis the advancing Egyptian and 
Syrian forces at the height of the Yom Kippur War for fear that doing so would increase Soviet 
nuclear guarantees to the Arab states. 
As this regime of costs limits the potential applications of nuclear weapons for 
aggressive or defensive purposes, nuclear weapons lose their overall strategic value. For 
example, Israel’s nuclear weapons arguably prevented further Arab challenges to Israel’s 
existence through a major conventional military assault on the Israeli heartland, but had less 
effect on Israel’s ability to defend the occupied Arab territories, or fight against the PLO, or 
prevent militarily other Arab states acquiring nuclear weapons. For these military missions, 
and others, Israel was forced to rely on its conventional forces. Notionally Israel could have, 
say, eliminated the PLO threat by simply bombing all of Palestine with nuclear weapons, but 
the costs of doing so would have made such a policy prohibitive. The incapacities of nuclear 
weapons due to such costs, coupled with their own operational limitations (i.e. anything not 
requiring massive and indiscriminate destruction), mean that they mightn’t be versatile enough 
to substantially embolden underlying tendencies toward more or less foreign policy aggression 
– they are useless (or at least less useful) to the offensive and defensive needs of the state. It’s 
analogous to a craftsman who wants to turn a screw yet only owns a hammer. 
Rational utility calculations notwithstanding, there are other reasons that the strategic value 
of nuclear weapons, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, might be sub-optimal, some 
of which I list here:511 
• Domestic politics: A nuclear-armed state might contain powerful domestic constituencies, 
such as religious, scientific, and activist groups, that constrain the extent to which 
nuclear-armed states can utilise their nuclear weapons in foreign policy. 
• Prestige: nuclear-armed states may feel that threatening others with nuclear use would 
come at the cost of their international prestige, and therefore eschew such behaviour. In 
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the mid-1950s US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for example, argued against a 
strategy of nuclear strikes in regional conflicts, cautioning that if such a policy were to be 
adopted “we will, in the eyes of the world, be cast as a ruthless military power, as was 
Germany earlier.”512 
• Nuclear inexperience: States may lack the intellectual wherewithal and policy experience 
to optimally utilise their nuclear weapons capabilities in their foreign policies. 
• Ethical, religious or moral compunctions: Members of the elite might reject the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons, whether for defensive or offensive purposes, due to their 
own personal convictions. US President Eisenhower, for example, when presented with a 
plan to strike the Viet Minh with low-yield tactical nuclear weapons during the First 
Indochina War reportedly exclaimed “You boys must be crazy. We can’t use those awful 
things against Asians for a second time in less than ten years. My God.”513 In another 
example, a theologian had reportedly consulted in the devising of South Africa nuclear 
strategy.514 
• Operational norms: Embedded norms against the military application of nuclear weapons 
at the organisational level may forego their application, potential or actual, in 
international politics. Israeli military leaders had, for example, demonstrated a preference 
for conventional deterrence over a reliance on the state’s ‘mystical’ nuclear weapons. 
Such incentives might be strengthened in cases where, again as with Israel, a covert 
nuclear weapons program reduces the state’s ability to internalise the strategic 
implications of nuclear weapons acquisition. 
• Weak technology: As in the case of South Africa, the ability of a nuclear-armed state to 
utilise its nuclear weapons capabilities for offensive or defensive purposes might be 
limited by the technological limitations of an unsophisticated arsenal. To gain the full 
political and strategic dividends of nuclear weapons a state must have sophisticated 
delivery mechanisms, C3, and second-strike capabilities, as well as an arsenal large 
enough to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage. Such capabilities develop over time. 
In methodological terms, these limitations on the effective use of nuclear weapons will 
reduce the treatment (from 0-100%), and therefore the observed treatment effect of nuclear 
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weapons acquisition on foreign policy outcomes, be that more or less aggression. For those 
states that returned a result for the null hypothesis, it might have been that one or many of these 
factors was so diminishing the treatment effect, making it unobservable above the ‘noise’ of 
non-nuclear security-seeking behaviour. 
6.2.2 Clustering of positive results 
The second striking aspect of the quantitative results was the clustering of positive results for 
HOR (and, to a lesser extent, HDR) around the case study states. This outcome suggests some 
unifying feature that makes these states more prone to manifest nuclear weapons capabilities 
in foreign policy behaviour. As discussed in section 2.3.2, all three cases were chosen on the 
basis that they reflected the ‘pariah’ archetype, characterised by Harkavy as “a small power 
with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily 
be solved by neutrality, nonalignment, or appeasement, and lacking dependable big-power 
support.”515 There are several reasons to think that nuclear weapons might have a stronger 
influence on the foreign policies of such states in general. 
The first is that pariah states have fewer options for self-help in the international system. 
Without alliance support or military strength, and facing hostile adversaries, a pariah state 
works with smaller margins in ensuring their security. Thus, whether the state perceives 
security minimally (defensive realism) or maximally (offensive realism), the acquisition of any 
tool that modifies their strategic environment is likely to have an acute observable effect. In 
other words, there will be less security-seeking ‘noise’ that will dilute the observable effect of 
nuclear weapons on foreign policy behaviour. Take, for example, Pakistan’s military campaign 
in Kashmir, which increased drastically with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Had Pakistan 
possessed a conventional strategic deterrent or mutual defence pact that could have forestalled 
a major Indian conventional offensive independently of nuclear deterrence, Pakistan might 
have stepped up its military campaign in Kashmir before acquiring nuclear weapons. Thus, in 
this scenario, there would have been little observable change in Pakistani foreign policy 
subsequent to nuclear weapons acquisition. In another example, and applying defensive realist 
logic, if a state is secure prior to nuclear weapons acquisition (i.e. due to conventional 
deterrence, security guarantees etc.) and has already adopted a passive international posture as 
a result (as predicted by defensive realism), the acquisition of nuclear weapons will add little 
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to its net security and is therefore unlikely to yield a further reduction in foreign policy 
aggression. 
The second reason that nuclear weapons are likely to have a stronger influence on the 
foreign policies of pariah states is that such states are typically less integrated into international 
regimes on behaviour such as from alliance commitments, international organisational 
participation, and the need to maintain favourable international opinion (i.e. given that it is 
already low), and therefore face fewer restrictions on their behaviour. Thus, they will be less 
restricted ex ante in the exercise of nuclear capabilities, in whatever modality and to whatever 
end, for security-seeking purposes. For example, the US had tried and failed to prevent 
Pakistan’s nuclear-driven proxy war in Kashmir. Were Pakistan and the US in a mutual defence 
pact, however, the US would have greater leverage in pressuring Pakistan to cease the conflict 
(i.e. in threatening to renounce the defence pact). 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom was the only non-case study state to yield a positive 
result, specifically a 71% reduction in military personnel in the nuclear era in support of HDR. 
Such an empirical outcome is consistent with British nuclear policy, which had explicitly 
couched nuclear weapons as a substitute for costly conventional forces that the declining 
empire could no longer afford.516 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had, for example, in 
1956 endorsed “the trend towards greater reliance on nuclear weapons” on the basis that “we 
are spending too much on forces of types which are no longer of primary importance.”517 
6.3 Conclusions 
This section evaluated through quantitative measures the effect of nuclear weapons on the 
foreign policies of all nine states to have possessed nuclear weapons historically. It was argued 
that nuclear weapons acquisition infrequently correlated with substantive foreign policy 
change, but where it did, it aligned more with the expectations of offensive than defensive 
realism. A number of explanations for the strong performance of the null hypothesis were 
offered. The first was that the high costs of nuclear use frequently diminish their utility, whether 
for offensive or defensive purposes, reducing the observed treatment effect of nuclear weapons 
acquisition on foreign policy. It was also argued that a variety of unit-level variables – such as 
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Scott, “Fighting Flu: Securitization and the Military Role in Combating Influenza,” Armed Forces & 
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international law and the moral compunctions of the elite – might also diminish the political 
utility of nuclear weapons and therefore their observed effect on foreign policy outcomes. 
It was also observed that, where there was appreciable foreign policy change consequent 
to nuclear weapons acquisition, it was typically the pariah states examined in the case studies 
that manifested this change. Explanations for the propensity of pariah states to manifest nuclear 
weapons capabilities in their foreign policy behaviour were offered, including the large relative 
import of nuclear weapons to the limited security-seeking capabilities of pariah states, and 
those states’ lesser integration into regimes that constrain international behaviour. The results 
of the case studies and quantitative analysis are synthesised in the concluding chapter, and 
general conclusions regarding the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy are drawn. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study has generated hypotheses regarding the effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on 
foreign policy through competing neorealist frameworks and subjected these hypotheses to 
empirical evaluation. The objective of this study was to establish a ‘first-cut’ theory of nuclear 
weapons and foreign policy, one that assesses whether, in general terms, nuclear weapons 
acquisition makes states more or less aggressive in their foreign policy behaviours. In 
concluding this study, this chapter summarises the findings of empirical analysis, synthesises 
a first-cut theory of nuclear weapons and foreign policy based on these findings, assesses the 
implications of this study for both academic and practitioner audiences, and suggests some 
areas for further research to build on the results of this study. 
7.1 Summary of the findings 
The primary objective of this study was to determine whether nuclear weapons acquisition 
made states more or less aggressive. The empirical evaluation of this question was undertaken 
in two phases. The first, and primary phase, involved in-depth case studies of three nuclear-
armed states: Pakistan, South Africa and Israel. The results across the case studies in terms of 
the hypotheses were mixed. 
Pakistan acquired a nuclear deterrent against the conventional superiority of its long-
term foe, India, in 1990. Relieved of this existential anxiety, Pakistan reactivated its 40 year-
long battle for the disputed territory of Kashmir by backing anti-Indian militants active in 
Jammu and Kashmir in a proxy war with India. Nuclear weapons were instrumental in 
Pakistan’s renewed aggression in Kashmir, both in military and diplomatic terms. Militarily, 
nuclear weapons provided Pakistan with strategic cover against major Indian conventional 
reprisal attacks, allowing it to pursue with vigour military operations in Jammu and Kashmir 
to the point of infiltrating disguised army regulars across the LoC and occupying Indian 
territory. Diplomatically, Pakistan used the carrot of nuclear retrenchment and the stick of 
nuclear war to encourage international parties to broker a solution to the Kashmir dispute, 
believing that the involvement of external actors would strengthen its own bargaining position 
against India. For Pakistan, nuclear weapons were tools used both in protecting against Indian 
militarism and pursuing territorial hegemony in Kashmir. 
South Africa’s nuclear deterrent came into being in 1979 following a purported South 
African nuclear test in the South Atlantic Ocean. South Africa’s principal goal in acquiring 
nuclear weapons was to deter a Soviet-backed invasion, believing that the Soviets coveted the 
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economic and geostrategic value of the southern state in its mission of expanding its communist 
empire in Africa. In addition to deterring a Soviet attack on South Africa, the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons also gave South Africa a new tool in fighting Soviet influence in the region. 
Specifically, under the protection of its nuclear deterrent, South Africa stepped up its military 
campaign in the Border War in southern Angola, believing that the threat of nuclear escalation 
would stay massive reprisals from the Soviet-Cuban forces active in the conflict. Despite such 
perceived deterrent dividends, South Africa was hedging its bets, and it continued the 
occupation of Namibia (against its own economic and diplomatic interests) as a source of 
defence in depth to a Soviet invasion. Even with a nuclear deterrent, South Africa feared that, 
were Soviet-backed forces to take control of Namibia, there would be a serious risk of a Soviet-
backed invasion. It would only be when Soviet and Cuban forces agreed to leave Angola in 
1988 that South Africa would accede to Namibian independence. Thus, South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons facilitated military aggression in southern Angola, and had no pacifying effect on its 
policy of occupation in Namibia. 
Israel acquired nuclear weapons covertly in 1973 as a way of managing the threat of 
the numerically superior conventional forces of the Arab states, which had repeatedly declared 
their intention to expunge the state of Israel. In this context, nuclear weapons were seen to have 
two functions: (1) pressuring the US to provide Israel with conventional arms with which to 
defend itself against the Arab states, i.e. under the threat of breaking nuclear opacity against 
US interests; and (2) deterring the Arabs from initiating an all-out war against Israel’s existence 
should conventional deterrence fail. Under the protection of nuclear deterrence Israel engaged 
in an assortment of foreign policy behaviours that spanned the qualitative spectrum from 
aggression to conciliation. Israel reduced its initiation of militarised conflicts by close to 50%, 
whilst at the same time engaging in a massive conventional arms build-up, increasing by some 
measures over 200%. In terms of the Arab territories occupied in 1967, Israel annexed the 
Golan Heights, steadily grew its influence in the West Bank and Gaza, and returned Sinai to 
Egypt. Though isolating the causal role of nuclear weapons in any of these outcomes was 
difficult given the extreme secrecy surrounding the Israeli nuclear program, tentative evidence 
suggests that, in the case of Sinai, it was the deterrent value of nuclear weapons that gave Israel 
the confidence to return the territory back to Egypt as part of the 1978-79 peace process. 
The coding results for the four indicators across the three case study states are presented 
in Table 13, and an index of all instances of nuclear aggression observed in the case studies is 
presented in Table 14. Assuming an equal weight for each indicator, offensive realism slightly 
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outperforms defensive realism at a rate of 50% to 33% (the null hypothesis accounting for 
17%). 
Table 13. Coding results for the case study states 
 Conventional 
military assets 
Militarised conflict 
initiation 
Policies toward 
occupied/disputed 
territories 
Other acts of nuclear 
aggression 
Pakistan Offensive realism Offensive realism Offensive realism Defensive realism 
South Africa Null hypothesis Offensive realism Offensive realism Offensive realism 
Israel Null hypothesis Defensive realism Defensive realism Defensive realism 
 
Table 14. Index of nuclear aggression observed in the case studies 
Case study 
state 
Type of 
aggression* 
Description 
Pakistan Nuclear shield Conducting a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir whilst protected from 
conventional reprisals by nuclear deterrence. 
Nuclear 
blackmail 
Implicitly threatening a nuclear conflagration in South Asia unless the 
international community interceded to prevent India from attacking 
Pakistan. (This was part of Pakistan’s deterrent strategy viz. catalytic 
deterrence.) 
Nuclear 
blackmail 
Implicitly threatening a nuclear conflagration in South Asia unless the 
international community can broker a solution to the Kashmir dispute. 
Bargaining chip Offering to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to safeguards if the 
international community can broker a solution to the Kashmir dispute. 
South Africa Nuclear shield Intensifying the Border War in Angola whilst protected from conventional 
reprisals by nuclear deterrence. 
Nuclear 
blackmail 
Threatening to conduct a nuclear test unless the US interceded to prevent 
Soviet conventional aggression again South Africa. (This was part of South 
Africa’s deterrent strategy viz. catalytic deterrence.) 
Bargaining chip Offering not to conduct a nuclear test without notice in exchange for US 
facilitation of the supply of reactor fuel. 
Israel Nuclear 
blackmail 
Threatening to break nuclear opacity unless the US supplied Israel with 
conventional armaments. (This was part of Israel’s deterrent strategy viz. 
catalytic deterrence.) 
* As per the typology of nuclear aggression mechanisms set out in Table 1 (p. 34). 
 
An exercise in quantitative analysis was then undertaken to triangulate the results of 
the in-depth case studies. Quantitative measures of two foreign policy indicators – militarised 
conflict initiation and conventional military assets – were compared between the pre-nuclear 
and nuclear eras for each state to have acquired nuclear weapons historically (n = 9). Assuming 
an equal weight for each indicator, offensive realism again slightly outperformed defensive 
realism (17 to 11%, respectively), though both fell far short of the null hypothesis (72%).518 
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We are thus presented with two conflicting empirical outcomes: moderate support for 
HOR (nuclear weapons increase foreign policy aggression) through case analysis, and strong 
support for the null hypothesis (H0; nuclear weapons do not cause change in foreign policy 
aggression) through statistical analysis. How do we reconcile these outcomes? One possibility, 
discussed in section 6.2.2, is that the type of states subjected to case analysis – pariah states – 
are more likely to manifest the emboldening effects of nuclear weapons in their foreign policy. 
Thus, while the tendency toward the pursuit of hegemony might be a constant imposed by the 
international system, it is only the pariah states that are likely to observably manifest this 
tendency in response to nuclear weapons acquisition, leading to a positive result when 
examining the pariah states alone, but causing the treatment effect to be lost when the scope of 
analysis is expanded to include non-pariah states. A second explanation is methodological: that 
the quantitative analysis did not allow the full implication of nuclear weapons acquisition on 
the chosen foreign policy indicators to be observed given the inability of the method to (a) 
control for unit-level variables, or (b) observe specific instances of nuclear weapons causing 
foreign policy outcomes (both advantages of in-depth case analysis). As an example as to how 
such limitations can bias results, in the case of Pakistan, there was actually little quantitative 
change observed in militarised conflict initiation between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras (-
1%; see section 3.2.2), yet in-depth process tracing revealed that nuclear weapons had actually 
emboldened Pakistan’s military pursuit of hegemony in Kashmir in the nuclear era, consistent 
with the expectations of offensive realism. 
In either case, whilst the overall empirical effect at the systemic level of analysis might 
be obscure, in-depth case analysis suggests that offensive realism provides a more persuasive 
theory of nuclear weapons and foreign policy than defensive realism, if only by a small margin. 
7.2 A ‘first-cut’ theory of nuclear weapons and foreign policy 
The goal of this study was to establish a ‘first-cut’ theory of nuclear weapons and foreign 
policy, specifically by adapting and adjudicating between two leading neorealist theories of 
international politics. In general, this study sought to establish whether acquiring nuclear 
weapons made states more or less aggressive in their foreign policy behaviour, as per the 
expectations of offensive and defensive realism, respectively. Through in-depth case analysis, 
nuclear weapons acquisition was more frequently associated with more foreign policy 
aggression than less. This outcome supports the offensive realist view of the world: states 
always seek expansion, and are only limited in this mission by their capabilities. Once a state 
acquires nuclear weapons and thereby an enhanced ability to compete for power, a state will 
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increase its foreign policy aggression commensurate with these new capabilities. In this study, 
nuclear weapons were found to enable such types of foreign policy aggression as hoarding 
conventional military assets, the initiation of conventional militarised conflicts, and more 
actively pursuing disputed territories, though many more types of nuclear aggression are 
conceivable, and might theoretically be employed by future nuclear-armed states. 
Such a conclusion should be qualified on two grounds, however. Firstly, it is not made 
with a high degree of confidence. Offensive realism only slightly outperformed defensive 
realism (50% to 33%), with some states (such as Israel) demonstrating no overall tendency 
toward more aggression. Opportunities for building on these results to increase confidence in 
the findings are suggested below. Secondly, such an assessment should not be considered 
determinative with respect to the specific behaviours of specific proliferators. As I address in 
chapter 2, systemic theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy cannot predict specific 
foreign policy outcomes as they do not take into account unit-level factors that might stand to 
intervene and exert an independent causal effect on outcomes. Rather, they suggest an overall 
tendency toward more or less aggression imposed by the structure of the international system 
that will manifest inconsistently, though assuredly, on aggregate. 
7.3 Implications of the research outcomes 
7.3.1 For academics 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for academic and practitioner 
audiences. For academics, to the extent that one can generalise from nuclear-armed states to 
the general population of states (recognising that nuclear-armed states are a self-selecting 
group), the overall support for offensive realism over defensive realism suggests that states are 
inherently driven to pursue hegemony, rather than security in the status quo, and that nuclear 
weapons embolden this pursuit by increasing a state’s capability for competing for power. This 
observation provides a basis for refining theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy at 
lower levels of analysis. It is reasonable to assume, as Bell does, for example, that nuclear-
armed states are driven to “improve their position in international politics” and “gain the 
maximum benefit from their nuclear weapons.”519 One can therefore propose theories as to 
how variables within national and organisational contexts might constrain or embolden such a 
tendency. For example, and as discussed in the case study of Israel, one might hypothesise that 
states with opaque nuclear weapons programs will be less aggressive than states with a public 
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nuclear weapons programs because opacity constrains states’ ability to devise and implement 
nuclear policy for maximum political effect, ultimately limiting the extent to which the nuclear-
armed state can draw on its nuclear capabilities in the underlying pursuit of hegemony. 
This study has also offered a number of methodological innovations that will be of 
interest to an academic audience. One is the unique approach to measuring nuclear weapons 
acquisition. As noted in section 2.3.1, measuring the date of nuclear weapons acquisition is 
traditionally based on technical milestones – most commonly when a state conducts its first 
nuclear test. I argued that such an approach was insufficient in determining when nuclear 
weapons can be expected to have an effect on a state’s foreign policy as it takes into account 
neither the strategic significance of the chosen technical milestone in the state’s strategic 
context, nor the process by which the decision-making elite internalise such capabilities and 
begin to manifest them in foreign policy. On that basis, I advanced an alternate approach to 
measuring the date of nuclear weapons acquisition wherein acquisition was seen as the point 
in time at which the state began to perceive that the probability of its survival in anarchy was 
enhanced due specifically to its nuclear weapons capabilities. In this framework, nuclear 
weapons acquisition was seen as a cognitive, rather than a technical construct. This approach 
proved viable, and has potential applications for other studies of nuclear proliferation. 
Primarily, in other studies that attempt to infer the effects of nuclear weapons on state 
behaviour, there will be value in increasing the accuracy of measuring the critical juncture of 
nuclear weapons acquisition through this method. Take, for example, the extensive quantitative 
literature on the effects of nuclear weapons on the incidence of interstate conflict.520 Most rely 
on secondary chronologies of nuclear weapons acquisition that draw from familiar technical 
milestones to separate and aggregate pre-nuclear and nuclear era data points for statistical 
analysis. However, it would arguably be more accurate to determine the critical juncture using 
the cognitive construct advanced herein. As argued in section 2.3.1, it is the perception of 
invulnerability to counter-attack that animates mainstream theories of nuclear-armed states 
initiating militarised conflict, and not the specific technical qualities of the nuclear arsenal. 
A further methodological innovation is the establishment of a typology of aggressive 
foreign policy behaviours driven by nuclear weapons (see Table 1, p. 34). Such a typology 
provides a conceptual framework for identifying and measuring acts of nuclear aggression 
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beyond the empirical scope of this study. The observance of similar patterns of nuclear 
aggression (as per this framework) across multiple cases might also provide a basis for 
theorising as to the occurrence/non-occurrence of particular types of foreign policy aggression 
in nuclear-armed states. For example, and as shown in Table 14, both Pakistan and South Africa 
engaged in the same ‘types’ of foreign policy aggression in the ten years following acquisition: 
using nuclear weapons as a ‘shield’, a ‘bargaining chip’, and engaging in ‘nuclear blackmail’. 
Such an observation invites theorising as to why Pakistan and South Africa adopted similar 
approaches to nuclear aggression, and when such patterns might apply to future proliferators. 
This study also advanced a mixed-methods approach to measuring foreign policy 
aggression – i.e. the four indicators of foreign policy aggression used in both the case and 
statistical analyses – that might be adapted elsewhere. Though these indicators were tailored to 
measure change in foreign policy aggression driven by the strategic opportunities for peace or 
hegemony afforded by nuclear weapons acquisition, they are notionally viable as measures of 
foreign policy aggression more generally.521 For example, there’s no reason to believe that, 
ceteris paribus, an hegemony-seeking state wouldn’t engage in more militarised conflict 
initiation (indicator 2), or horde more conventional military assets (indicator 1) than a status 
quo-seeking state, regardless as to whether or not those states possessed nuclear weapons. 
7.3.2 For practitioners 
Returning to the primary finding of this study, that nuclear weapons acquisition generally leads 
to foreign policy aggression will also be of interest to policy practitioners. Those that stand to 
lose from an increasingly aggressive State X will be justified in bearing greater costs to stifle 
State X’s development of nuclear weapons, whether through carrots or sticks. Some examples 
of the former could include confidence-building measures and/or security guarantees to allay 
State X’s security-based reasons for proliferation, or simply ‘buying-out’ State X’s nuclear 
program with some political or monetary concession. Some examples of ‘sticks’ could include 
diplomatic, political and economic sanctions against State X to increase the costs of 
proliferation, or direct intervention to prevent acquisition such as through sabotage, interdicting 
transfers of sensitive and dual-use technologies, regime change, and military strikes on nuclear 
sites. Where such non-proliferation measures fail, those states that are likely to be subject to 
State X’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy – such as neighbours, rivals, or those states 
that possess bounties coveted by State X – would be justified in investing heavily in defending 
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against external aggression through internal and external balancing. Third parties with a stake 
in regional security would also do well to extend security guarantees to such targeted states, 
and otherwise look to increasing protections for non-nuclear states generally. Such injunctions 
will become increasingly urgent as the proliferating state approaches the pariah archetype given 
that, as argued above, such states are precipitously more likely to manifest the emboldening 
effects of nuclear weapons acquisition than non-pariah states. 
Another lesson for practitioners comes from the US experience in managing each of 
the three case study states’ nuclear weapons programs. In all three cases the US involvement 
created a dilemma for US policy makers. By engaging with the regional proliferators, the US 
was able, through carrots and sticks, to constrain the nuclear-armed states’ nuclear policies, for 
example in preventing Pakistan from extending deterrence to other Islamic states. At the same 
time, however, the nuclear-armed states were able to manipulate this US interest for political 
gain, for example with South Africa acquiring reactor fuel in exchange for maintaining nuclear 
opacity, or Pakistan invoking the risk of a nuclear exchange in South Asia to entice the US to 
broker a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Thus, the US’s involvement in these states’ nuclear 
weapons programs both restrained and enabled nuclear weapons-driven foreign policy 
aggression.522 Assuming a normative position that such aggression is undesirable, we might 
ask how the US and other major powers with reach into regional nuclear weapons programs 
can tip the balance of utility for protégé proliferators toward non-aggression. 
The simple answer is to increase the negative sanctions and reduce the positive 
sanctions of such behaviour. The former can be achieved by strengthening the existing 
international sanctions regime against nuclear proliferation and aggression. The latter is more 
complicated and comes with an element of risk. Major powers must engage in retrenchment 
from regional nuclear disputes. When the major power has a lesser stake in the outcomes of 
such disputes, there is less for the regional nuclear-armed state to bargain with. This, of course, 
comes with the risk that, absent an external constraining force, regional nuclear conflicts will 
escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange. Had the US not been there to talk Pakistan and India 
back from the brink in 1999, for example, could Kargil have escalated into a nuclear 
exchange?523 Whilst an inherent risk of such a policy of retrenchment, there is also a reason to 
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believe that, over time, as protégé proliferators recognise their patrons’ decreased willingness 
to intercede on their behalf, they will engage in less nuclear aggression aimed at an activist 
international audience. One could argue, for example, that Pakistan would not have initiated 
the Kargil War in the first place if it was not convinced that the US would intercede on its 
behalf as: (a) Pakistan would not have the leverage to reap favourable diplomatic outcomes 
from the US given the latter’s indifference, reducing the overall utility of such an adventure; 
and (b) absent the constraining influence of the US, the risk of nuclear exchange with India 
would’ve been much higher. In other words, without a senior power to manage regional nuclear 
spats, nuclear aggression becomes less politically profitable and more dangerous, 
hypothetically pushing regional nuclear-armed states toward reduced foreign policy 
aggression. 
What’s more, such a policy of retrenchment from the US and others might reduce 
incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Catalytic deterrence was a 
central component of all three case study nuclear-armed states’ deterrent strategies. Without a 
senior power interested in intervening in a regional conflict – either to prevent a covert 
proliferator breaking opacity (as with Israel and South Africa) or prevent a nuclear exchange 
(as with Pakistan) – nuclear weapons lose their catalytic deterrent functionality, and therefore 
their overall utility, pushing the cost-benefit function of acquiring nuclear weapons toward 
abstinence. 
This study’s general support for the theory of offensive realism also provides some 
troubling implications for those with an interest in global peace. As US unipolarity rescinds 
and new states – principally the BRICS524 – rise to political prominence, according to the logic 
of offensive realism we would expect to see an increasing number of poles, with more cross-
cutting interests, competing with increasing intensity (i.e. relative to their growing influence) 
for power (a scarce resource).525 A forward-thinking US would use its current pre-eminent 
influence to put in place the structural checks against violent manifestations of such 
competition, both for its own future benefit and that of global peace. For example, the US might 
strengthen legal and normative frameworks against the use of international violence, 
principally through encouraging membership in international organisations, proposing pacifist 
policies to those international organisations, and strengthening international organisations’ 
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abilities to enforce such preferences. A second policy option would be to promote and 
strengthen the democratic qualities of the BRICS states such that the benefits of the democratic 
peace can be wrought when the incentives for conflict are likely to be at their highest (i.e. in 
multipolarity).526 
7.4 Opportunities for further research 
This study presents a number of opportunities for further research. First, and as stated above, 
this first-cut theory of nuclear weapons and foreign policy is useful in explaining general 
trends, not specific instances of nuclear weapons affecting foreign policy behaviours. This 
theory can be refined and imbued with greater theoretical precision by building upon it theories 
of nuclear weapons and foreign policy at lower levels of analysis. That is, theories that predict 
how variables at the national, organisational and individual levels lead to foreign policy 
outcomes in the context of an international system that generally pushes nuclear-armed states 
toward greater foreign policy aggression. 
Second, the results of this study could be supplemented with additional data points. As 
I concede above, offensive realism only modestly outperformed defensive realism, and more 
adjudicative data points (i.e. through empirical challenges of HOR and HDR) would be beneficial 
in strengthening inference and ultimately increasing confidence in the result. Such data points 
could be collected and assessed within the general framework of this study. For example: more 
nuclear-armed states could be taken through to in-depth case analysis as with Pakistan, South 
Africa and Israel; the scope of empirical analysis could be increased to greater than ten years 
either side of nuclear weapons acquisition (acknowledging the methodological challenges of 
such an approach as discussed in section 2.3.1);527 new nuclear-armed states could be evaluated 
within this research design as they emerge; and new foreign policy indicators re more or less 
aggression could be devised and measured across the universe of cases. On the last point, I note 
in particular the opportunity to refine Indicator 1 to focus not just on general measures of 
conventional military strength (i.e. tanks, combat aircraft and active service personnel), but 
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contention in the literature. For a primer see Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power 
Systems and International Stability,” World Politics 16, no. 3 (1964).  
527 One advantage of expanding the empirical scope of analysis to greater than the first ten years of 
nuclear weapons acquisition is that, as a state’s nuclear weapons capabilities develop over time, we 
might expect the theoretical effect of nuclear weapons on foreign policy to grow. In other words, as a 
state’s nuclear weapons capabilities become more robust, that state might become increasingly 
emboldened to pursue a new course in foreign policy (whether more or less aggressive), leading to 
larger observable treatment effects which enhance inference (see the discussion in section 4.3). 
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also on those military assets that more specifically demonstrate aggressive or pacific intent. 
For example, military assets such as aircraft carriers, forward military bases, and long-range 
and stealth bombers are optimised to project power. Thus, increases in such assets would more 
assuredly demonstrate aggressive and expansive intent (as per offensive realism) than 
comparable increases in general military assets whose functions are not limited to expansion. 
By the same token, declines in such assets would demonstrate a disinterest in expansion (as per 
defensive realism). 
Third, there is scope to apply this research design to states beyond those nine or so that 
have acquired nuclear weapons. There might be other nuclear arrangements and capabilities 
short of nuclear weapons acquisition that emulate the effect of the latter on foreign policies, 
such as hosting a third party’s nuclear weapons, being the beneficiary of extended nuclear 
deterrence, being in a mutual defence pact with a nuclear-armed state, or being able to rapidly 
develop one’s own nuclear arsenal (nuclear latency). If one could assess that such ‘lesser’ 
nuclear weapons capabilities have the same emboldening effects on foreign policies as nuclear 
weapons acquisition, one could apply the lessons and methods of this study to a much wider 
universe of cases. 
Fourth, there is an opportunity to investigate one of the curious outcomes of the 
quantitative analysis, being that pariah states are seemingly more likely to manifest nuclear 
weapons capabilities in their foreign policy (whether in pursuing more or less aggression). In 
section 6.2.2 I advance two hypotheses for this observation which might serve as a theoretical 
basis for such studies. The first is that pariah states have fewer options for self-help in the 
international system, meaning that the acquisition of any tool that modifies their strategic 
environment is likely to have an acute observable effect on their foreign policies. The second 
is that pariah states are typically less integrated into international regimes on behaviour, placing 
fewer restrictions on how they manifest their nuclear weapons capabilities in their foreign 
policies. 
Fifth, and related to the preceding point, there is an opportunity to investigate the strong 
performance of the null hypothesis in the quantitative analysis, especially with regards to the 
non-pariah states. Though I argue above that there were likely methodological pathologies 
biasing results toward H0, such as the exclusion of unit-level controls, the overwhelming 
performance of H0 for the non-pariah states (92%) warrants investigation on its own merits. 
That is, an examination not of what the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy are, but 
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why those effects aren’t. In section 6.2.1 I advance numerous avenues for investigating this 
question, such as the strictures of prestige considerations, morality, or the strategic incapacities 
of nuclear weapons. 
Sixth, collectively, the case studies found in favour of HOR over HDR, though there was 
a clear disaggregation between cases, with Pakistan and South Africa supporting HOR and Israel 
supporting HDR. This outcome invites unit-level theorising as to why Israeli foreign policy 
responded so differently to nuclear weapons acquisition than that of Pakistan or South Africa, 
despite all three sharing the general quality of being a pariah state. Such work could draw from 
existing theories of nuclear weapons and foreign policy (see section 2.1.1), or from the various 
unit-level variables identified in this study as influencing foreign policy outcomes in the three 
case study states. 
As a final and general recommendation, there is scope to engage in further research 
with respect to the neorealist foundations of this study. In this dissertation I have treated 
offensive and defensive realism as mutually exclusive theoretical frameworks. Applying such 
theories to the plasticity of the real world, however, opens up opportunities for syncretisation 
that stand to enhance their respective theoretical values and provide a more robust 
understanding of the relationship between system and outcomes. In the first instance, it is 
possible to envisage a state that both seeks a limited amount of security (defensive realist 
preferences) whilst demonstrating an insatiable desire for power (offensive realist policy). 
Zakaria and others have suggested that, as states expand in power, so too does their conception 
of minimal security: 
Most policy is explained as protecting – and often genuinely formulated to protect – the 
nation’s security; but the definition of security, of the interests that require protection, usually 
expands in tandem with a nation’s material resources. The definition of these interests is 
shaped by individual statesmen, by domestic politics, by the general values and culture of the 
society, but in the first instance by a state’s power.528 
Therefore, states can ostensibly adopt defensive realist preferences whilst persistently finding 
security-based rationales for aggression, pursuing a limited security ideal always slightly out 
of reach. This – along with the argued weaknesses of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing even an 
objectively defined conception of ‘minimal security’ (see sections 2.3.1 and 6.2) – might 
explain the persistence of, and indeed increase in foreign policy aggression by states that exist 
under the protections of nuclear deterrence. 
                                                 
528 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 184-87. 
Christopher J. Watterson 
177 
 
Moreover, there is an imperative to take a less dogmatic view of balancing and the risk 
that it poses to states. In defensive realism balancing tends to happen, and in offensive realism 
balancing tends not to happen, with such constraints socialising states to less or more foreign 
policy aggression, respectively. Given its determinacy in neorealist outcomes, there is a need 
to build an evidence base in support of claims of a general international tendency for or against 
balancing. Understanding, for example, that, faced with the choice, states will balance a rising 
power 20% of the time and not balance 80% of the time would be a boon for offensive realist 
theory and critically challenge defensive realist theory.  
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Appendix A. Content analysis methodology 
This study undertook content analysis to measure Pakistani efforts to attract international 
attention to the Kashmir territorial dispute over time. The data source for this content analysis 
was the Pakistan Horizon journal published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs 
from 1948–2008. From 1953 Pakistan Horizon published quarterly summaries of Pakistani 
foreign policy events and statements as the ‘Pakistan and the World’ series. The series included 
small, single-paragraph précis of Pakistani foreign policy events and statements ordered 
chronologically and aggregated by issue area. The précis, authored by journal staff, included 
the basic information of the referent event or statement, including key messages, actors and 
actions. For example: 
18 April 1992: Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif held a meeting with Peshawar based 
Mujahideen leaders to convince them that the implementation of the United Nations peace 
plan was essential to save Afghanistan from further bloodshed.529 
Content analysis of these précis was undertaken for the period 1 January 1980 (Pakistan 
Horizon, Vol. 33, No. 1/2) to 31 December 1999 (Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 53, No. 1). 
In utilising the Pakistan and the World dataset as a source for content analysis, some 
limitations must be acknowledged. Although the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs 
avows no direct link with any government or military agency, it is still likely to exhibit some 
bias, whether political or academic, in interpreting and reporting foreign policy events and 
statements. Therefore, the précis cannot be considered comprehensive indexations or 
descriptions of Pakistan’s foreign policy events or statements. Despite these limitations, the 
dataset remains a viable source for the purposes of this research as the standard of reporting, 
however imperfect, is consistent – therefore errors in measurement will be held constant across 
the scope of analysis. Thus, whilst such content analysis should not be considered an absolute 
quantification of foreign policy events or statements, it can still demonstrate relative change in 
Pakistani foreign policy practice. 
This content analysis quantifies Pakistani attempts to internationalise the Kashmir 
issue, with the ‘Kashmir issue’ referring to a final decision on the territorial sovereignty of 
Kashmir between the two primary claimants: Pakistan and India. Three categories of this 
foreign policy behaviour were adopted: 
                                                 
529 “Pakistan and the World (Chronology: April - June 1992),” Pakistan Horizon 45, no. 3 (1992): 97. 
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K1. General foreign policy statement on the need to resolve the Kashmir issue. 
K2. General foreign policy statement in support of a plebiscite, or the right to ‘self-
determination’ in resolving the Kashmir issue. 
K3. Requests for international involvement in the Kashmir issue. 
Individual précis were coded against these categories and aggregated by year. For a précis to 
have been considered viable for counting, they must have satisfied the conditions detailed in 
Table 15. 
Table 15. Conditions determining the viability of ‘Pakistan and the World’ foreign policy précis for counting in this 
content analysis exercise. 
Category Condition Examples Example viability 
K1; K2; 
K3 
The foreign policy statement/event, 
as summarised, must have been 
presented by a group or individual 
representing the Pakistani national 
government in an official capacity. 
Both decrees from Pakistani 
government officials, and joint 
statements acceded to by Pakistani 
government officials are included. 
12 June 1986: The President of 
Azad Kashmir, Sardar Abdul 
Qayyum Khan, said that… 
Not viable: not a 
statement from a 
Pakistani national 
government official. 
11 May 1988: Pakistan’s Interior 
Secretary, Mr. S.K. Mahmud, 
talking informally to newsmen, said 
that the Government of Pakistan 
has… 
Not viable: 
Pakistani national 
government official 
not speaking in a 
representative 
capacity. 
18 October 1983: Pakistan’s 
representative to the General 
Assembly’s Third Committee 
pledged his country’s support to… 
Viable. 
The foreign policy statement/event, 
as summarised, must have been a 
direct treatment of the Kashmir 
territorial dispute in its totality; that is, 
relating to the territorial sovereignty 
of the entire disputed region. 
6 June 1987: Addressing a public 
meeting in Gilgit, Prime Minister 
Junejo reaffirmed that Pakistan 
would do its best to resolve the 
Siachen Glacier issue with India in 
a peaceful manner. 
Not viable: relates 
only to the disputed 
status of the 
Siachen Glacier – 
one part of 
Kashmir. 
30 January 1992: Pakistan 
reiterated its resolve to remain 
deeply committed to seeking a 
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir 
problem. 
Viable. 
The foreign policy statement/event, 
as summarised, must include a direct 
reference to ‘Kashmir’. 
12 November 1983: Speaking in 
the Majlis-e-Shoorha, the Minister 
of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 
Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada said that 
India had no Locus standi with 
regard to the Northern Areas, and 
the statements by the Indian 
Government about the territory 
were unwarranted and without 
legal basis. 
Not viable: no 
direct mention of 
‘Kashmir’. 
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Category Condition Examples Example viability 
30 January 1992: Pakistan 
reiterated its resolve to remain 
deeply committed to seeking a 
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir 
problem ... 
Viable. 
K1 General foreign policy statement on 
the need to resolve the Kashmir 
issue 
30 January 1992: “Pakistan 
reiterated its resolve to remain 
deeply committed to seeking a 
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir 
problem...” 
Viable. 
K2 General foreign policy statement in 
support of a plebiscite, or the right to 
‘self-determination’ in resolving the 
Kashmir issue 
8 February 1992: “Reaffirming 
Pakistan’s commitment to the 
cause of self-determination for the 
people of Kashmir…” 
Viable. 
K3 The foreign policy statement/event, 
as summarised, must involve a 
request for international involvement 
in the Kashmir issue. The request 
must include an actionable 
instruction. 
21 January 1995: Foreign Minister 
Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, 
addressing the opening ceremony 
of the fifth meeting of the ECO 
Council of Ministers in Ashkhabad, 
said that regional countries could 
not remain indifferent to the 
sufferings of the people of 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan 
and Kashmir… 
Not viable: doesn’t 
include an 
actionable 
instruction. 
12 February 1992: Prime Minister 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif strongly 
urged the international community 
to force India to resolve the 
Kashmir dispute and bring to an 
end the untold sufferings of the 
Kashmiri people. 
Viable 
 
Results 
K1 – 1980: 23-Jul, 6-Oct, 15-Oct. 1981: 18-Jan, 2-Oct. 1982: 1-Feb. 1983: 18-Oct. 1984: 16-Oct. 1985: 16-Jul. 
1986: 5-Mar, 3-Aug. 1987: 25-Jan, 20-Jul, 28-Sep, 14-Oct. 1988: 17-Oct, 3-Dec. 1989: 17-Jul, 17-Oct. 1990: 4-
Jan, 12-Feb, 26-Feb, 23-Mar, 11-Apr, 18-Apr, 19-Jul, 29-Jul, 4-Aug, 12-Aug, 28-Sep. 1991: 20-Apr, 4-Jun, 7-Jul, 
6-Sep, 12-Sep, 30-Sep, 1-Nov, 10-Nov, 12-Nov, 13-Nov, 9-Dec, 10-Dec. 1992: 15-Jan, 15-Jan, 30-Jan, 12-Feb, 
17-Feb, 4-Apr, 22-Apr, 1-Jul, 1-Jul, 3-Jul, 10-Jul, 20-Jul, 15-Aug, 1-Sep, 2-Sep, 2-Sep, 22-Sep, 23-Sep, 30-Sep, 
11-Oct, 7-Nov, 12-Dec. 1993: 12-Mar, 10-Apr, 16-Apr, 25-Apr, 6-Jul, 15-Jul, 28-Jul, 18-Sep, 18-Sep, 25-Sep, 30-
Sep, 2-Oct, 12-Nov, 17-Nov, 24-Nov, 10-Dec. 1994: 18-Feb, 2-Mar, 28-Mar, 28-Mar, 1-Jun, 19-Jul, 10-Aug, 12-
Aug, 7-Sep, 9-Sep, 25-Oct, 2-Nov, 3-Nov, 4-Nov, 19-Nov, 20-Nov, 22-Nov, 24-Nov. 1995: 12-Apr, 28-Apr, 17-May, 
28-Jun, 6-Jul, 27-Sep, 2-Oct, 8-Oct, 8-Oct, 17-Oct, 19-Oct, 10-Nov. 1996: 14-Jan, 3-Feb, 4-Feb, 5-Feb, 7-Mar, 18-
Mar, 10-Apr, 8-May, 16-May, 4-Jun, 7-Jun, 19-Jun, 13-Aug, 11-Sep, 19-Oct, 13-Dec. 1997: 4-Feb, 5-Feb, 14-Feb, 
17-Feb, 13-Mar, 14-Mar, 23-Mar, 25-Mar, 8-Apr, 28-Apr, 7-May, 11-May, 13-May, 15-May, 23-Jun, 26-Jul, 18-Aug, 
26-Aug, 9-Sep, 22-Sep, 25-Sep, 18-Oct, 24-Oct, 26-Oct, 8-Nov, 20-Dec, 27-Dec. 1998: 20-Mar, 21-Mar, 26-Mar, 
28-Mar, 30-May, 30-May, 6-Jun, 7-Jun, 10-Jun, 10-Jun, 13-Jun, 23-Jun, 23-Jun, 8-Jul, 1-Aug, 2-Aug, 4-Aug, 12-
Aug, 25-Aug, 3-Sep, 18-Oct, 2-Dec, 23-Dec, 27-Dec. 1999: 4-Feb, 5-Feb, 21-Feb, 1-Mar, 11-Mar, 9-May, 28-May, 
14-Jun, 18-Jun, 19-Jun, 6-Jul, 7-Jul, 20-Jul, 31-Aug, 25-Sep, 29-Sep, 29-Oct, 4-Nov, 18-Dec, 20-Dec. 
K2 – 1985: 25-Oct. 1986: 20-Sep. 1989: 17-Oct. 1990: 12-Feb, 26-Feb, 13-Mar, 14-Mar, 7-Apr, 24-Apr, 26-Apr, 
29-Jul, 28-Sep, 5-Oct. 1991: 7-Feb, 26-Feb, 22-May, 12-Sep, 17-Oct, 27-Nov, 9-Dec. 1992: 17-Feb, 26-Feb, 3-Jul, 
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22-Sep, 30-Sep, 12-Dec. 1993: 25-Apr, 6-Jul, 26-Aug, 22-Sep, 27-Sep, 15-Oct, 1-Nov. 1994: 1-Jul, 19-Aug, 2-Nov, 
3-Nov, 22-Nov. 1995: 28-Apr, 17-May, 24-Oct. 1996: 28-Mar, 10-Apr. 1997: 23-Mar, 31-Mar, 26-Sep, 11-Dec. 
1998: 3-Sep, 30-Dec. 1999: 31-Aug. 
K3 – 1990: 26-Feb, 7-Apr, 24-Apr, 28-Sep. 1991: 20-Apr, 22-May, 12-Sep, 1-Nov, 27-Nov, 10-Dec. 1992: 15-Jan, 
12-Feb, 3-Jul, 20-Jul, 2-Sep, 2-Sep, 22-Sep. 1993: 12-Mar, 10-Apr, 25-Apr, 6-Jul, 15-Jul, 28-Jul, 18-Sep, 27-Sep, 
30-Sep, 2-Oct. 1994: 15-Jan, 1-Jun, 1-Jul, 19-Jul, 12-Aug, 19-Aug, 7-Sep, 2-Nov, 4-Nov, 22-Nov. 1995: 27-Sep, 
2-Oct, 8-Oct, 19-Oct, 24-Oct. 1996: 3-Feb, 29-Oct, 1-Dec. 1997: 26-Sep, 26-Oct. 1998: 30-May, 6-Jun, 13-Jun, 23-
Jun, 2-Aug, 25-Sep, 23-Dec, 27-Dec. 1999: 18-Jun, 29-Oct. 
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